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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Organizations are pervasive in contemporary society. Few aspects 
of living, apart from private thoughts or rare spontaneous interac­
tions, are nonorganizational. Even our private thinking and individ­
ual interactions are often indirectly impacted by organizations (Hall, 
1977)• Organizations provide the means whereby individuals collec­
tively accomplish ends that cannot be attained by persons acting alone. 
No one would deny the enormous benefits that accrue to society because 
of organizations. 
Power is a crucial dynamic for organizations if they are to ac­
complish collective interests. While the study of organizations and 
their relations has become a major area of sociology, the study of or­
ganizational power relations has received too little attention until 
recent years. There is need to understand the process of organiza­
tional power as a social phenomenon that is both advantageous and omi­
nous for societies. 
The general objective of this dissertation is to enhance the un­
derstanding of organizational power by constructing a formal theory of 
power as a process characterizing the relations among organizations. 
Chapter I will include: (l) the statement of the problem, (2) a dis­
cussion of the significance of the problem, and (3) the contributions 
of the thesis to the study of interorganizational relations and more 
2 
generally to the study of social organization. 
The Study Problem 
The construction of a formal theoiy of organizational power, as 
a property of relations among organizations, is one means by which ex­
planation and understanding of the power process and the antecedents 
and consequences of organizational power can be increased. The proc­
ess of organizational power, like the process of social power general­
ly, is one of the least understood processes of social organization 
(Olsen, 1978). 
Social power is a process that characterizes relationships among 
actors (Olsen, 1978). Actors can be individuals or social collectivi­
ties, but actors do not possess power in isolation (Olsen, 1978). So­
cial power exists only as actors enter relations with other actors. 
For this exercise the actors of interest are organizations. Organiza­
tional power is viewed as the ability of organizational actor A to con­
trol and convert resources for its outcomes of interest relative to 
the ability of organizational actor 3 to control and convert resources 
for its outcomes of interest. 
One reason for the lack of understanding of the social power proc­
ess may be that power, while conceived as a process, has not been ex­
plicated so that the component elements of the process can be examined 
and the relationships among elements analyzed. The multidimensionality 
of power as a social process has not been delineated. The concept of 
power suffers numerous ambiguities regarding its meaning, and is a 
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concept that must be measured indirectly. The result is an inability 
to select valid measures for empirical study. While there is a grow­
ing body of literature containing statements and propositions relating 
power to other relevant concepts, a formal theory of social power that 
is testable is yet to appear. 
The problem for this dissertation is to develop a formal theory 
of the process of organizational power. Application of the criteria 
of formal theory construction will be used to explicate the process of 
organizational power, develop propositions regarding the process of 
power and organize the propositions into an interrelated set that can 
be subjected to empirical test. The specific objectives of the study 
are to: 
(1) elaborate a conceptual definition of the concept of organizational 
power as a multidimensional process of relations among organiza­
tional actors, 
(2) explicate the dimensions of the process of organizational power 
and develop theoretical and operational definitions of the con­
cepts central to each dimension, 
{5) develop propositions linking concepts of the dimensions of the 
power process with clarification of theoretical and operational 
linkages, 
(4) order the theoretical propositions into an interrelated set by se­
lecting some statements as premises or assumptions and arranging 
the remainder into a model of causal relationships, 
(5) identify specific indicators for the concepts contained in the 
4 
causal model, 
(6) empirically evaluate the causal model, and 
(7) assess the exercise of theory construction and evaluate the for­
mal theory in terms of the contributions to the understanding of 
the process of organizational power. 
The study of power in interorganizational relations 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of 
interorganizational relations focusing on the process of organiza­
tional power as a pervasive feature. Interorganizational analyses 
have become more frequent in recent years. And the prominence of or­
ganizational actors that wield extensive power has been noted (Cole­
man, 1974)* The process of social organization not only includes the 
emergence of collectivities of individuals as actors but also the 
structuring of relationships among collective actors as additional 
phenomena that have implications for modern social life. This continu­
ing process of emergence can be seen in the variety of interconnected 
organizations that impact the lives of individuals. Networks of or­
ganizations that have increasing scope make it ever more difficult for 
individuals to understand or control the influence they have on their 
lives. This is apparent for public organizations where bureaucratic 
norms of administrative efficiency have pressed for interconnectedness 
as well as for private organizations where cartels are formed to gain 
an advantage in market competition. Clearly, interor^ nizational net­
works and power relations are significant phenomena in modem society 
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(Hall, 1977). 
There has been a paucity of attempts to analyze the process of 
power that include all its ramifications for interorganizational re­
lations. One reason may be that there are basically two different 
theoretical orientations to the study of power. These two approaches 
are linked with two dominant sociological paradigms - coercion and 
consensus (Dahrendorf, 1959). Organizational sociologists have tended 
to emphasize an integration or consensus approach to the study of or­
ganizations, stressing the ways organizations seek to maintain equi­
librium while attempting to achieve their goals. In this approach sim­
ilarities among actors are emphasized which give rise to consensus. 
Power is generated by actors' investments in shared common values 
(Parsons, I96)). This approach has tended to cause a bias toward 
study of intraorganizational power. 
The coercion (conflict) perspective stresses differences among 
actors in interests, values and resources which result in mutual de­
pendencies. "Power resides in the mutual dependency which occurs in 
all social relationships" (Emerson, 1962). This view of power has re­
ceived limited attention by organizational sociologists until recent 
years. But it holds potential for an expanded interest in studies of 
interorganizational power relations. The emphasis to date has been on 
adaptation to environmental dependencies rather than on how organiza­
tions gain power or dominance to control environmental contingencies. 
While these two views of power offer contrasting approaches for 
analysis of the power process, they are not logically incompatible 
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(Olsen, 1978). This exercise includes elements of both approaches in 
the conceptualization and explication of the process of organizational 
power. 
Units of interorganizational analysis 
A number of different units of analysis are employed at the inter-
organizational level including the interorganizational field, the or­
ganization set or network, the organizational dyad and the relations 
of a single organization with the aggregate of organizations in its set. 
The most comprehensive unit that has been described is the organiza­
tional field (Warren, et al., 1964; Rogers, 1974^ )* An or^ mizational 
field includes the total structured interactions of organizations that 
have a character distinct from those of any single organization or sub­
set of the field. Field structures form a context for organizations 
ftnri are important environmental considerations for their activities 
(Emery and Trist, 1965; Terryberry, 1968; Turk, 1975). 
Evan (1966) advanced the notion of the organization set as a unit 
of interorganizational analysis. An organization set for a single or­
ganization is the network of interactions carried on by that organiza­
tion with other organizations in its environment. Task environments 
often uctermxne the network of organizations withm a sst. Ths crgani= 
zation set also forms a context for the actions of organizations and 
the set's characteristics reflect the nature of the organization's en­
vironment. Aldrich (1976b) distinguishes the organization set from 
the organization network. In his terras an organization set refers 
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to those organizations with which a focal organization has direct 
links (Aldrich, 1976b). A network is defined as the totality of 
all the units connected by relationships of a particular type, 
Networks consist of all the ties connecting all the organi­
zations within the limits of specified boundaries. In this study, 
however, set and network are used interchangeably. Boundaries are de­
fined for the network of organizations considered and the remainder of 
organizations within these boundaries become the set of organizations 
for each focal organization. 
The organizational dyad is often considered the smallest unit of 
interorganizational analysis. Molnar (1976) argues that it offers 
several advantages for investigation. First, interorganizational be­
havior is most directly and fundamentally manifested between two or­
ganizations. Interactions and contacts in their simplest form occur 
between two organizational actors. Secondly, dyadic interactions form 
the basis for examination of emergent properties. Aggregated linkages 
between organizations, two at a time, form set or field properties 
that can be used as contextual variables (Rogers, 1974b). Finally, 
Molnar (1976) demonstrated the utility of the dyad for analyzing the 
relationship between comparative and relational properties of organi­
zations. 
The aggregate of relations of a single organization with other 
organizations in its set remains a useful unit for analysis of inter­
organizational relations. Here the focus of attention is on the inter­
organizational relations of individual organizations. While properties 
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of emergent units beyond the single collectivity cannot be addressed, 
there are advantages in maintaining the identity of the organization 
in order to explore its contacts with other organizations. Further­
more, in view of the lack of theoretical and methodological progress 
concerning higher order units, the relations of the single organiza­
tion may be the most advantageous unit to pursue at this time. This 
study will develop a formal theory of the process of power as a charac­
teristic of the aggregate of relations of single organizations with the 
other organizations comprising their networks. 
Formal theories 
While there is considerable agreement that formal theory con­
struction is essential for the progress of sociology, very few formal 
theories are extant in the literature.^  And, to date, a formal theory 
of organizational power relations has not been developed. There are 
many definitions of a theory and each imposes certain constraints upon 
2 
the process of theory construction (Sage, 1972). Most agree that a 
theory is a set of propositions or theoretical statements (Zetterberg, 
xne terms "model" (Abell, 1971; Dubin, 1969) and "system" (Dubin, 
1969) have been used interchangeably with theory. 
D^ifferent definitions of a theory are offered by Hage (1972), 
Zetterberg (196)), Gibbs (1972), Reynolds (l97l), Abell (l97l), Dubin 
(1969), Merton (1957), Romans (1964), Wallace (1971)» Sjoberg and Rett 
(1968), and Warren, et al. (1977). The definition used here incor­
porates elements from a number of these authors. 
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1963; Reynolds, 1971; Gibbs, 1972). However, each emphasizes some 
different criteria for a formal theory. A theory is defined in this 
thesis as a set of interrelated propositions, with assumptions expli­
citly stated, that describes, explains and predicts. A theory is 
stated formally and is testable. 
There are many modes of formal theory construction. Any one of 
which is no better than another if the objective of testability is re­
alized. But it is important that the theorist expose the particular 
mode used to public scrutiny, so that its merits in terms of meeting 
the objective of testability can be assessed (Gibbs, 1972). The mode 
of formal theory construction used here will include: (l) identifica­
tion of the purposes of a formal theory of organizational power, (2) 
delineation of the attributes of a formal theory of power and criteria 
for their development, and (5) presentation of criteria for assessing 
the formal theory of organizational power relations. 
Purpose of a formal theory The purpose of a formal theory is 
to facilitate the attainment of the goals of science-prediction and ex­
planation. Theories function to describe, explain and predict events. 
Explanation can be contrasted with description. Whereas descrip­
tion informs of "what", explanation informs of "why" (Kaplan, I969). 
Theoretical concepts describe, while explanation requires theoretical 
statements that link two or more concepts (Hage, 1972), Some descrip­
tions can explain by providing knowledge of prior or intervening events 
in a causal sequence, but explanation adds to description by clarify­
ing relevance and relationship. Reynolds (l97l) argues that a sense 
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of understanding is a function of a theory in addition to prediction 
and explanation and that it is "provided only when causal mechanisms 
that link changes in one or more concepts (the independent variables) 
with changes in other concepts (the dependent variables) have been 
fully described." The advantages for explanation and understanding 
provided by organizing events as parts of a whole (pattern) and of ri­
gor and precision of the relation between premises and the conclusion 
(deduction) are considered essential for theory building and testing 
(Kaplan, I969). The view here is that explanation encompasses under­
standing which is accomplished when causal mechanisms linking concepts 
are fully described. Thus, the aim of this study is to explicate the 
causal linkages among dimensions of the process of organizational 
power in order to achieve an explanatory theory. 
Prediction adds credibility to the premises and conclusions of a 
theory (Kaplan, 1969). Yet it is often the case that we have predic­
tion without explanation and explanation without prediction. Knowl­
edge of the %hole and some parts doss not always allow prediction of 
other parts. While a pattern may provide explanation, a range of pos­
sibilities exist that are only understood after the facto Likewise, 
in a deductive model we may explain throu^  delineation of necessary 
conditions, but fail to detail the sufficient conditions required for 
prediction. Conversely, we can often accurately forecast facts from 
other facts without achieving understanding of why the relationship 
exists, its specific form or intervening conditions. 
Accurate sociological explanation and prediction is not a possi­
bility with single bivariate or even multivariate statements of 
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relationship (Hage, 1972). Systematically organized and testable sets 
of statements or equations are needed to arrive at satisfactory expla­
nation and prediction. This dissertation will develop a set of inter­
related propositions to describe, explain and predict the process of 
organizational power. 
The attributes of a formal theory It is important that an exer­
cise to construct a formal theory include the theorist's claims regard­
ing the attributes of a formal theory. These attributes can then be 
used as criteria by the theorist and others to assess the process of 
theory construction. If the theorist states his criteria, a better op­
portunity for consensus is also provided. 
The attributes of a formal theory that will be used to construct 
the theory of organizational power were selected from a number of sources 
(Hage, 1972; Reynolds, 1971; Wallace, 1971; Gibbs, 1972; Dubin, 
1969; Zetterberg, 1965; Warren, et al., 1977) and include: (l) level 
of abstraction, (2)  unit of analysis, (3) concepts, (4)  statements, (5)  
theoretical and operational linkages, and (6) ordered and interrelated 
statements. The remainder of this section discusses each attribute 
and its role in the construction of a formal theory of organizational 
5 power relations. 
The language of formal theory construction is complex and diverse. 
Terms are used that often have overlapping meanings. Synonymous terms 
also exist for the same meaning of a single term may be used by differ­
ent authors with different meanings. The reader is cautioned to confine 
terms and their meanings to the definitions provided. 
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Level of abstraction Reynolds (1971) suggests that there 
are three characteristics that are desirable of scientific knowledge: 
(1) abstractness, (2) intersubjectivity, and (5) empirical relevance. 
Level of abstraction refers to the relative freedom from location in 
time and space and the degree of scope or generality of concepts and 
units included in a theory. The more abstract a concept is the more it 
is free of being fixed at a specific time and place and the more cover­
age of meaning it possesses. A nonabstract or empirical concept is 
concrete or specific to a particular time and place and covers a very 
narrow range of meaning. Organizational power is a hi^ ly abstract 
construct. As such, power relations of organizations have resisted ef­
forts to develop a theoretical definition that has useful generality 
and that at the same time allows development of empirical indicators. 
Intersubjectivity and empirical relevance have not been characteristic 
of knowledge about organizational power. This problem is discussed at 
some length in Chapter II. For that reason it is only noted in passing 
at this point that there is little consensus regarding conceptions of 
social and organizational power. Competing conceptions have left a leg­
acy of vagueness and ambiguity, hardly the conditions needed for inter­
subjectivity and empirical relevance. 
The process of theory construction reyuires that the ubeorigt work 
almost simultaneously at different levels of abstraction. The aim of 
this study is to bring the conceptual (highly abstract) and empirical 
(nonabstract) worlds of organizational power together in a manner that 
corrects some of the problems noted in Chapter II. The process used 
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to construct the theory of organizational power thus includes both ab­
stract and empirical levels of analysis (Gibbs, 1972; Hage, 1972). 
Thus, the total process of theory construction will entail move­
ment in both directions with the ultimate aim of constructing a theory 
of organizational power with concepts that have as much scope and gen­
erality as possible and that are also measureable at the empirical lev­
el, allowing a test of the propositions and theoiy. The degree of in­
tersubjective agreement at both the conceptual and empirical levels 
will ultimately determine the theory's adequacy as a contributor to 
scientific knowledge. 
However, the premature search for a single hi^ ly abstract general 
theory to explain all sociological facts and relationships has been 
criticized (Herton, 1957)» Merton argues for "theories of the middle 
range," These theories are formulated at a middle range of abstrac­
tion, contain concepts that are clearly defined and operationalized 
which are included in statements of relationship for phenomena of less 
scope and generality than the grand theories. Middle range theories 
are abstract but the relationship of the concepts contained within them 
with their empirical indicators are clearly specified. In Merton's 
(1957) view a focus on testable theories that embrace phenomena of lim­
ited scope and generality can eventually result in their integration 
into more abstract and general theories. For this theory construction 
exercise movement across levels of abstraction will be disciplined by 
the belief that at this point in time a theory of power at a middle 
range of abstractness is most advantageous. 
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Unit of analysis Theories are built to describe proper­
ties of things rather than the things themselves (Dubin, I969), These 
things, which have descriptive properties, are ordinarily called units 
of analysis or analytical units. The construction of a formal theory 
that is testable requires that the unit of analysis be defined consis­
tently at the theoretical and operational levels (Gibbs, 1972; Hage, 
1972). The unit of analysis of the theory developed here is the rela­
tions of organizations in a network. In succeeding chapters consistent 
theoretical and operational definitions of the analytical unit are pre­
sented to facilitate testing. 
Concepts Theories are constructed most fundamentally from 
concepts as basic elements. In general, concepts point to or denote 
phenomena of interest, "ideas" or "notions". The names of concepts 
serve as symbols for which meanings are shared. It is throu^  the use 
of concepts (meanings linked to symbols) that we are able to communi­
cate ideas and describe phenomena of interest. Thus a concept includes 
a name or term, a theoretical definition and an operational definition 
(Hage, 1972). 
Concepts are units of thought smaller than propositions and the­
ories. Concepts are linked together to form propositions. Proposi­
tions are interrelated to form theories. Oonoepts oan be thought of as 
valid or invalid, applicable or inapplicable, useful or useless. Propo­
sitions or theories are thought of as true or false, verified or falsi­
fied. 
The most efficient way to start the construction of a theory is 
with theoretical concepts that characterize the phenomena of interest 
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(Hage, 1972; Reynolds, 1971). Thus, Chapter II begins with an explication 
of the power construct whereby concepts that comprise the power process 
are labelled and theoretically defined. 
Concepts can be more or less abstract and they can be of two types; 
variable and nonvariable. Variable concepts characterize dimensions of 
phenomena (Hage, 1972). Nonvariable concepts are sources of variable con­
cepts and are useful for labelling units of analysis. However, variable 
concepts are more crucial for theory building because they represent con­
tinua, are general, are more precise and provide more information about 
phenomena. Concepts that comprise the power process will be conceived as 
variables in order to move to the development of statements or proposi­
tions about the variation of organizations regarding the process of power. 
Whether or not the concept is variable or nonvariable, multidimensional 
or unidimensional and the level of measurement will be explicated at the 
theoretical level so that relationships among concepts can be accurately 
proposed and empirical indicators found that validly represent the con­
cepts for measurement and testing of relationships. 
Statements Theoretical statements connect two or more 
theoretical concepts (Hage, 1972). Just as there are different kinds 
of theoretical concepts there are also different types of theoretical 
statements. And there are a number of names used for theoretical 
statements; i.e., proposition, axiom, theorem, hypothesis, assumption, 
premise, corollary. 
Theoretical statements are a necessary element of a theory because 
they make it possible to move from the description provided by 
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theoretical concepts to explanation and prediction provided by state­
ments of relationship between two or more concepts. 
Concepts can be linked in various ways and it is the types of 
linkages in theoretical statements that have implications for theory 
building. Linkages can be continuous or discrete. Discrete linkages 
result in either-or type theoretical statements which are ordinarily 
used for logical premises or assumptions. Continuous linkages result 
in theoretical statements that permit mathematical manipulations ; i.e., 
addition, subtraction, multiplication, and concepts can be connected 
with constants, powers and coefficients (Hage, 1972). These mathemati­
cal manipulations or forms of connections are not possible when link­
ages are discrete. The statement, "Power is a characteristic of the 
relations among organizations," contains a discrete linkage. "The 
greater the power advantage an organization has in its interorganiza-
tional relations, the less its environmental uncertainty," is an ex­
ample of a theoretical statement that contains a continuous linkage. 
Progress in the construction of theories that contain theoretical 
propositions of sufficient complexity to validly reflect real world so­
cial phenomena depends primarily on theoretical statements with contin­
uous linkages. Continuous theoretical statements have several advan­
tages to this end. They are more precise, contain more information and 
are more complex. Continuous linkages provide information about change 
in one or more variables associated with change in others. Except for 
the statement of assumptions continuous statements will be developed in 
this study in order to more accurately map the complexity of the process 
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of organizational power. 
Theoretical and operational definitions Theoretical con­
cepts are composed of three parts: a name, a theoretical definition and 
an operational definition (Hage, 1972). Theoretical definitions speci­
fy the meaning of a theoretical concept. Operational definitions set 
forth the procedures to measure the concept. Once theoretical state­
ments are formed with continuous linkages among variable concepts, the 
focus of concern becomes one of clarifying the meaning of the concepts 
and specifying the empirical indicators that represent the theoretical 
meaning space. The quality of the relationship among concepts or idea­
tions of real world properties, empirical indicators or measures of 
these properties and the real world phenomena which both represent is 
the fundamental criterion for assessing the adequacy of theoretical and 
operational definitions. There must be a "good fit" among all three. 
In summary, theoretical and operational definitions of concepts 
comprising the process of power are essential for the development of a 
testable theory of organizational power. It is the aim of this dis­
sertation to provide both definitions for accurate meaning and measure­
ment. This dissertation will apply these criteria in Chapters II and 
IT to assure the empirical applicability of concepts, one necessary 
step in the construction of a testable theoiy (Gibbs, 1972). 
Theoretical and operational linkages The importance of 
locating theoretical continuous statements has been noted. However, 
verbal theoretical statements, whether they have discrete or continuous 
linkages among concepts, are relatively contentless until the precise 
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vay in which concepts are linked together is elaborated. This is ac­
complished by specifying theoretical and operational linkages. The 
theoretical linkage supplies reasons why concepts are linked a certain 
way and the operational linkage describes how they are linked (Hage, 
1972). 
Thus the construction of the formal theory of organizational 
power will focus on identifying and developing theoretical continuous 
statements with theoretical and operational linkages specified. Chap­
ter III contains the theoretical propositions and discussion of theoret­
ical linkages. Empirical hypotheses and the discussion of operational 
linkages are presented in Chapter IV, An attempt will be made to think 
through the nature of the relationship in sufficient detail to accu­
rately represent the relationship of interest. 
Ordering Statements In Chapter III theoretical state­
ments are ordered into an interrelated set to form a theory of 
organizational power. Assumptions are stated which contain 
the premises for the theory (Hage, 1972). Less general corol­
laries are derived, which together with the assumptions, describe, ex­
plain and predict the process of power relations. First, theoretical 
equations (statements and linkages) are developed and ordered. Second, 
less abstract statements containing operational concepts and linkages 
are developed and ordered consistent with the theoretical equations. 
The method of ordering or interrelating statements for this thesis 
is causal modeling. For this purpose it is useful to assume an under­
lying deterministic relation between variables (Abell, 1971). 
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Deterministic causal relations are asymmetric and transitive and the 
interrelated causal model is a linear recursive system. Furthermore, 
it is assumed that if A causes B, A is a sufficient condition for B 
within the context of initial conditions defined. 
Both causal and noncausal connections are assumed to occur in the 
real world. However, cause is considered a useful way of thinking 
about the process of organizational power relations to construct a 
theoretical model and to maintain consistency with empirical proposi­
tions to test the model. Abell's (1/71) notion of conditional 
cause is adopted. The concept of conditional cause includes a set of 
initial conditions for the causal connections. The conditional causal 
notion allows the investigator to avoid the trap of classical determi­
nism and to construct models more consistent with the complexity and 
voluntary nature of social phenomena. It is possible for behavior to 
be caused and remain intentional and voluntaristic. The key concern is 
the nature of the set of initial conditions. Cause, tied with alter­
native conditions, opens up alternatives of rational choice for beha­
vior, To show that action is caused, given one set of initial condi­
tions, does not mean that another action could not have been selected, 
given a different set of initial conditions. Specification of causal 
connections with a set of initial conditions actually eontribates to 
the rationality, rather than irrationality, of behavior. Consequences 
of specified alternatives are explicated which provide a greater number 
of choices for rational action. The view presented here is that, given 
a set of initial conditions, the process of power is a sequence of 
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causal relations among concepts included in the basis, exercise and man­
ifestations of power. Explication of these causal relations among the 
dimensions of the power process is reasoned to be a major improvement 
over approaches to analyses of power that ignore the complexity of or­
dered relationships comprising the power dynamic by lumping all as­
pects of its meaning in unidimensional conceptions. Traditional con­
ceptions of power as influence, reputation and decision-making illus­
trate the simplistic approach (Dahl, 1957» Hunter, 1955)» while later 
conceptions of power as a multidimensional process represent a move to­
ward a view of power as a process of causal relations (Olsen, 1978; 
Burt, 1977). 
Criteria for assessing the formal theory Several criteria will 
be used to assess the formal theory developed in the remaining chap­
ters. All are encompassed by Gibbs' (1972) notion of predictive power 
as the ultimate criterion for assessing a theory. The criteria are: 
(l) testability, (2) parsimony, (3) scope, (4) accuracy of prediction, 
and (5) accuracy of explanation. 
Testability refers to the extent a formal theory has been pre= 
pared to allow its subjection to empirical observation and analysis. 
Has the theorist presented a theory that is empirically applicable? 
Can it be tested with reasonable effort? Potential testability can be 
assessed by noting the adequacy with which each attribute of the theory 
is developed. But the ultimate criterion will be the number of actual 
tests of the theory that are conducted in eemparisoa to some other the­
ory (Gibbs, 1972). 
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Parsimony refers to the number of assumptions that are made in 
the development of theoretical statements. A theory that makes few 
assumptions is a powerful theory. Parsimony entails maximum explana­
tion with minimal assumptions and conceptual unknowns (Hage, 1972). 
Scope measures the range, generality or informative value of a 
theory (Hage, 1972; Reynolds, 1971; Gibbs, 1972). A theory that can 
embrace a large number of issues and problematics of a discipline is a 
theory of large scope. The theory developed in this exercise is one 
of the middle range (Merton, 1957)* Consequently, it will address a 
limited number of issues. It is expected to be of medium scope. 
Sociological theories that predict accurately are likely to be 
very rare until sets of equations and extremely complex multivariate 
propositions are available for testing. Yet accuracy of prediction is 
an objective of theory development and can be increased by more ade­
quate conceptualization of concepts and linkages and the development of 
epistemically correlated measures and analysis procedures. Accuracy of 
prediction is an important criterion for assessing a formal theory 
(Hage, 1972; Wallace, 1971). 
Accuracy of explanation is the validity or truth of a theory. The 
adequacy of theoretical premises and linkages among concepts along with 
empirical tests of relationships will do most to provide understanding 
of how and why events occur in a particular sequence. The aim of this 
study is to construct a theory of organizational power that explains 
and which can be tested to assess its validity or resistance to refu­
tation (Hage, 1972). 
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Significance of the Problem 
Organizations have become increasingly useful to society, but they 
have also grown in size, complexity and interconnectedness. And they 
have been accorded a legal status akin to that provided the individual 
citizen with corresponding ri^ ts and responsibilities (Coleman, 1974)• 
As a result, organizations have become significant actors in power proc­
esses which affect social control, social change and resistance to so­
cial change. 
Certainly organizations will continue to grow and become more 
dense and interrelated. Broadened patterns of organization will con­
tinue to emerge from these relationships to impact other units of so­
cial life. Some scholars hold the pessimistic view that as this occurs, 
organizations and their interrelationships will totally dominate socie­
tal aud intersocietal life, subordinating individual needs and desires 
to the detriment of quality life (Perrow, 1972; Sail, 1977)* 
Power is viewed as a core dynamic in social ordering and organiza­
tion, Neither are possible without power (Bierstedt, 1950). Power 
processes are inherent in all organized social life (lawley, 1965). 
Thus power processes influence the emergence of all units of social or­
ganization. The primary significance of the research problem is the 
need to explicate the process of organizational power in order to under­
stand its role in the emergence of interorganizational relationships. 
The specific intent is to elaborate the process whereby organizations 
attempt to manipulate their power relations in order to control the 
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threats posed by uncertain environments. The influence of power in 
interorganizational relations nor the emergence of new relations of 
power cannot be understood unless the power process itself is analyzed. 
Antecedents and consequences of the power process also cannot be ex­
plored that have implications for the internal structuring of organi­
zations. Likewise, explanation of the consequences of distributions of 
organizational power require understanding of the process of power. 
The problem, therefore, involves developoent of a formal theory that 
explicates the bases, exercise and manifestations of the process of or­
ganizational power. 
While traditional sociology has been strongly oriented toward the­
ory, there has been a paucity of interest in formal theory construc­
tion (Gibbs, 1972). Formal theory construction has been criticized as 
not improving substantive significance, for generating propositions 
that have little substantive significance, and for not insuring empiri­
cal applicability. However, formalization surely cannot in itself make 
a theory insignificant. And lack of substantive worth should be more 
quickly revealed when subjected to the criteria of a formal theory con­
struction process. Formal theory construction requires that concepts 
and relationships be specified so that accurate measurement and test­
ing can be accomplished. Theories that are not stated formally are 
likely to remain untested because they are allowed to contain ambiguous 
concepts with measurement procedures unspecified. Existing theoretical 
and empirical analyses of power unquestionably illustrate this asser­
tion. The formalization of a theory of organizational power with sys­
tematic ordering of statements that are phrased in a way that invites 
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empirical refutation, should enhance testing and explanation of organi­
zational power relations. A further significance of the dissertation 
problem is the need to develop a formal sociological theory of organi­
zational power relations. 
Contributions of the Thesis 
The main contributions of the thesis are summarized. First, a for­
mal theory of organizational power is constructed. While many suggest 
that formal theories are needed, few examples are extant in the litera­
ture. To the writer's knowledge no formal theory of organizational 
power exists. It seems apparent that progress in the study of organiza­
tional power awaits efforts directed at organizing concepts and propo­
sitions describing the power process into an interrelated set that can 
be subjected to empirical test. The relationship of the process of 
power to other aspects of social organization cannot be examined until 
the power process itself is analyzed. This thesis contributes to the 
study of organizational power by applying techniques of formal theory 
construction to develop a theory of the process of organizational power. 
Second, previous approaches and conceptualizations of social power 
and organizational power, specifically, are reviewed. Views of power 
are assessed and integrated into a cortosptualization of organizational 
power as a process. The theoretical synthesis should add to an ability 
to explain organizational power process. The process of organizational 
power is viewed as a manifestation of the process of social organiza­
tion, a view of power process that has received little attention in 
25 
recent years (Olsen, 1978)• 
Third, organizational power is conceptualized as a multidimensional 
process. The meaning of power has been vague and has tended to have no 
meaning apart from the meaning of social organization. Its meaning as 
a process which contributes to all social phenomena has not been de­
scribed. Furthermore, power is a highly abstract concept that cannot 
be measured directly. Hence measurement of social power has been prob­
lematical. The approach to conceptualization used in this exercise pro­
vides better specification of the meaning of organizational power. The 
thesis will present operational procedures to guide the selection of em­
pirical measures which reflects the better specification of meaning of 
the process of power. Explication of the multidimensional nature of 
power will also allow assessment of a multiple indicator approach to 
measurement. 
The view of organizational power, as a process and an abstract 
construct, argues that power is best reflected in a multidimensional 
causal measurement model or theory. This approach is intended to con­
tribute concepts and measures of the power process which are needed to 
advance the development of theory. Furthermore, a multiple indicator 
approach to measurement of the power process is advocated and illus­
trated as an approach that has important advantages for efforts to cap­
ture the multidimensional scope of highly abstract concepts in empiri­
cal analysis. 
Fourth, propositions (statements) linking variables (concepts) in­
cluded in the dimensions of the power process are developed. Theoreti­
cal and operational specification of the li%&:ing relationships of the 
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variable concepts are described. This thesis will contribute to the 
clarification of the character of linkages among concepts, theoretical 
and operational, so that appropriate tests of the theory can be performed. 
Finally, the thesis contributes a causal interpretation of inter-
organizational power relations to explain the interaction strategies 
that organizations select to gain a power advantage or balance power-
dependence relations with other organizations in attempts to control 
environmental uncertainty. This is an important contribution to under­
standing how organizations gain or lose power in a network and to under­
standing the role of power relations in shaping the nature of interor-
ganizational interactions. The thesis specifically seeks to clarify 
the circumstances of power relations that determine the selection of 
cooperative versus conflicting interactions by organizations in a net­
work. 
Outline of remaining chapters 
The concepts of social power and organizational power are explored 
in Chapter II. A theoretical definition of organizational power is pre­
sented as a property of an organization's relations. Theoretical defi­
nitions of other properties of organizational relations that are expli­
cated as the process of organizational power are also presented^  
Theoretical statements are developed to explain the process of or­
ganizational power in Chapter III, Assumptions for the formal theory 
are stated and continuous statements are deduced. Finally, the theoret­
ical linkages of all the statements are discussed and concepts are re­
lated in a causal sequence to form an interrelated set of explanatory 
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statements. 
Chapter 17 is devoted to the development of operational definitions 
of the concepts to guide the selection of empirical indicators. Assump­
tions for measurement of the concepts are described and major measure­
ment issues and problems are discussed. 
Operational linkages are clarified and the appropriate methods of 
analysis are also described in Chapter IV. The results of the analysis 
are reported in Chapter V. Implications and a summary of the dissertation 
are presented in the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER II. THEOREPICAL DEFINITIONS 
OF MAJOR CONCEPTS 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the concepts which are used to construct the 
theory of the process of organizational power. The focus of the chap­
ter is on establishing the meaning of concepts through the development 
of theoretical definitions. Relevant literature is discussed as the 
concepts are introduced and defined. First, organizations are defined 
conceptually. The discussion then turns to a review of approaches to 
conceptualization of social power. • Next organizational power is de­
fined theoretically. Organizational power is treated as a multidimen­
sional concept that cannot be directly measured. The process of organi­
zational power is broken into three dimensions - the basis, exercise 
and manifestations of power. Theoretical definitions of the dimensions 
of the power process are presented and less abstract concepts included 
in each dimension are analyzed. Figure 2.2 contains the dimensions of 
the power process and explication of concepts central to each dimension. 
References will be made to Figure 2.2 throughout the narrative so that 
the reader can better follow the theoretical elaboration of the power 
process. Finally, theoretical definitions of concepts subsumed by the 
basis, exercise and manifestations of organizational power are presented. 
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Organizations 
Organizations are distinguished conceptually from the broader term 
of social organization. Blau and Scott (1962) conceive of social or­
ganization as the "network of social relations and shared orientations 
... social structure and culture, respectively." Organizations are a 
part of this broad set of relationships and processes. Some have tried 
to distinguish organization from social organization by using terms 
such as complex organization, bureaucratic organization, large-scale 
organization and formal organization (Blau and Scott, I962). Because 
these defining terms can be misleading in that organizations can vary 
in size, complexity, degree of formalization and bureaucratization; the 
term organization is preferred for this study (Hall, 1977)• 
Etzioni (19^ 9) defines organizations as "social units deliberately 
constructed and reconstructed to seek specific goals," According to 
Etzioni, organizations are characterized by: (l) a division of labor, 
(2) a power center(s), and (3) substitution of personnel. Scott (1964) 
adds that organizations are "collectivities" established to pursue spe­
cific goals on a "more or less continuous basis with fixed boundaries, 
a normative order, authority ranks, a communication system and an in­
centive system vhich enables various types of participants to york to-^  
gether in the pursuit of common goals." 
For this study, organization refers to a collectivity that has a 
division of labor and systems of communications, coordination and au­
thority relations purposefully created to realize specific goals (Hall, 
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1977; Scott, 1964; Etzioni, 1964)* As such organizations are interaction 
systems that are relatively permanent, but are also semi open-systems 
that grow and change due to interactions with environmental elements 
(Hall, 1977; Haas and Draybeck, 1975). The definition distinguishes or­
ganizations as a unique unit of social organization. Small groups do 
not have formal relations of authority. Communities and societies are 
not purposefully organized to attain specific goals. 
Organizations are real actors or entities (Warriner, 1956). Or­
ganizations have characteristics of their own apart from individuals in 
them which in turn affect the behavior of individuals as well as organi­
zational decisions (Hall, 1977). Organizations have a life of their 
own that continues after individual members leave and are replaced 
(Durkheim, 1955). 
While this view of organizations includes elements of open-systems, 
resource dependency, exchange and political economic models, it empha­
sizes the effective, as opposed to adaptive responses of organizations' 
relations with their environments. 
Open systems perspective stresses the importance of the environ­
ment and is critical of traditional closed system models (Eatz and 
Kahn, I966). The model is an attempt to avoid a focus on organiza­
tional goals by examining the processes of inputs* throughputs and out­
puts that are true of all organizations and how they operate. The open-
systems perspective stresses that environmental factors affect organi­
zations from two directions. Inputs are received primarily from the 
environment and are processed as throughputs to become outputs. The 
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outputs are then sent back into the environment where they are con­
sumed, utilized and evaluated in the environment (Hall, 1977)* 
The natural-system model, which precedes and contains the roots 
of the open-systems perspective and largely corresponds to it, views 
the organization as a "natural whole" for which the realization of 
goals is but one of several needs to which the organization must at­
tend Gouldner, 1959)» One important need is survival which tends to 
subvert the importance of rational goal seeking. Organizational ac­
tions are viewed as relatively unplanned adaptive responses to envi­
ronmental uncertainties that threaten survival. 
Resource dependency, political economic and resource exchange mo­
dels are all generally subsumed by the open-systems approach (Aldrich, 
1976a&b; Benson, 1975» Cook, 1977; Levine and White, 196I). These models 
view organizations as rational, goal-seeking actors that interact and 
adapt to critical environmental contingencies in order to realize their 
goals. All view organizations as primarily adaptive, however, the re­
source dependency and political economic models focus on power as a 
critical factor in the organization's ability to deal with its environ­
ment. 
Organizations are conceptualized as semi-open systems which inter­
act with environmental elements (including other organizations) in order 
to acquire resources needed to achieve their goals for survival. Thomp­
son (1967) argues that environmental uncertainty is a major problem for 
interdependent organizations and that organizations interact to make ac­
quisition of resources as predictable as possible. Resource dependen­
cies become constraints or contingencies that the organization must deal 
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with rationally in order to maintain a power advantage or to avoid the 
power advantages of others. Organizations select strategies for adap­
tation to or control of environmental contingencies that will increase 
the certainty of their environments and thus make it easier for organi­
zations to act rationally for goal attainment. 
The conceptualization presented here recognizes that organiza­
tions are rational and goal-seeking and includes the important influ­
ences of environmental elements, particularly relations with other or­
ganizations, on organizational actions. Furthermore, the conceptuali­
zation stresses that organizations are not moved about helplessly by 
environmental contingencies. Rather, the argument is that, contrary to 
the prevailing view that organizations respond adaptively to their en­
vironments, organizations also respond effectively to environmental 
factors in order to shape or control them to their advantage (Metcalfe, 
1976; McNeil, 1978). This leads to an examination of interorganiza-
tional power relations. The central argument is that organizations 
seek to maintain as much power as possible relative to othes^  organisa­
tions in their immediate environments in order to reduce environmental 
uncertainty and that power relations is one factor that influences the 
strategies of interorganizational interaction that are selected to do 
so. 
The manipulation of power relations is seen as a way of managing 
environmental contingencies of interdependence. The more general view 
is that organizations select specific strategies depending upon their 
power relations in order to reduce environmental uncertainty. While 
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Thompson (1967) refers to cooperative strategies as means to gain power, 
the approach for this study broadens the conception of power as a proc­
ess that includes cooperation as one of several strategies that are 
used by organizations to gain or balance power relations to improve the 
certainty of their interorganizational environment. 
Social Power 
There is general agreement that social power is an important con­
cept for study of human organization (Mott, 1970; Olsen, 1970; Bier-
stedt, 1950). Yet few concepts seem to have so successfully eluded 
consensus regarding their meaning. Power remains one of the most dif­
ficult sociological concepts to define and measure (Duke, 1976). While 
most agree that power is some form of energr (Mott, 1970» Olsen, 1978) 
and stress that power is the ability to influence social action (Olsen, 
1970), the consensus seems to end there. Power is defined by some as 
an attribute of individuals (Goldhammer and Shils, 1939) by others as a 
property of a relation (Emerson, 1962; Dahl, 1957) and by others as a 
characteristic of social organization (Mott, 1970)* lAck of consensus 
re^ rding the nature of social power centers on such issues as; (l) the 
unit that power characterizes, (2) whether power is a capacity for ac­
tion or actual behavior, (3) the conceptual classification of power and 
other related concepts <= force, dominance, authority, attraction, con­
trol, and (4) whether power is symmetrical or asymmetrical, zero sum or 
nonzero sum, commodity or generalized capacity or situation specific. 
Â basic assumption in this thesis is that social power is a proc­
ess inherent in all social organization (Olsen, 1978)• Social power 
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is a property of relations among actors - individuals or organizations 
(Adams, 1975» Emerson, 1962). As such the process of social power is a 
highly abstract concept which includes several types - influence, force, 
dominance, control, authority and attraction. Social power is viewed 
as a general characteristic of social relations among actors. It is a 
process that entails outcomes of the relative control of valued re­
sources by actors, mobilized to effect their social goals. 
Olsen (1978) argues that power is a relational property that can 
be exercised by individuals or organizations. He distinguishes inter­
personal from interorganizational power processes. The interpersonal 
perspective emphasizes a person's power to influence the behavior of 
others in accordance with his own intentions. The interorganizational 
perspective, according to Olsen (1978) focuses on "the generalized ca­
pacity of a social system to get things done in the interest of collec­
tive goals." Lehman (19^ 9) conceptualizes "intermember" and "systemic" 
power. Gamson (1968) distinguishes the "influence" perspective from 
the "social control" perspective of social powsr. The view presented, 
here is that a general conception of social power must include both no­
tions; of intermember influence and of actions to meet social goals» 
Intermember power takes on the added dimension, "systemic" or "general­
ized" power, when collective units are the actors involved. It appears 
that Olsen (1978) equates social control within an organization with 
systemic power, when he asserts that power in its systemic form refers 
to the "capacity of some unit acting as an agent of the system to over­
come the resistance of members in setting, pursuing and implementing 
collective goals." The view presented in this study incorporates 
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intermember and systemic notions in the conception of the process of 
organizational power. 
Approaches to the study of social power 
There are two general orientations to the study of all sociologi­
cal phenomena and these orientations are reflected in two major ap­
proaches to the study of social power. Dahrendorf (1959) identifies 
the two metatheoretical perspectives as "coercion" (conflict) and 
"consensus" (cooperation). The coercion perspective focuses on dif­
ferences among actors regarding interests, resources and values* These 
differences cause mutual dependencies which in turn promote social or­
dering. The consensus orientation highlights similarities among actors 
in activities, interests and values which give rise to consensus. Ac­
cording to this orientation, ordering flows from shared commitments. 
The dependency approach to analysis of social power reflects the 
coercion orientation and stresses differences among actors with power 
residing in the mutual dependency of social relationships (Snerson, 
1962). Actor A exercises power over actor B to the extent B is depen­
dent on A for resources mediated by A. Power is viewed as the obverse 
of dependence and the power of A over B is expressed in the equation 
P V = Force and dominance forms of cower fit best within the de-
cbi/ ua, 
pendency approach to power analysis (Olsen, 1978). 
Parsons (1963) is the principal advocate of the trust approach to 
social power. In this view norms of trust emerge from shared common 
values - actors' beliefs that other actors will behave in ways benefi­
cial to them. The basis of power is the investment of trust in other 
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actors and the relationships that bind them together. Authority and 
attraction forms of power are conceptually most consistent with the 
trust approach to analysis of social power (Olsen, 1978). Olsen (1978) 
suggests that these two approaches to social power analysis are not ne­
cessarily incompatible and that a theoretical synthesis of the two ap­
proaches would further the ability to explain the process of social 
power. While there is some attempt to fuse the two approaches, the 
theory presented in this study is oriented primarily by the dependency 
approach. 
The view of organizational power presented in the following sec­
tions is derived from the abstract notion of social power as pervasive 
in all social organization. While the process of organizational power 
is also an abstract conception, it has less scope than the conception 
of social power. The scope of the theory of organization power will be 
middle range, narrowed by the specific nature of the power process as a 
characteristic of organizational power relations. 
Dimensions of power 
There are four aspects of power that have received the most atten­
tion in sociological literature. Most agree that the power of an actor 
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and Pappi, 1976; Marsden and Laumann, 1977). Power as possession of 
traits (resources) is a common conception. The argument is that pow-r is 
the possession of resources (Burt, 1977a; Bierstedt, 1950) or that power 
is a function of resources committed and encountered (Olsen, 1970). 
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Power as position is also often the focus of analyses of power 
relations. Power is viewed as a function of an actor's location in a 
social network. Structural arrangements are emphasized which give 
actors in a system varying access to or constraint over rewards. Power 
is also often viewed as reputation or the perceptions that other actors 
hold about an actor's potential influence (Mott, 1970; Burt, 1977a), 
The conception of power as potential for influence underlies this 
approach. 
Power through reciprocal obligations is a conceptual approach ad­
vanced by Emerson (1962) and Blau (I964). The focus is on power-
dependence relations that emerge from the development of obligations 
incurred by actors in exchange relationships. Actors who receive re­
sources from other actors must comply with the requests of those who 
provide resources if there is an inability to reciprocate with like re­
sources. 
Burt (1977a)argues that there are three aspects of power in a sys­
tem of actors; power as possession, power as control and power mani­
fested in the relations of influence. The view presented here also 
distinguishes three aspects of the power process. However, the power-
dependence approach (Bnerson, 1962; Blau, 1964) is integrated into the 
three aspects. Approaches that emphasize distribution of resourees and 
macroapproaches that analyze the location of actors in a network of 
actors are articulated in a single conception. The power process is 
conceptualized as including the basis of power-dependence relations, 
the exercise of power and the manifestations of power in relationships. 
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The basis of power-dependence relations is the relative ability to con­
trol relevant resources which encompasses conceptions of the compara­
tive resources possessed, the structural location of actors in a system 
and the availability of alternative sources of resources. In this view 
types of power reflect the nature of resources that are controlled to 
form a basis for power. For example, reputation for influence is con­
sidered one of a set of traits that can be a valued resource for organ­
izations in determining power dependence relations. Power exercise is 
viewed as the relative ability of actors to convert resources for ac­
tion and includes Emerson's (1962) conception of the extent motives 
are invested in relationships, Blau's (1964) notion of the obligations 
incurred and Olsen's (1978) concept of the capacity of actors to co­
ordinate their subunits for action. Manifestations of power are the 
outcomes of power relations which include interaction strategies select­
ed as a function of power-dependence relations, prestige and effective­
ness. 
Organizational Power 
Organizational power is a property of relations among organiza­
tional actors.^  Power characterizes organizational relations as the 
extent of ability of actor A to control and mobilize resources for goal 
attainment relative to the ability of actor B or a set of actors, B, C 
U^nless otherwise specified, the term, actor, will refer to an or­
ganization throughout the remainder of the dissertation. 
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and D to control and mobilize resources for its goal attainment (Olsen, 
1978)• Power is not an attribute of individual actors in isolation 
(Bnerson, 1962; Cook, 1977). Rather it is a quality of their social 
interaction. To say that "actor A has power" is not meaningful unless 
A's power is specified in relation to some other actor B or actors B, 
C and D. 
Organizational power is based on the control and mobilization of 
resources that actors need to meet their goals (Korsi, 1974)• It is 
the capacity to convert valued resources for influence to manage and 
direct events of interest and is tied to the types of events that are 
relevant to goal attainment. Thus organizational power is a property 
of relations that describes a dimension of equality among actors which 
is reflected in the relative amount of control each actor has over 
commonly needed environmental resources and the relative ability to 
mobilize these resources to meet organizational objectives. 
Organizational power is a dynamic relational property with ref­
erence to things external to an actor; the control of environmental 
resources upon which actors, party to a relation or relations, bestow 
equivalent value. Anything valued can become a basis for the develop­
ment of power. Things are converted into or mobilized for preferred 
action when control over them is unequally distributed, when they are 
needed and valued by other actors and when availability is limited. 
In this sense power is viewed as the ability to effect preferred so­
cial action. It involves at least two actors that possess resources 
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2 that can be used by one another to realize their interests. 
It is assumed that in a system of actors where each exists so­
cially in reference to each other actor in the system, and where ac­
tors value the same resources, that power is unequally distributed 
among the actors (Burt, 1977a). And it is assumed that each actor will 
act to control and possess resources which will enhance the probability 
of its survival. Thus it is also assumed that actors will vary in 
their relative ability to achieve goals and that some will prevail over 
others in the selection of actions to achieve goals. The situation 
where actors are not interdependent concerning the control of valued 
resources, i.e., each actor is in full control of resources needed for 
survival; is not of interest in this discussion of power (Coleman, 
1977). 
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"No distinction is made between potential or actual influence; di­
rect or indirect influence. The conception of power presented here is 
a process that includes dimensions of development, exercise and manifes­
tation of potential and actual, direct and indirect influence. Aa ac­
tor (A) can prevail over another actor (B) in the selection of actions 
to enhance A's goal achievement because of latent capacity or actual 
ability to convert resources directly as well as indirectly. Actors as­
sess one another's abilities and adjust actions accordingly. The de­
pendence of actor A on actor B or the need of A for resources controlled 
by B constitutes the potential for influence of B on A (Emerson, 
1962; Adams, 1975» Rogers,M. 1974). Potential influence is latent or in­
direct, but it has actual effect on A's actions. However, the power 
process can also include direct influence exerted by B on A actions. A 
distinction can be made between possible and probable influence (Wrong, 
1968). Actual influence is the extent that B's wishes prevail over A's 
and alter A's behavior, but it is exercised only if a demand is made by 
B. B's potential influence may nonetheless alter A's actions without a 
demand being made by B» This is latent influence. But in order to do 
so potential influence must be latent or probable and not merely possi­
ble influence. B's control of resources must be valued by A and A must 
realize B's capacity of control over resources (Wrong, I968). 
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As a property of a relation between two or more actors, power is 
a continuing process. The power relation can be symmetrical (A and B 
have equal ability to achieve goals) asymmetrical (either A or B have 
greater ability to achieve goals) or it can be symmetrical and asym­
metrical at different points in time of the continuing relation. 
Organizational power as a relational property 
Emerson (I962) argues that the implicit treatment of power as an 
attribute of a person or group is a recurrent conceptual flaw. This 
view leads to analysis of "who has power?" within a social system and 
assumes that power is a generalized characteristic. While A may have 
power over B and C, A may be dominated by D and E and B may dominate D. 
Clearly, it is readily observable in everyday experience that power re­
lations are often intransitive. Thus, power is a property of a social 
relation (Emerson, 1962; Adams, 1975» Cook, 1977) - a quality of social 
interaction. These social relations involve mutual dependencies (ïtaer-
son, 1962). When actors are mutually dependent, they have need to in­
fluence one another and each is at least partially able to facilitate 
or constrain the other's goals achievement. Thus power resides in the 
control each has over resources valued by the other and their relative 
abilities to convert these resources for goal attainment (Adams, 1975; 
Bnerson, I962). 
The dynamic and continuing character of the power process and its 
potential for symmetry as well as asymmetry is illustrated in Figure 
2.1 adapted from Adams (1975)» The ability of A or B to control and 
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convert X relative to one another, illustrates the basis and exercise 
dimensions of the power relation. It determines the symmetry or asym­
metry of the relations and the changing dynamic of the relation over 
time in terms of the particular X of value. If A has more control and 
ability to convert X than B, or vice versa, the relationship is asym­
metrical. If A and B have equal control and ability to convert X the 
relationship is symmetrical. In the conception presented here, the 
power of an actor relative to all other actors in a system of actors is 
an aggregate of the actor's differential with each other actor.in the 
system regarding dimensions of control and conversion of resources. 
(actor) social (actor) (actor) social (actor) 
A relation B A. 2 relation B, 2 
A B A B 
Figure 2.1 Basic components of the power process 
Organizational power, control and influence 
It is important to distinguish power conceptually from control. 
Control generally is a nonreciprocal process while power is reciprocal. 
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Control can refer to physical, nonsocial objects as well as to social 
actors as objects. With social control, objects of control are social 
actors, outcomes are largely predetermined and objects of control have 
little or no ability to counter (Olsen, 1978)• The power relationship 
is based on patterns of controls and actors act in terms of their con­
trols in a power relation (Adams, 1975)* Furthermore, there are forms 
of social control that do not involve a power relation; i.e., actors 
behave in accord with internalized norm (Wrong, 1968), Power as inten­
tional manipulation of bases of control to gain further social control, 
should be distinguished from the many forms of social control exercised 
by collectivities over socialized individual actors (Wrong, 1968), Or­
ganizational control and influence are seen as a continuum of the deter­
mination and outcomes of power where influence is the exercise of power 
where outcomes are not predetermined (Olsen, 1978). 
Organizational power, force, dominance, authority and attraction 
Etzioni's (1975) typology of power distinguishes three types of 
power; normative, coercive, utilitarian; which are based on different 
types of resources» Olsen (1978) similarly treats power as a generic 
concept with force, authority, dominance and attraction evolving as types 
of power that rest on the nature of resources controlled. îPhe resources 
that must be controlled for actor A to use force or coercion have to be 
total in terms of actor B's survival. In other words actor B is com­
pletely dependent on A and has no available recourse» This can occur 
only if A intentionally commits his control of resources totally to back 
up his demand on B (Olsen, 1970) or if political processes eliminate 
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alternatives (Blau, 1964). 
To use authority an actor must be granted legitimacy for the right 
to make demands on other actors. Legitimacy then becomes the actor's 
resource base for social power. Legitimacy can be granted formally as 
through voting or assuming a position in a formal organization, or in­
formally by consent or agreement to follow those vbo claim legitimacy. 
Legitimate authority ordinarily rests on: (l) institutionalized values 
and norms, (2) legal prescriptions, or (3) special skills and knowl­
edge relevant to a specific circumstance (Olsen, 1970). According to 
Dahrendorf (1959) legitimacy is the most prized scarce resource for ac­
tors, because legitimacy reconciles losers in a power struggle to their 
disadvantaged position. Domain consensus reflects cultural integration 
among organizations and is important in explaining outcomes of interor-
ganizational systems (Molnar, 1976). Domain consensus reflects attribu­
tion of legitimacy by other organizations regarding an organization's 
own claims and intentions (Warren, et al., I964). 
Dominance differs from force in that it is unintentional and does 
not require the commitment of additional resources to back up demands. 
Dominance flows from the regular functional performance of roles. Thus 
the base of resources for dominance is the actor's ability to perform 
his roles without drawing on additional resources, aueh as withholding 
services or access. 
Appeal or liking is the resource base for attraction and commonly 
is derived from positive affection, charisma and cognitive identifica­
tion (Olsen, 1978). Actors comply with other actors to which they are 
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attracted in some way. This gives the attractive actor power over other 
actors that is most often unintentional, although actors sometimes pur­
posefully manipulate their appeal throu^  public r& ations and adver­
tising campaigns to increase their relative power within a system (Per-
row, 1961)9 Bierstedt (1950) distinguishes power from prestige, argu­
ing that power is more often the cause rather than the result of pres­
tige. The position here is that prestige, the degree of positive evalu­
ation of an actor by others, is mostly an outcome of the exercise of 
power. Thus positive evaluations by others are viewed as social objec­
tives that actors seek to attain by manipulating the control and con­
version of valued resources. While prestige differs from force and 
dominance in that it can only be granted by others and is often sought 
as an end in itself, it is also an often used basis for power - to gain 
and maintain special rights and abilities (privileges) to influence 
others. Once gained, prestige can be an inexpensive way of maintaining 
or achieving power because power can be gained without making a commit­
ment. If actors feel that it will add to their positive evaluations to 
interact with a prestigeful actor, the prestigeful actor can increase 
its ability to effect desired social actions without any corresponding 
loss (Thompson, 196?)• 
To summarize, the organizational power process includes the valued 
resources controlled by each actor relative to those controlled by other 
actors in the system and is the relative ability to convert these re­
sources to achieve desired outcomes (Figure 2.2). Organizational power 
is defined theoretically as a property of relations among organizational 
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actors. Thus it is a general concept of less scope than the concept of 
social power because it is limited to the power relations of formally 
organized collective actors. It is a process that includes the rela­
tive control of resources and their conversion into actions to meet ob­
jectives of interest. Relations of power and dependence emerge as a proc­
ess that includes the similarities or differences in resources controlled 
and converted by actors to achieve desired ends. Organizational power is 
conceived as a multidimensional variable concept to be measured indirect­
ly by indicators of its operation; the basis of power (control of re­
sources), the exercise of power (conversion of resources to effect so­
cial action), and the manifestations of power relating (interaction 
strategies, prestige and goal attainment effectiveness). The concepts 
explicated to comprise the dimensions of the process of power are 
thought of as variable properties capable of cardinal measurement. As 
such, there is no distinction of types of power. The emphasis is on 
the relative amount of power as a process - the relative control and 
conversion of valued resources manifested in interaction strategies to 
effect desired outcomes. 
The Dimensions of Organizational Power 
Dimensions of the process of organizational power - basis or con­
trol of resources, the exercise or conversion of resources for action 
manifested in an organization's interaction strategies, goal effective­
ness and prestige have been identified (Figure 2.2; a, b and c). These 
dimensions comprise a general representation of concepts to consider in 
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an analysis of organizational power and are considered explicates of the 
power process (Olsen, 1978). Coleman (1975) emphasizes control of re­
sources or events in order to effect desired outcomes in his definition 
of power. This aspect of power is also central to the view that organi­
zations seek to control environmental elements to reduce uncertainty and 
thus enhance the probability of survival (Thompson, 1967)» Power is 
viewed as the obverse of dependency in exchange formulations (Blau, 1964; 
Emerson, 1962). While power-dependency is often analyzed as a property 
of organizational dyads, theoretical definitions of the concepts which 
comprise the process of organizational power as characteristics of an or­
ganizations relations with all other organizations in a network are pre­
sented in the following sections. Power-dependency relations of an or­
ganization with the aggregate of organizations in its network is an ap­
proach that also exists in the literature. This approach recognizes 
that power-dependency relations of a pair of organizations are influ­
enced by relations of each organization with all others in a relevant 
network. 
Basis of power - control of relevant resources 
Resource control forms the basis of the development of power 
(AdamsJ 1975); The basis of organizational power is the asouût of con­
trol of valued environmental resources relative to other organizations 
in the network (Figure 2.2, a). Control of relevant resources refers to 
the capacity to hold resources for conversion to influence social action. 
Control of resources to reduce dependency depends on the amount and kind 
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of resources possessed, constraint of resource flows and the availability 
of alternative sources of resources. Control is not reciprocal. Thus, 
an organization that possesses a larger amount of valued resources, is 
more able to determine the flow of resources in a system and has more al­
ternative sources than other organizations, will have more control over 
resources relevant to goal interests in that system. Organization A with 
a large staff and budget, a reputation for influence and legitimation; 
that also enjoys a position of centrality in terms of the flow of money 
and products within a network; and has several alternatives for obtaining 
inputs and disposing of outputs will have considerable control over the 
resources it holds. 
Possession of resources There are commodities that some organi­
zations have or are characterized by that make it easier for them to re­
alize their goals than other organizations. These things that others also 
desire are usually referred to as resources. Resources possessed is one 
aspect of the control of resources or basis of the power process (Figure 
2.2, a, 1). Resources are assets that have the potential to be converted 
for the exercise of power (Etzioni, 1975)= Resources that are possessed 
are thus an important aspect of the control of valued resources to re= 
duce interorganizational dependencies. 
A resource is defined as any attribute, activity, circumstance, 
service or commodity; tangible or intangible, limited or unlimited; that 
is useful to b'j mobilized for goal attainment. Any thing can be a valued 
resource, i.e., knowledge, staff, money, equipment, information, reputa­
tion. Value is determined by whether or not it is needed for the organi­
zations* goal attainment (Adams, 1975)* Limited resources are fixed in 
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supply and diminished by use, while unlimited resources are not diminished 
by use (Olsen, 1978)• Tangible resources are always limited as are 
many intangible resources, such as reputation, if abused or overextended. 
Attributes that are typical resources for organizations include 
prestige and reputation for influence, although here prestige is viewed 
as a resource goal that is attained by power exercise and which becomes 
a resource to maintain power. Legitimacy, freedom from superordinate 
constraints, and flexibility of time are circumstance resources. Ac­
tivities or services include the type of functions performed or products 
produced. Commodities ordinarily refer to money, staff, equipment, 
knowledge and skill. Some resources must be possessed before other more 
instrumental resources can be activated or invoked (Rogers, îH974)l In­
formation and time are often resources that must be controlled before 
other resources can be used for influence. "Bids" could be requested 
for a major contract, but if an organization does not receive notice or 
has insufficient time for developing a "bid", it would have little in­
fluence on the outcome even if it possessed many other resources that 
could have allowed it to win the contract. Most resources can serve as 
necessary preconditions for the activation of other resources. 
Possession of resources refers to the resources held by an organi­
zation as property or attribute. Resources possessed are those attri­
butes, activities, circumstances, services or commodities that an or­
ganization has, owns, holds or masters. As such resources can be valued 
inputs or outputs for the organization. 
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Since any "thing" can be a resource if it is valued, the identifi­
cation of specific resources possessed as control of resources is contin­
gent upon particular organizations and their interests. While resources 
vary in their generality according to how widespread the need is for the 
resources (Rogers, M. 1974). It cannot be assumed that resources of hi^  
generality will necessarily be valued by a specific set of organizations. 
Amount and types of valued resources that are possessed by an organiza­
tion are assumed to represent underlying continuous dimensions that can 
be measured at an interval level. 
Access to and constraint of resource flows Access to or con­
straint of resource flows refers to the location of an organization 
within a network regarding its connectedness with other organizations. 
Thus organizations can be arrayed on a continuum of the degree of access 
or constraint they have over resource flows. An organization that is 
located centrally in terms of the flow of information about resources to 
and from other organizations is located strategically for access to val­
ued resources and to constrain the flow of these resources to other or­
ganizations in the network. Power is gained relative to other organiza­
tions due to involvement in transitive connections (Mott, 1970)• Extent 
of access to or constraint of resources is the extent that exchange 
among members of an organizational get is dependent upon an actor due to 
its location within the network. Emerson (1975) refers to this property 
as structural dependence. Thus, organizations that are more central in 
the network have more control over resources in the system than organi­
zations on the periphery (Olsen, 1970:6-7). Central organizations play 
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roles that are needed for system integration (Laumann and pappi 1976). 
While centrality can be an important indicator of structural dependence 
(Emerson, 1975)» the important point is the degree resources are mediated 
by an organization relative to other organizations in a network. An or­
ganization may appear to have the most central position in a network in 
terms of the exchange of resources, but be dependent on more peripheral 
organizations as a source point for resources to be exchanged within the 
system (Cook, 1977» Cook and Bnerson, 1978). Organizations can also be 
"isolates" in a field due to a willingness "to do without" rather than 
lose autonomy (Blau, I964). Thus, centrality of communication connected­
ness is viewed as the critical structural factor of access to and con­
straint over resource flows. The more information an organization sends 
to and receives from other organizations, the more access to and con­
straint over the flows of resources in the network it is likely to have. 
Some resources possessed are not transferable. This can be due to 
their lack of value in the system or the inability of an organization to 
transfer resources because of superordinate constraints. Furthermore, 
some resources are attributes that are conferred by others or are a 
function of the particular organization alone. Examples are prestige 
and image. The exercise of constraint over resource flows to other or­
ganizations provides the organization with opportunity to compensate for 
nontransferrable resources in the distribution of resources and repre­
sents an important aspect of control of resources to influence outcomes 
(Burt, 1977a) (Figure 2.2, a, 2). 
Availability of alternatives Availability of alternatives for 
obtaining resources or disposing of them as outputs is a further aspect 
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of an organization's dependency and vulnerability in its power rela­
tions. According to Thompson (I967) organizations seek to maintain al­
ternative sources of needed resources because the availability of alter­
native sources increases power by decreasing dependence upon other or­
ganizations in the environment. An organization is less dependent upon 
exchanges with other organizations to the extent that needed element can 
be obtained from other sources (Levine and White, I96I). Conversely, 
the fewer alternative sources available to an organization, the less bar­
gaining leverage it has to determine exchange ratios with other organi­
zations in its set (Jacobs, 1974) and the less control it has over allo­
cation of its own resources. Thus availability of alternatives is an 
important aspect of the organization's ability to control resources for 
determining preferred outcomes (Figure 2.2, a, 5)» If organization A is 
one of many suppliers of a resource to a single recipient B, it is likely 
to be highly vulnerable to the influence of the one outlet organization 
B and apt to be in competition with the fragmented set of suppliers. 
Conversely, but similarly, if A is one of several organizations seeking 
inputs from a single supplier B, it will also be vulnerable to B's de­
mand and influence. Likewise, A will be dependent on B if A is a single 
supplier and B is the only consumer or if A is a single buyer and B is 
the only supplier. In these circumstances A's ability to hold its re­
sources to impact its own objectives will be limited relative to B's 
control of resources to effect the actions it desires. Availability of 
alternatives reflects a continuous dimension of cardinal measurement by 
which organizations can be characterized and distributed. 
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Exercise of power - conversion of resources for goal attainment 
An organization's ability to exercise power is expressed in its capt>c-
itv to convert or mobilize resources to realize its own objectives (Burt, 
1977a; Olsen, 1978)• The ability to convert resources to influence social 
action is affected by the control of resources. There are three aspects 
of the capacity for conversion of controlled resources as power exercise? 
the motivational investment in the relationship, the obligations already 
incurred by the organizations and the capacity of the organization to co­
ordinate the mobilization of resources as a structure (Figure 2.2, b). 
Power-dependency relations emerge from the relative control of resources 
but more directly are reflected in the rewards mediated by a relationship 
and the respective obligations accumulated by transactions (Jacobs, 1974; 
Blau, 1964), The relative capability to organize social action also re­
flects the organization's structural ability to mobilize resources and ex­
ercise power (Olsen, 1978), 
Capacity to coordinate The capacity to coordinate activi­
ties of its subuaits is a feature of collectivities that refers to the de­
gree a collectivity is socially organized. Organizations are energy-
binding systems (Mott, 1970) and as such their power is partially dependent 
upon the degree they are organized or internally coordinated for collective 
action. Mott (1970) asserts that the creation of systems of coordinated 
action is the major means of binding in energy (power). Parsons (i960) 
refers to organizational power as "the generalized capacity of a social 
system to get things done in the interest of collective goals," The organi­
zation, is an action system that uses power of coordination to achieve the 
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collective goals of its subunits. This helps grasp the notion of internal 
coordination as an aspect of organizational power. Coordination of sub-
units to act in concert is an important aspect of the processing of re­
sources to achieve specific outcomes (Figure 2.2, b, l). The more subunits 
(complexity) there are, the more potential there is for binding in energies 
to realize collective goals. The relative capacity of organizations to 
coordinate and integrate subunits is thus an aspect of their power relations. 
The idea that organizations gain power from their degree of social 
organization is in contrast to individuals, who do not, although organi­
zational membership may be a resource base for power relations among indi­
viduals. The more activities are coordinated to meet a common objective 
in an organization, the more the organization will be able to mobilize re­
sources and dominate others to effect desired social action. "In union 
there is strength" goes the old adage. This is a source of power that 
is unavailable to single individuals. It is an aspect that is unique to 
power as a property of organizational relations - the comparative degree 
of social organization or coordination of subunits for goal attainment. 
Blau (1964) refers to the double power of organizational leadership. 
Through exercise of power within an organization the leadership derives 
power from the organization for use in relations with other environmental 
units. While this source of power is similar to domination by ability to 
perform roles, it differs in that internal coordination of subunits is 
purposeful and intended. The degree an organization is able to coordinate 
its subunits for action will affect the efficiency with which it can con­
vert resources for the exercise of power. 
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Obligations incurred Ability to convert resources also in­
volves the reciprocity of social exchanges (Figure 2.2, b, 2). Social ex­
change refers to voluntary actions motivated by what is expected in return 
from others (Blau, I964). A principle of exchange is that an actor that 
supplies resources to another creates obligations to repay. When the ob= 
ligations to repay are not met in kind, dependence is created through non-
reciprocity of exchange. The dependent actor is then obligated to comply 
with the interests of the first actor. Compliance becomes an anticipated 
commodity of exchange when transfers are not reciprocal. 
Organizations unable to reciprocate in the exchange of resources will 
incur obligations and will trade compliance in order to balance the rela­
tionship. However, organizations that have accumulated few obligations 
can expect compliance from other organizations in exchange for needed re­
sources and can enter exchange with little constraint toward creating de­
pendencies. It is in this way that organizations utilize the dependencies 
that emerge from differential control of resources to increase power ad­
vantage. The antzcipated ability to extract compllancs froz actors that 
have accumulated obligations is one aspect of an actors freedom to convert 
resources to realize its desired outcomes. 
Motivational investment Motives invested in a relationship re­
flect the necessity for an organization to commit resources in a relation­
ship (Figure 2.2, b, )). The investment of motives mirrors the essential 
benefits organizations perceive will accrue to them from a specific rela­
tionship or the degree of commitment to the relationship (Emerson, I962). 
In Emerson's (1962) terms the power of A over B is reflected in B's depen­
dency on A. This premise (Pab=Dba) is a reciprocal relation (Pba=Dab), 
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The dependence of A upon B is directly proportional to A's motivational 
investment in goals mediated by B and inversely proportional to the 
availability of these goals to A outside the A-B relation. Thus the more 
potential benefits an organization perceives, the more it will be pressed to 
commit its resources to the relationship» The organization may want to 
avoid using resources in the relation out of fear of increasing dependence, 
but need to do so in order to obtain other needed resources. However, if 
A has no motivational investment in the relationship it will not be con­
strained to commit resources out of necessity. If A does commit resources, 
they can be used to increase a power advantage. Generally, the greater 
the perceived potential benefits for A relative to B, the more dependent 
A will be on B and the less power A will have relative to B, if both per­
ceive some benefit and both commit some resources. This means that the 
least dependent organization will have greater ability to convert the 
resources it controls to influence the more dependent organization and 
to realize its own outcomes. 
Jacobs (1974) discusses motivational investment as the degree of 
"essentiality" of resources or the extent organization A can do without 
resources mediated by B. The criterion here is A's substitutability of 
resources to be obtained from B. The view here is that motivational in­
vestment is an aspect of the conversion of resources apart from availabil­
ity of alternative sources, but influenced by available alternatives. 
The essentiality of resources is the perceived necessity to commit re­
sources to a relationship. Relative nonessentiality will be necessary if 
an organization is able to convert its resources for influence. Lack 
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of substitutability or motivational investment is reflected in the un­
importance of a relationship or the lack of necessity of a relationship. 
Substitutability refers to an organization's ability to or willingness 
to use alternative resources as the result of redefinition of values for 
goal attainment. Substitutability is thus distinguished from availabil= 
ity of alternative resources where there is no shift in goal values. 
An example of the redefinition of values is a health care facility that 
opts to focus on provision of long-term or convalescent rather than 
acute care services, thus opening up opportunities to substitute avail­
able resources for goal attainment. This action reduces the essentiality 
of some resources that must be obtained in exchange with other health 
care agencies and reduces motivational investment in relations with 
these agencies. The substitutability of resources will be partially de­
termined by other resources that are controlled, such as time and freedom 
to develop alternative programming. 
The motives invested in relationships, obligations incurred and capac­
ity to coordimts subunits ars each conceptualized as variables. Each is 
a variable characteristic of organizations' relations reflecting an under­
lying dimension of continuous and equal categories. 
Manifestations of organizational power 
The power process is conceptualized in terms of three dimensions 
of its dynamics - the basis, exercise and manifestation of organizational 
power relations. Manifestations of power are viewed as outcomes of the 
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basis and exercise of power. Manifestations of the power process in­
clude strategies for interorganizat;ional interaction, organizational 
prestige, and organizational effectiveness (Figure 2.2, c). 
Strategies for interorganizatioml interaction Some believe 
that interorganizational relations are the key to understanding power in 
society and as such are seen as the most important aspect of modern so­
cial life. It has been empirically demonstrated that linkages among or­
ganizations become bases of power to shape community decisions and direc­
tions (Perrucci and Pilisuk, 1970; Turk, 1975)* A dominant reason for 
the development or avoidance of linkages among organizations is that or­
ganizations attempt to enhance their positions by their choice of inter­
actions with other organizations in their environments (Levine and White, 
I96I; Benson, 1975). The interactions chosen are evaluated in the con­
text of resources controlled by each actor and the ability of each to 
convert resources into desired action. The specific patterns of inter­
organizational linkages that emerge are reflections of organizations' 
abilities to control and convert resources vis-a-vis other organizations 
in the environment. In this theory the process of organizational power, 
as a pervasive element of social organization, includes strategies of 
interaction among organizations as manifestations of their power rela­
tions (Figure 2.2, c). 
The basis and exercise of power are important factors in an organi­
zation's ability to adapt to or control environmental contingencies 
(Thompson, 1967)* The relative power of organizations is a function of 
the control of valued resources and their conversion into social action 
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to influence outcomes of benefit to them (Coleman, 1973)» The concepts 
elaborated in the dimensions of the power process generally coincide with 
Blau's (1964) typology of conditions of independence and require­
ments of power. Blau (1964) argues that four alternative strategies 
are available to an actor A to avoid dependence on actor B. The actor 
can; (l) supply B with resources of value - cooperation, (2) take re­
sources from B by coercive force - conflict, (3) do without B's resources 
- withdrawal, or (4) obtain the resources elsewhere - circumvention. In­
teraction strategies selected for adaptation to or control of environ­
mental uncertainties (dependencies) can be seen as outcomes of the power 
relations among organizations or as response to the organizations alter­
natives to compliance (Blau, I964). Stated otherwise these alternatives 
are strategies that can be used by organizations to maintain power or 
reduce the power advantage of other organizations. Interorganizational 
relations and structures are conceptualized as emerging from the power 
relations of organizations and often involve a process of power balanc­
ing within a system of organizations (Cook, 1977). To sustain a power 
advantage an organization must prevent other organizations from choosing 
any of the alternatives but must have one or more of the alternatives 
available for its own action. To balance the power advantage of another, 
an organization must be able to reciprocate with valued resources, do 
without or obtain resources elsewhere. Implications of each of the or­
ganizational interaction alternatives directs attention to initiation of 
voluntary cooperative interactions by an organization when it has a reci­
procity advantage, when few motives are invested in relations and when 
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alternatives are many. Attention is directed to conflict when a reci­
procity advantage exists and motivational investment is high, but others 
have more alternatives. Circumvention is most likely when the organiza­
tion is disadvantaged for power exercise but alternative sources are 
available. Withdrawal is the most probable outcome when the organization 
is unable to reciprocate, has motives invested in the relationship and 
has no or few alternatives (Figure 2.2, c, 2). 
Cooperation Cooperation generally refers to a state of 
mutual reinforcement among social entities. It is the "quality of the 
state of collaboration..." (Lawrence and Lorsch, 196?). Most agree that 
when cooperation occurs, the parties have been helped (Goldman, 1962). 
Cooperation entails a willingness of actors to communicate with one ano­
ther and contribute action (Barnard, 19)8). Warren, et al,, (1974) defines 
organizational cooperation as "interaction between organizations directed 
at achieving the same issue (the subject matter, problem or issue that 
occasions the interaction) outcomes." Cooperation can be an adaptive 
or a controlling strategy, but in either case the cooperating organiza­
tions "must demonstrate capacity to reduce uncertainty" for each other 
and "must make a commitment to exchange that capacity" (Thompson, 1967). 
However, cooperation does not necessarily mean that benefits are symmet­
rical or that costs do not accrue to either party. Cooperation is social 
interaction in which actors voluntarily or involuntarily conduct joint 
ventures (Halpert, 1974). Cooperating relations vary according to the 
amount of constraint placed on cooperating parties (Thompson, 196?) and 
according to the intensity of interaction or amount of resources 
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comoiitted to transactions (Rogers, 1974b; Klonglan, 1972)• Cooperative 
interactions also vary according to the types of resources that are 
sought by the parties and that are committed to the exchange. Hence 
loss of autonomy and power are potentially important costs in coopera­
tive interactions. Cooperative strategies to gain or balance power thus 
vary according to different degrees of commitment and constraint that are 
required of the participants. Contracting, coopting and coalescing are 
alternative cooperative strategies that can be selected by organizations 
(Thompson, 196?)• Contracting is the negotiation of agreements for fu­
ture exchanges or joint programs. Contracting represents the least con­
straining cooperative strategy but varies itself according to the degree 
of formalization of agreements. Coopting is the absorption of environ­
mental elements into the leadership or decision-making structure of an 
organization as a means of reducing threats and increasing stability 
(Selznick, 1949). Coopting is a more constraining strategy than con­
tracting. Coalescing refers to joint venture with another organization 
which provides a basis for continued exchange and joint decisions. As 
such, coalescing is the most constraining cooperative strategy, although 
joint ventures can vary according to the degree of formality and degree 
of permanence of the agreement to share programming. 
Conflict Conflict refers to opposition between two or more 
social units (Murray, 1974). Thus organiiacional conflicts are opposing 
responsibilities, priorities and actions or disagreements between two 
organizations. Ordinarily conflict involves attempts to obtain needed 
resources by coercive force or block another organization's access to al­
ternative sources (Blau, 1964). Conflict interactions vary in their 
65 
degree of regulation and in the degree of intensity or potential harm or 
costs rendered the parties in the interaction (Coser, I956). Regulated 
conflict generally involves a third party that monitors predetermined 
rules of opposition, and is institutionalized and legitimized (Dahren-
dorf, 1959; Barnard, 1938). lypes of conflict representing different 
degrees of intensity and regulation include competition, bargaining, ne­
gotiation, price wars. Cooperative relations; contracting, coopting and 
coalition formation; can also be formed as conflict strategies by less 
powerful organizations to monopolize a source and oppose the actions of 
more powerful organizations in their environments. However, conflict re­
lations refer here to interactions initiated by organizations to directly 
and indirectly oppose or block the resource inputs or goals and programs 
of others. 
Withdrawal An organization may choose to withdraw inter­
actions when power relations are balanced against it. Withdrawal refers 
to avoiding interaction by doing without a valued resource (Blau, 19^ 4). 
Withdrawal can often be made possible by redefining the scarce resource 
as unnecessary which amounts to a decrease in the value of the resource 
for the dependent organization and a decrease in the size of the organi­
zational network (Cook, 1977). New ideals are formed which redefine the 
nature of valued resources. A response to the alternatives to compliance 
can be change and differences between ideologies (Blau, I964). 
Circumvention An organization may attempt to increase the 
number of alternative suppliers or outlets for a resource of value in or­
der to circumvent and minimize the control of another organization (Ja­
cobs, 1974; Cook, 1977» Emerson, 1962), Cook (1977) refers to this 
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strategy as "network extension." The imbalanced power relation prompts 
a search for alternative sources which may result in new exchange rela­
tions and extend the network of interorganizational relations (Cook, 1977)» 
Conflict processes also emerge as organizations attempt to block the de­
velopment of alternative sources by other organizations. Political 
structures to prevent or maintain the development of alternative sources 
are an outgrowth of these power maneuvers. For example, the American 
Medical Association has a long history of successes in sponsoring or op­
posing legislation to prevent the development of alternative sources of 
access to clientele by other health professions. 
Strategies selected to control environmental contingencies depend 
on whether an organization is relatively dependent or independent in a 
power relation. Furthermore, the interactions and. structures that form 
some organization's relations may impact other organizations as conflict 
relations, or may counter strategies of circumvention. An example would 
be when organization A's attempts to circumvent B to form an exchange re­
lation with C and 2 are countered by B's coalition with C and B. The 
prestige and corresponding privileges of organizations to effect their 
desired actions (Burt, 197%) and the effectiveness of their goal attain­
ment (Olsen, 1970) are, therefore, functions of resources controlled, the 
ability to convert resources into action and the interaction strategies 
used to adapt to or control environmental uncertainties. The number of 
cooperative, conflicting, circumventing and withdrawal strategies select­
ed by organizations each are conceptualized as reflecting a dimension 
that is continuous and consistent with a cardinal level of measurement. 
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Prestige and privilege Prestige and the corresponding privi­
leges that accompany it are outcomes of power relations (Lenski, 1966) 
(Figure 2.2, c, 2). Prestige refers to the "favorable evaluation that 
an actor receives from others" (Olsen, 1978). Privilege is access to de­
sired resources that is granted by others. Actors seek to exercise 
power in order to gain prestige and privilege. Hence power and prestige 
are highly interrelated in social life. However, prestige and privilege 
can be distinguished analytically from the basis and exercise of power. 
Prestige and privilege must be granted the actor by others, whereas re­
sources are controlled and converted in the process of power regardless 
of the wishes of others. Furthermore, the basis and exercise of power 
are antecedent to the acquisition of prestige in the process of power. 
Prestige and privilege accrue to actors in social relationships when the 
control and ability to convert resources are balanced in their favor. 
Initially all actors compete for scarce resources, but as differences 
in status emerge from different degrees of success, the more successful 
actors seek prestige and privilege. The less successful exchange sub­
servience and support for prestige and privilege for needed resources 
(Blau, 1964)» The basis and exercise of power rest primarily on the dis­
tribution of resources controlled and converted to force desired social 
action, while prestige rests on social consensus concerning privileges 
or rights that must be granted actors because of their status (Blau, 
1964). Prestige and privilege are outcomes of power relations that are 
important for the maintenance and increase of power. The genesis of 
power is most immediately dependent upon control and conversion of re­
sources in ongoing social relationships, but prestige and privilege are 
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reflections of power that have the potential to be transferred across 
social contexts (Olsen, 1978). Prestige and privilege are usually sought 
as ends in themselves. Actors seek to gain an advantage in the control 
and conversion of resources, but it is ordinarily a means to ^ in pres­
tige and to shape social organization. 
Goal attainment effectiveness Organizational power is the abil­
ity relative to other organizations in a set, to control and mobilize 
resources for desired outcomes. Thus the effectiveness of organizations 
in attaining their goals relative to other organizations in its network 
is the manifestation that ultimately reflects interorganization power re­
lations (Figure 2.2, c, 3)» Effectiveness is the reflection of net power 
advantage or disadvantage which results from a set of relationships be­
tween the organization and other organizations in its environmental set. 
Effectiveness is conceptualized as the degree to which an organi­
zation realizes its goals (Etzioni, I964). Organizations are viewed as 
rational and goal-seeking. As such, goals guide what happens in an or­
ganization. Goals are desired ends that an organization attempts to re­
alize (Etzioni, I964). They are abstractions around which behavior is 
organized (Hall, 1977)= Effectiveness of goal attainment is a useful 
notion for understanding the extent to which organizations as actors are 
able to effect their desired ends or get their own way. 
However, the definition of effectiveness as goal attainment is not 
without problems. One difficulty is that organizations often have multi­
ple goals and some can be in conflict with others. Efficiency is also 
often confused with effectiveness. Efficiency is the "amount of resources 
used to produce a unit of output" (Etzioni, I964). Although efficiency 
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and effectiveness are sometimes related, an organization can be effective 
but not efficient and the reverse is also possible. 
Operative goals are specific policy goals developed from official 
and unofficial sources through interactions within the organization. The 
operative goals persist after the interactions have ceased and thus re­
flect abstract official goals, modified by interactions within the organ­
ization and adjustments of the organization within its environment. If 
it is to survive an organization must maximize its effectiveness. Ef­
fectiveness can best be understood in terms of the operative goals - the 
specific operations established by the organization to realize its own 
interests. 
Abstract values that guide organizational behavior are converted 
into specifics for the day to day operation of an organization. Perrow 
(1961) distinguishes "official" from "operative" goals. Official goals 
are the general purpose of the organization as put forth in the charter, 
annual reoorts, public statements br key executives and other authorita­
tive pronouncements. Operative goals "designate the ends sought through 
actual operating policies of the organization." They are means which 
become ends when the organisation is analyzed. 
It is the organization's goals, actually pursued, that are of con­
cern and not whether they necessarily represent the interests of all mem­
bers of the collectivity. In other words it is assumed that the goals 
pursued by an organization reflect the interests of the intraorganiza-
tional dominants - the same dominants that represent the organization in 
its interorganizational relations to reduce uncertainties. The effective­
ness of an organization is thus an outcome of resources controlled and 
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converted to effect desired social action and ordering. 
This view of organizational effectiveness as a manifestation of 
power is in part consistent with the perspective that views organiza­
tional effectiveness as the organization's ability to acquire scarce re­
sources, maintain a bargaining position and maximize autonomy within its 
environment (Yuchtman and Seashore, 196?). However, organizational ef­
fectiveness is not seen here as synonymous with ability to acquire re­
sources and maintain a power advantage. Rather environmental dependen­
cies along with other factors influence an organization's goal attain­
ment effectiveness. While the process of power relations is manifested 
in the relative effectiveness of organizations within a network, the proc­
ess of power relations does not contain all determinants needed to ex­
plain a distribution of relative organizational goal attainment effec­
tiveness. 
The concepts to be used to construct a formal theory of organiza­
tional power have been presented and defined theoretically. In order to 
proceed these concepts are arbitrarily treated as a closed system. There 
are other concepts that could have been included that would increase the 
explanatory power of the theory and add to its scope and complexity. 
For example, vertical linkages with superordinate systems are not con­
sidered in the theory. Also propositions are developed only for interac­
tion strategies as the ultimate dependent variables. Progress in the con­
struction of formal theories will not be realized in single attempts to 
develop grand complex theories. Rather progress will come through the 
accumulative results of modest attempts to formalize small sets of con­
cepts into propositions and theories. For this reason, complexity and 
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scope are sacrificed for manageability. 
In Chapter III the propositions are developed and interrelated to 
form a theory of the process of organizational power relations. 
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CHAPTER III. A THEJOHÏ OF THE PROCESS OF 
ORGAnZATIONAL POWER 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop theoretical statements 
which interrelate concepts explicated from the abstract construct -
organizational power - and order the theoretical statements to build a 
theory of the process of organizational power. The development of con­
tinuous theoretical statements that form the main body of the theory of 
organizational power is emphasized. However, several either-or state­
ments that comprise assumptions for the theory are also presented.^  Cau­
sal modeling is the procedure chosen to order the continuous theoretical 
statements into an interrelated explanatory set that link the basis, ex­
ercise and manifestations of the process of organizational power. 
Limitations on the scope of the theory of organizational power 
The conceptualization of organizational power includes organiza­
tional effectiveness and prestige as ultimate outcomes of the process 
The important distinction between continuous and either-or theoret­
ical statements or propositions is elaborated in Chapter I. The criti­
cal distinction is the way concepts are connected in statements. Contin­
uous rather than discrete connections are necessary for mathematical 
modelling and analyses that allow maximum explanatory power. 
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of power relations. However, for this study causal connections are de­
veloped for the interaction strategies as the ultimate dependent varia­
bles in the causal model. Development of theoretical propositions and 
causal ordering beyond this point is considered outside the scope of the 
dissertation. 
The scope of the theory is also limited by the nature of linkages 
among organizations that are considered. The theory addresses organiza­
tions that are linked together horizontally to form a network. 
The chapter is organized into two main sections. The first section 
contains the assumption for the theory of organizational power and for 
the causal model approach. Continuous theoretical statements (proposi­
tions) are developed in the second section along with the theoretical 
rationale for linkages among concepts and for causal ordering. 
Theoretical Statements 
Theoretical assumptions 
"Social organization is the process of bringing patterns of social 
ordering and shared cultural meanings into human social interaction 
through time" (Olsen, 1978:6), As such, the process must involve at 
least two interacting actors. As interactions among actors continue 
throu^  time, they become patterned with shared meanings. Social order 
emerges from patterned relationships and shared meanings. Hence social 
organization is a process of emerging social order. And at any point in 
time the structure of the social order that has emerged can be described. 
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Social organization thus refers to the continuing process of emergent so­
cial order and to existing social structural entities. 
Organizations emerge from the process of social organizations and 
are products of that process. As such, organizations are social actors 
in their own right. Likewise, the patterned interactions and relation­
ships among organizations are also products of social organization. This 
is formally expressed below as a theoretical proposition - the first gen­
eral assumption of the theory of organizational power. 
A.l. Organizations and interorganizational relations are a part of 
the broad set of relationships, structures and processes of social organ­
ization. 
The structural entities that emerge from the process of social or­
ganization are also characterized by numerous more specific social proc­
esses. Examples are social conflict, integration and cohesion. Social 
power is one of the more fundamental and thus more important of these 
processes. Power infuses all social relationships and acts (Hawley, 1965). 
The relative energy to determine outcomes is characteristic of every so­
cial order and organization. Social order and or^ nization are thus not 
possible without power (Bierstedt, 1950). Based on this discussion the 
second theoretical statement provides a general assumption for the theory 
of organizational power and is stated as follows: 
A.2, Social power is a process inherent in all social organization. 
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Since power is a process inherent in all social organization, power 
characterizes the relations of two or more actors in a system. Socially, 
actors exist in reference to all other actors in a system. The distri­
bution of power in any system of actors is influenced by past and present 
conditions that are relevant to the actor's propensity to make certain 
outcomes occur and the ability of each actor to manipulate those condi­
tions to realize its own interests relative to the ability of other ac­
tors in the system (Burt, 1977a). The third assumption for the theory of 
organizational power is stated as follows; 
A.3. In a system of organizational actors each actor will purposively 
attempt to control resources in order to realize outcomes which will en­
hance the probability of it survival. 
The supply of resources valued by actors in a system tends to be 
limited. At some point resources will "run out," Even some attribute 
resources become limited by the manipulations of actors to balance the 
control of other resources (i.e., reputation, legitimacy). Since actors 
are purposive, the knowledge that resources are limited will promote at­
tempts to gain advantages over other actors concerning the control of re­
sources needed for realization of desired outcomes. This leads to the 
fourth assumption for the theory of organizational power. 
A.4. Power is unequally distributed among or^ nizational actors in a 
system where each actor exists socially in reference to each other actor 
and where the actors value the same resources (Rogers,M., 1974). 
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Systems of organizational actors include those where relations 
among the actors are influenced by the formal authority of superordinate 
actors or by actors that have regulating functions. While these organi­
zations, that are linked vertically to other organizations, are important 
actors to consider in the process of organizational power relations, the 
power process emerges among organizations where all relations are hori­
zontal, basically voluntary and no organization formally coordinates or 
regulates the activities of others. Hall, et al. (1977) argues, on the 
basis of data from organizations serving problem youth, that the power 
issue is resolved when the basis of contact among organizations is a le­
gal mandate. Nonetheless, power difference still exist. Differences in 
resources that are controlled and the ability to convert them to effect 
desired actions may also influence the selection of interaction strate­
gies to gain or balance power. Even when legal mandates are in effect 
there are elements of voluntarism in interorganizational contacts. Thus, 
horizontal contacts are functionally voluntary with legal mandates super­
imposed regarding certain specific relations. However, the magnitude of 
relationships may vary depending on the basis of contact that is per­
ceived to be most pervasive and thus is a potential moderating condition 
in the process of organizational power relations. The fifth assumption 
states; 
A.5. Organizational power relations exist in a network where linkages 
are horizontal and contacts are fundamentally voluntary. 
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Organizational power is viewed as a process which includes the ba­
sis, exercise and outcomes of power relations. As such, a causal sequenc­
ing of variables is assumed to exist which can he used to draw inferences 
about power relations. According to Bunge (1959s30), causation is only 
one type of determinancy that can be conceptualized. The notion of cau­
sation includes asymmetry; the idea of a recursive process of producing 
effects. Blalock (1964:9) notes that cause is always associated with the 
idea of something "producing" something else. Here the manifestations of 
organizational power relations are viewed as outcome effects produced by 
the relative capacity of organizations to control and convert resources. 
Furthermore the exercise of power (conversion of resources) depends on 
the basis of power (resources controlled). While power exercise is not 
completely determined by resources controlled, the dynamics of resource 
conversion for power exercise cannot develop without the control of re­
sources. For purposes of analysis the process is assumed to be a closed 
system which is isolated from all other disturbances not included in the 
system. Thus the causes of events that are posited are contingently nec­
essary rather than sufficient or absolutely necessary (Abel], 1971). They 
are "framed in" by the assumptions or initial conditions set forth in the 
theory. The final assumption for the theory of organizational power is 
stated below. 
A.6. Organizational power can be viewed from a process perspective 
that emphasizes causal, unidirectional relations among concepts which com­
prise its dimensions - the basis, exercise and manifestations of organiza­
tional power. 
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Figure 3«1 illustrates the general theoretical causal ordering of 
the concepts subsumed by the process of organizational power. 
Power Basis Power Exercise Power l'îanifes tat ions (interaction strategies) 
Availability of 
alternatives 
Access to or 
constraint over 
resource flows 
Resources 
possessed 
Motivational 
investment 
Obligations 
incurred 
Capacity to 
coordinate 
subunits 
Cooperation 
Circumvention 
Withdrawal 
Conflict 
Figure 5.1 Causal ordering of concepts 
Continuous theoretical statements 
The basis of the power relations of organizations is the relative 
control each has over resources valued by other organizations. Interac­
tion to gain needed resources is at the root of social power (Bannester, 
1969)0 Social power issues from the disposal of some situationally valued 
resource. Control of resources includes the amount and kind of resources 
of value that are possessed, the degree of constraint over resource flows 
and the availability of alternative sources of resources for specific goal 
oriented transactions. Power is fundamentally derived from the control 
over resources, not from the resources themselves. Other factors being 
equal; resources possessed, constraint over resource flows and alternative 
sources are directly interrelated in an accumulative fashion as the organ­
ization's basis or capacity for power. Possession, constraint and 
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availability of alternatives are directly and reciprocally related to 
one another, Mthough each (possession, constraint or alternatives) is 
possible without the others, each increases the likelihood of an organi­
zation obtaining and increasing control of resources as a basis for power. 
Causes of ability to exercise power The exercise of power is 
the organization's ability to convert resources to realize desired out­
comes. The ability to convert resources (power exercise) includes obli­
gations incurred by organizations in their interorganizational relations» 
the motivational investment in relations with other organizations and the 
capacity to coordinate subunits for goal attainment. 
The degree an organization is able to coordinate its subunits for 
action is a dimension of power exercise. It is the capacity to coordinate 
the activities of many units that transforms input resourceB into organi­
sational output commodities or actions. The extent of resource control 
directly affects an organization's capacity to coordinate subunits. Or­
ganizations with little control over resources will tend to have fewer 
subunits and fewer activities to coordinate (Blau and Schoenherr, I971).  
Or^ nizations with a small amount of resource control will have less ca­
pacity to create energy from the coordinated activities of a complexity 
of units because of a shortage of resources that can be mobilized, And 
shortages in controlled reaouroes that are needed by an organization 
;^ hen it is large and complex will promote divisiveneas and competition 
among subunits (Walton and Button, 1969» Oorwin, 1969). While 
each dimension of resource control is expected to positively and inde­
pendently influence the capacity of an organization to coordinate its 
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subunits, resources directly available through possession will have the 
strongest independent impact. The amount of resources actually possessed 
will be most relevant to the organization's complexity and coordination 
among subunits. General hypothesis number one (l) and Figure 3*2 for­
mally present these relationships. 
G.E.I, An organization's total capacity to coordinate its subunits 
relative to the capacities of other organizations in its set is a posi­
tive linear function of the combined effects of amount and type of re­
sources possessed, the degree of access and constraint it has over the 
flows of valued resources to and from other organizations and the number 
of alternative sources of valued resources it has available compared to 
other organizations in its set, the effect of each is significant. 
Resources 
possessed 
Constraint over 
resource flows 
Availability of 
alternatives 
Capacity to 
coordinate 
Figure 3,2 Variables affecting capacity to coordinate 
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Obligations incurred by an organization are an important aspect of 
the organization's ability to convert resources for power exercise. The 
basis of power does not freely become applied as power exercise unless 
there is potential for gain. Organizations will tend to not commit re­
sources in transactions unless there is potential to gain a valued recip­
rocal advantage. Obtaining valued resources constitutes a reciprocal ad­
vantage, but the most prized advantage and the one most crucial for power 
exercise is the potential to extract compliance for reciprocity. Blau 
(1964) suggests that actors unable to reciprocate in the exchange of re­
sources will incur obligations for compliance in future transactions. 
Thus an organization will attempt to maintain reciprocity of resources 
that are exchanged in order to avoid the accumulation of obligations. 
And the fewer its obligations the more an organization will be in a posi­
tion to commit its resources in transactions to extract compliance from 
other organizations. Thus the ability of sm organization to maintain non-
reciprocity of resource exchanges in its favor is an important factor in 
its willingness to convert resources for power exercise. Resources pos­
sessed, constraint over resource flows and availability of alternative 
sources of resources each influence the resource exchange ratios or the 
obligations incurred by organizations in their transactions. Organiza­
tions with ample amounts and types of valued resources, that have alter­
native sources of valued resources available or those that are in a posi­
tion to constrain other organizations' access to valued resources will 
tend to incur fewer obligations. However, it is possible for an actor 
to hold large amounts of valued resources and/or have a great deal of 
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constraint over resource flows and still accumulate obligations. Re­
sources possessed or constrained, althou^  valued, may not match the re­
sources needed for particular transactions. And some resources, al-
thou,^  valuable, cannot actually enter exchange transactions; i.e., an 
organization's legitimacy cannot be transferred to another actor as an 
exchange commodity (Burt, 1977a). In this sense the availability of al­
ternative sources of resources is particularly important in determining 
the obligations incurred by actors. Dependence is less to the extent al­
ternative sources are available to an actor (Emerson, 1962). Thompson 
(1967) argues that organizations seek to maintain alternative sources in 
order to minimize the power of any single organization. Levine and White 
(1961) also link the number of alternative sources to the dependence of 
an organization on other organizations in its set. The greater the num­
ber of alternative sources of valued resources that are available to an 
organization, the more it will be able to determine the nature and ratio 
of interorganizational exchange (Cook, 1977). This is so because the or­
ganization that can draw on alternatives will be less apt to deplete re­
sources and will be more apt to control a valued resource needed to keep 
the obligations it incurs in transactions at a minimum. Thus it will be 
able to maintain nonreciprocity of resource exchanges in its favor. 
An organization's capacity to coordinate will also directly influ­
ence the obligations it incurs in transactions with other organizations 
in its set. Resource control affects the reciprocity of transactions di­
rectly and indirectly via coordinated activities of subunits. This is so 
because concerted actions are needed to "free up" resources and effect 
interorganizational transactions. Organizations with low coordination 
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capacities will bm less able to reciprocate even if reciprocal resources 
are accessible and will thus accumulate a large number of obligations. 
Resources possessed, constraint over resource flows, availability of al­
ternatives and capacity to coordinate subunits are conceptualized as neg­
atively related to obligations incurred. Obligations increase as con­
trol of resources decreases. E&ch is expected to significantly influence 
obligations incurred when the effects of the other three are controlled. 
However, availability of alternatives will have the strongest in­
fluence on obligations incurred over and above the effects of resources 
possessed, constraint of resource flows and capacity to coordinate. 
These relationships are summarized in the second general hypothe­
sis and are diagrammed in Figure ),3. 
G.H.2. The relative number of total obligations incurred by an or-
mnization in its transactions with other organizations in its set is a 
negative linear function of the combined effects of the relative total 
amount and type of valued, resources it pOBsesseBj the degree of access 
and constraint it has over the flows of valued resources to and from 
other organizations, the number of alternative sources of valued re­
sources it has available and the extent of its capacity to coordinate 
subunits compared to other organizations in its set, the effect of each 
is significant. 
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Resources 
possessed 
Constraint over 
resource flows 
Availability of 
alternatives 
Capacity to 
coordinate 
Obligations 
incurred 
Figure 5.5 Variables affecting obligations 
Motivational investment in relationships is the third aspect of 
power exercise that is crucial for the analysis of the process of organi­
zational power. Emerson (1962) defined the dependence of A on B as di­
rectly proportional to A's motivational investment in goals mediated by 
B. Jacobs (1974) views A's motivational investment as the degree of 
"essentiality" or "substitutability" of resources to be obtained from B. 
Motivational investment is the importance of the relationship to A or A's 
willingness to substitute for entities received in relationships. Im­
portance or willingness to substitute reflects the extent shared values 
are sustained which will continue to define valuable resources as neces­
sities; Motivational investment is an important aspect of resouree con­
version as power exercise. Degree of motivational investment in rela­
tions is one important contingency in the commitment of resources to par­
ticular power balancing strategies. Organizations with a substantial 
power base advantage will tend to have developed more options for 
85 
substitution of resources than those with more limited power bases. 
Time, money and knowledges needed for development of alternative pro­
gramming to meet goals are more apt to be available to organizations with 
a power base advantage. Furthermore, organizations with a power base ad­
vantage will tend to "lead out" in the definition of values for any par­
ticular system, thus reducing their investment in motives that arise 
from relationships with more disadvantaged organizations. Likewise, 
those organizations that have a greater capacity to coordinate their in­
ternal units will be more apt to mobilize the resources needed to search 
out and negotiate offers for exchange. These organizations will be less 
apt to become committed to specific relationships which would curtail 
their abilities to maneuver and bargain for transactions that are most 
beneficial to them. Thus, resources possessed, constraint over resource 
flows, availability of alternative sources of valued resources and capac­
ity to coordinate subunits have a linear and inverse relationship with 
motivational investment. Each aspect of the basis of power and capacity 
to coordinate subunits is expected to significantly affect motives in­
vested in the relationship when the effects of the other aspects are con­
trolled. The contributions of each are expected to be uniform. These 
relationships are summarized in the third theoretical hypothesis and are 
depicted in Figure 3»4. 
G.H.5. The total comparative motivational investment of an organiza­
tion relative to other organizations in its set is a negative linear func­
tion of the combined effects of amount and type of resources possessed, 
the degree of access and constraint it has over the flows of valued 
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resources to and from other organizations, the number of alternative 
sources of valued resources it has available and the degree an organiza­
tion is able to coordinate its subunit s compared to other organizations 
in its set J the effect of each is significant. 
Resources 
possessed 
Constraint over 
resource flows 
Availability of 
alternatives 
Capacity to 
coordinate 
Motivational 
investment 
Figure 5«4 Variables affecting motivational investment 
Figure 3.5 illustrates all of the relationships among concepts in 
the process of organizational power that have been discussed thus far. 
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resource flows 
Availability of 
alternatives 
Obligations 
incurred 
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Figure 3«5 Causes of power exercise 
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Causes of interaction strategies The strategies that organiza­
tions select to interact with other organizations in their environmental 
set are part of the process of power and are conceptualized as manifes­
tations of power relations. The selection of interaction stmtegies de­
pends on the total amount of resource control and ability to mobilize re­
sources as power exercise an organization has compared to other orgemiza-
tions in its set. The objective for each organization is to maintain 
maximum power relative to other organizations and thus reduce the uncer­
tainty it faces in obtaining the resources needed to realize its own in­
terests, This is accomplished by increasing an existing power advantage 
relative to others or by balancing the power advantages of other organi­
zations. Organizations make gains in their power relations by manipulat­
ing resource dependency and vulnerability relative to other organizations. 
Organizations select strategies of interaction with other organizations 
that will reduce resource dependencies and uncertainties (Aldrich, 1976b). 
Under conditions of voluntarism organizations can choose cooperation» con­
flict, circumvention or «ithdraval as strategies for iateraotion with 
other organizations in their environment (Blau, I964), Which strategy is 
chosen by an organization in its effort to reduce critical dependencies 
on others, or increase the dependencies of others on it, is dependent upon 
particular combinations of the contingencies of the basis of power and 
ability to exercise power relative to others in its set. Generally 
speaking, organization A selects the interaction, given the relative con­
tingencies of resource control and ability to convert resources for power 
exercise, that will reduce A's dependence on B or increase B's dependence 
on A, 
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A number of studies of interorganizational relations have ex­
amined the relationship between "resources" and interorganizational 
interactions. However, the preponderance of theoretical and empiri­
cal analyses have focused on cooperative interactions. Conflict inter­
actions have received limited attention, while circumventing and with­
drawal strategies have received even less. 
A common approach is to examine the relationship of "resources" 
and "organizational interactions" using the exchange perspective. This 
perspective has a built in bias toward cooperative relations (Negandhi, 
1975; Mulford and Mulford, 1977)• Furthermore, the exchange orienta­
tion emphasizes how organizations adapt to environmental forces rather 
than how organizations seek to gain power to control environmental fac­
tors. The central theme is that an actor A (whether an individual or an 
organization) will engage in an exchange relation with actor B if each 
can obtain valued resources equal to or exceeding their costs. While 
power has become a central concept in the exchange paradigm, particu­
larly in resource dependency and political economic formulations, it is 
limited in ability to explain how organizations use cooperative inter­
actions to gain power or balance the power advantages of other organiza­
tions. 
À shortage of resources (resource dependency) is most often viewed 
as a cause of exchange interaction (Levine and White, 1961; Aiken and 
Hage, 1968; Aldrich, 1976b; Reid, 1964; Schmidt and Kochan, 1977). How­
ever, these studies did not examine resource scarcity directly in terms 
of a set of resources valued by organizations. leather they have 
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assumed certain resources to be valued and scarce. 
In a study of health and welfare organizations Levine and White 
(1961) found resource scarcity to be positively related to the number of 
exchange relations an organization had with others in its set. In a 
further study of the same organizations, perceived shertage of staff and 
funds were directly related to the number of interorganizational ex­
changes (Levine, White and Paul; I963). Aiken and Hage (I968) present 
data to support the argument that organizations interact in order to ob­
tain resources needed for new and innovative programs. Resource scarcity 
is an assumed condition for these organizations. And while Schmidt and 
Kochan (1977) argue for a positive relationship between resource scar­
city and number of interactions their data do not allow a direct test of 
the relationship. 
Cook (1977) argues that organizations enter exchange relations be­
cause of specialized function and resource scarcity with specialization 
of function being the major cause of scarcity. Aldrich (1976b) similarly 
reasons that the need to relieve resource sbortages prompts or^ nizations 
to make transactions. 
A few writers present contrasting arguments for the relationship 
between scarcity of resources and frequency of exchange interactions, 
Adamek and Lavin (1975)» in an attempt to replicate the Levine and White 
(1961) study, found that organizations with few resources were less likely 
to engage in exchanges. They concluded that while resource scarcity, in 
a system generally, may motivate exchange, adequate supplies of resources 
are associated with more frequent exchanges because organizations can 
avoid a negative cost benefit ratio. 
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Litwak and Rothman (1970) and Blau and Scott (1962) also suggest a 
negative relationship between resource scarcity and frequency of ex­
changes. Finally, in a study of organizational pairs, Paulson (197&) 
found support for his hypothesis that the greater the difference between 
two organizations resources, the greater the perceived exchange interac­
tion. Rogers and Maas (1978) were unable to present conclusive empiri­
cal evidence for the relationship between difference in resources and 
interactions for pairs of natural resource agencies. Thus it remains un­
clear as to whether organizations with scarce or ample resources are more 
prone to cooperative interorganizational interactions. 
These conflicting results may be clarified by distinguishing some 
contingencies which impact the exchange relationship. First of all, the 
view of interorganizational interactions as strategies an organization 
selects to increase or balance power advantages focuses attention on the 
actor that initiates the interaction. McNeil (1978) speaks to the need 
for social scientists to study how organizations gain control over their 
environments to gain power, xhis ia in contrast to the prevalent use of 
adaptation models which focus on how organizations adapt to and are con­
trolled by their environments. In adaptation models there is a tendency 
to lose sight of the process of organizational power. 
Secondly, the various aspects of resource control; structural con­
straint, availability of alternative sources of resources and resources 
possessed; may interact to make the selection of different interaction 
strategies more advantageous in their power process. 
Thirdly, certain intervening conditions combine with elements of re­
source control to produce specific advantageous strategies. The capacity 
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to coordinate subunita, the number of obligations accumulated in pre­
vious transactions and the strength of motives invested in a relation­
ship are critical intervening factors that impact the selection of an 
interaction strategy. 
Finally, organizations will use specific cooperative strategies -
contracting, coopting and coalescing - depending on the advantages the 
strategy offers for increasing or balancing its power relations. 
While an organization with limited resource control may engage in 
cooperative relations, it is not as likely to initiate as many informal 
cooperative exchange transactions with other organizations in its set as 
is the organization that controls many and large amounts of valued re­
sources. The number of alternatives available to an organization is a 
critical factor in determining selection of the interaction strategy. Or­
ganizations will more frequently select to cooperate with informal agree­
ments, cooptation and joint programming with other organizations to ex­
ploit a power advantage. Organizations with a power disadvantage will at­
tempt to avoid eooptation by and joint programming with more powerful or­
ganizations or will seek to circumvent those that have advantage over 
them in order to cooperate with or^ nizations with which they have more 
equitable power relations, the more alternatives they have available to 
them or they will be more apt to select formal agreements in order to gain 
more certain future commitments. Conversely, the fewer the number of al­
ternatives open to organizations the more they will tend to use conflict 
to block the use or development of alternatives by others or they will 
withdraw from relations altogether. However, the extent an organization 
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has motives invested in relations with others and the number of obliga­
tions incurred in previous transactions are intervening conditions of 
power exercise that affect the selection of an interaction strategy. 
Obli^ tions accumulated and motives invested in relations both act to 
promote compliance. Organizations that are in debt to others are con­
strained to comply with the desires of the creditors, while those with 
more motives invested share values that define resources as essential, 
thus reducing substitutability and constraining them to enter relations 
where there will be more risk of inability to reciprocate. Organizations 
with high capacities to coordinate subunits will be able to utilize re­
sources at their disposal to maximum advantage. Coordinated efforts will 
tend to enhance ability to reciprocate in transactions and thus reduce 
the number of obligations incurred. Thus, relatively fewer obligations 
and motivational investments and greater capacities to coordinate sub-
units constitute an advantage for power exercise. The fewer obligations 
accumulated in previous transactions and the less the extent of motiva­
tional investment in relations with other organizations in its environ­
ment compared to other organizations, the more frequently an organization 
will select informal contracting, cooptation and coalescence as coopera­
tive interaction strategies. 
The organization with an advantage for power exercise will tend to 
select a cooperative exchange strategy to maintain or increase an exist­
ing power advantage. An organization with many alternatives and a large 
advantage for power exercise will more often initiate a cooperative strat­
egy in order to exploit nonreciprocal relations in the knowledge that it 
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has more control over alteimatives than its exchange partners do. Its 
ability to obtain benefits equal to or in excess of costs is thus maxi­
mized relative to other organizations. In this situation the organiza­
tion will tend to initiate informal contacts, cooptation and/or coales­
cence with as many of its suppliers as possible in order to maintain re­
ciprocity advantages as a hedge against unfavorable circumstances in the 
future (Thompson, 196?; Cook, 1977)» 
As alternatives become fewer and as motivational investment in­
creases compared to other organizations, the organization will seek to 
maintain its power advantage by directly blocking and opposing other or­
ganizations ' access to alternatives. When alternatives are equalized 
throughout the environmental set and resources are in demand, conditions 
of perfect competition prevail. In this circumstance we would expect or­
ganizations to initiate fairly equal numbers of conflict and cooperative 
interactions. But these conditions are highly unstable over time and 
they do not exist simultaneously for all input and output resources» 
The greater the obligations accumulated in previous transactions 
and the weaker the motivational investment in relations with other organi­
zations in its environment the more frequently an organization will choose 
circumvention as an interaction strategy to gain an advantage or balance 
the advantage for power exercise of other organizations. Given more obli­
gations and less motivational investment, the organization will more of­
ten initiate circumvention as a power balancing tactic when altermtives 
are available and as they increase relative to others. Cartels are often 
developed among those more disadvantaged for power exercise in order to 
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gain power throu^  concentration, reducing the alternatives of the more 
powerful organizations. Cook (1977) asserts that less powerful organiza­
tions cooperate with one another to gain a competitive advantage against 
dominant organizations. Frequency of initiation of circumvention strate­
gies increases as the number of alternatives increase since more alterna­
tives enhance the probability that any specific resource can be obtained 
elsewhere. 
Organizations will choose to withdraw from interorganizational re­
lations more frequently as the extent of their power exercise disadvan­
tage increases and as alternatives become fewer relative to other organi­
zations. As the number of alternatives decrease relative to others there 
will be fewer opportunities for use of circumventing tactics. As the re­
lative number equalizes in the organizational set, organizations will 
tend to choose circumvention and withdrawal with equal frequency, if re­
lative motivational investment is constant. However, motivational in­
vestment will interact with obligations and alternatives to produce cir­
cumvention or withdrawal as the chosen strategy. As an orgaaizatioa be­
comes relatively more disadvantaged for power exercise through increasing 
obligations and motivational investments and as alternatives become fewer, 
it will choose to withdraw from relations with other organizations with 
increasing frequency. The probability that withdrawal will be the only 
power balancing strategy option open will increase as the organization be­
comes increasingly disadvantaged relative to others in the organizational 
set. 
In summary, organizations with greater power advantage relative to 
other organizations; i.e., they have fewer obligations and motives 
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invested in relations and have a greater number of alternative sources; 
will seek cooperative exchange relations with others. However, as the 
situation reverses for each of these contingencies of power basis and ex­
ercise, they will tend to withdraw from interactions and become isolates 
in the interaction network, When the contingencies of ability to exer­
cise power combine with the basis of power so that organizations have an 
advantage in terms of obligations Incurred, but have a limited number of 
alternatives and have strong motives Invested in relations, they will 
tend to come into conflict with other organizations in order to obtain 
needed resources by coercion or to block attempts of less advantaged or­
ganizations to circumvent them. Conversely, organizations will more fre­
quently seek to circumvent other organizations the more alternatives they 
have, the greater their accumulated obligations and the weaker the mo­
tives are that are invested in the relations. 
These relationships among dimensions of resource control and conver­
sion and interaction strategies selected by organizations are stated for­
mally in theoretical hypotheses four (4), five (5), six (6) and seven (?)• 
G.H.4. The relative frequency of selection of cooperative exchange 
strategies by an organization is a linear function of the combination of 
the positive direct effects of the total amount and type of regourçes 
possessed, total degree of access and constraint over resource flows, the 
number of alternatives available, the extent of capacity to coordinate 
subunits and the negative direct effects of number of obligations accu­
mulated and strength of motivational investment relative to other organi­
zations in its set, the effect of each is significant. 
94 
Gr.H.5. The relative extent of conflict initiated by an organization 
with other members of its set is a linear function of the combination of 
positive direct effects of the total amount and type of resources pos­
sessed, total degree of access and constraint over resource flows, the 
extent of capacity to coordinate subunits and the strength of motives in­
vested in relations and the negative direct effects of the number of al­
ternatives available and the number of obligations accumulated relative 
to other organizations in its set, the effect of each is significant, 
G.He6, The relative frequency of selection of a strategy of circum­
vention by an organization is a linear function of the combination of the 
negative direct effects of total amount of resources possessed, total de­
gree of constraint over resource flows, the total capacity to coordinate 
subunits and the strength of motives invested in relations and the posi­
tive direct effects of the number of alternatives available and the number 
of obligations accumulated in transactions relative to other organizations 
in its sst, the effect of each is ai^ if leant « 
G.H.7. The relative frequency an organization withdraws from interac­
tion with other organizations in its set is a linear function of the com­
bination of negative direct effects of total amount of resources pos­
sessed, total extent of constraint over resource flows, the total number 
of alternatives available, the total capacity to coordinate and the posi­
tive direct effects of the number of obligations incurred and the strength 
of motives invested in relations with others relative to other organiza­
tions in its set, the effect of each is significant. 
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The complete theoretical causal model 
The complete theoretical causal model is presented in Figure ).6. 
The model illustrates the causal ordering of concepts and propositions to 
form a theory of the process of interorganizational power relations. 
Refinement of the theoretical model 
The model presented in Figure ).6 can be simplified for analysis by 
including only initiation of cooperative and conflict strategies as endo­
genous variables. Redundancy exists in the model as presented. As po­
sited, selection of withdrawal strategies is a function of combined ef= 
fects that are the reverse of those that produce selection of cooperative 
strategies. Likewise, selection of circumvention is a function of com­
bined effects that are the reverse of those that produce conflict. Thus, 
the theory is most parsimoniously presented in Figure 3*7 as a causal 
model with selection of cooperative and conflict strategies as the 
final dependent (endogenous) variables. 
Theoretical statistical propositions 
Theoretical statistical propositions are specified to assure consis­
tency between the theoretical relationships hypothesized and the testing 
or validation of relationships with empirical observations. Since this is 
a theory construction or theory building exercise, the aim is to determine 
the potential validity of the theory by assessing its consistency with em­
pirical observations. The theoretical statistical hypothesis for each 
general hypothesis takes the following form; 
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Figure 3»6 The ca,usal model of the process of organizational power. 
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Figure 5.7 Revised causal model of the process of organizational power. 
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Null hypothesis: The population multiple correlation / 0 
Alternative: The population multiple correlation / 0 
In Chapter IV empirical hypotheses are specified that correspond to 
the general hypotheses in this chapter. Likewise, the empirical statis­
tical hypotheses are presented. These four types of propositions are 
developed to insure integration of the theory and the appropriate mea­
surement and statistics for empirical analysis. While many studies omit 
specification of the theoretical statistical propositions, it is an im­
portant element of the integration of theory, measurement and statistical 
analysis. Both the general propositions of the theory ami the theoretical 
statistical propositions refer to the population of units of analysis. 
After statistical empirical analysis using a sample of units it is by 
means of the theoretical statistical propositions and model that infer­
ences are made back to the population (Warren, Klonglan and Faisal, 1977)« 
5»^ 
CHAPTER IV. OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS AND 
LINKAGES: METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
Introduction 
The theoretical concepts, propositions and the causal model of or­
ganizational power were presented in Chapters II and III. The process of 
building the theory of power is continued in Chapter IV. The objectives 
of this chapter are to present: (l) the operationalization of the units 
of analysis, concepts and linkages to guide the selection of indicators 
and procedures to bring concepts and propositions to an empirical level 
and (2) the methods and statistical procedures that can be used to assess 
the fit between the causal model and data. 
Operational Definitions 
The operational definitions that arc developed m this Ouâptôj? sêzvc 
to specify procedures for identifying indicators that cm* be used to rep­
resent the meaning space for each of the complex concepts included in 
the dimensions of organizational power (Figure 2.2). The scope of mean­
ing of each of the concepts was provided by the theoretical definition 
outlined in Chapter II. The operational definition is a bridge between 
an abstract concept and its indicator(s) and serves to outline procedures 
for developing measures to indicate the concept (Warren, et al., 1977). 
The theoretical concepts are complex and meant to apply across a variety 
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of social situations. Thus, there is no one proper operational defini­
tion for a theoretical concept and all possible operational definitions 
cannot be presented here. Bather, general operational approaches will be 
discussed for each of the complex concepts. Â basic assumption is that 
the abstract concepts in the model of power are highly complex. Opera-
tionalization and measurement of the concepts must attend to this feature 
if indicators are to be valid. Thus much effort will be needed to identi­
fy indicators that will reflect all the dimensions of a concept. Given 
the complexity of the concepts involved indicators of a concept repre­
senting different dimensions will not necessarily be homogenous. In 
other words because they are apt to represent different aspects of mean­
ing they will not always be hig^ily intercorrelated. This dissertation is 
a model building effort. The intent is to document some progress in the 
definition of concepts and selection of measures that validly represent 
the concepts. The operational definitions and indicators specific to 
the concrete features of the particular set of data to be used in this 
study are presented to allow an assessment of the adequacy of the theoret­
ical model and the specification of areas where further work in model 
building is needed. Specifically, the aim is to build an auxiliary theory 
that will allow its assessment against competing theories. 
Approaches to measurement 
The single indicator, multiple indicators and indexes are three ba­
sic approaches to measurement of theoretical concepts or unobserved /ami­
ables (Jacobson and Lalu, 1974). The single indicator approach is the 
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simplest and uses only one indicator (measure) to capture the entire do­
main of meaning of a theoretical concept. This approach has the disad­
vantage of the need to assume that a single indicator accounts for most 
of the variation in the true variable and that the association of the 
true variable with another occurs only through the posited link with its 
single indicator.^ 
The index procedure uses a combination of several indicators to 
build a composite or summary measure. While an index has the advsuitage 
over single indicators of being able to more adequately represent the 
meaning space of highly abstract, multidimensional concepts, there are 
disadvantages of using index measures. Namely, the problem of specifi­
cation error can be exaggerated and adequate theoretical rationale for 
construction of summary measures is often lacking. 
The multiple indicators approach, unlike the use of indexes, main­
tains the separate identity of each indicator throughout the analysis. 
While there are disadvantages to the use of multiple indicators, the ad­
vantages of more complete representation of the scope of meaning of high­
ly abstract concepts, along with the opportunity afforded to test for 
differential bias, recommends the procedure for measurement of many socio­
logical concepts, particularly highly complex concepts. For these reasons, 
I consider multiple indicators to be the most useful approach for measure­
ment of concepts included in the theoretical construct, organizational 
^Jacobson and Lalu (1974) detail the advantages and disadvantages 
of all three approaches to the measurement of theoretical concepts. 
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power. Much of the efforts devoted to building a theory of organiza­
tional power must therefore be directed at the identification and evalu­
ation of multiple indicators for the complex concepts subsumed by the 
power construct. 
Although the potential advantages of using multiple indicators to 
measure complex concepts in causal models seem to outvfei^  disadvantages 
in comparison to the use of single indicators or indexes (jacobson and 
Lalu, 1974), there are some disadvantages to their use. 
One critical problem is that selection criteria ordinarily assume 
high intercorrelations within blocks and homogenous or consistent rela­
tionships across blocks (Costner, 19^ 9; Sullivan, 1971). Costner's con­
sistency criterion has been found to be too easily achieved when across-
block intercorrelations are «C + ,)0. And no test of the hypothesis of 
consistency has been developed (Mayer and Younger, 1975)* 
An equal number of indicators should also be selected for each con­
cept in the model, especially for independent variables. Jacobson and 
Lalu (1974) have shown that unequal numbers of indicators can often result 
in misleading results due to problems of differential repetitiveness and 
unequal redundancy. The effects of several indicators, each highly cor­
related to the dependent variable, may partition out while fewer indica­
tors of another unmeasured concept, although less strongly related to the 
dependent variable may remain in the model as significant effects. 
A further problem is that indicators of highly complex concepts may 
not be hi^ ly intercorrelated, especially in the early stages of model de­
velopment. When this is so, techniques based on the assumption of high 
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within-block correlations, cannot be used to assess measurement and spe­
cification error in a model. The problem of measurement error is a cri­
tical one for sociological research because of reliance on fallible in­
struments (Hiese and Bohmstedt, 1970). Steps should be taken to adjust 
for errors of measurement in order to avoid erroneous conclusions. How­
ever, unless one can assume hi^  intra-block correlations and consistent 
across-block correlations, specific procedures are not available for ad-
2 justments due to measurement error. 
A further problem of the use of multiple indicators in causal mod­
elling involves assessing the fit between the model and data. Even with 
single models, the number of relationships that must be separately ana­
lyzed can be burdensome. In order to retain the advantages of multiple 
indicators for causal model analysis, a circumstance where they are 
needed most, Sullivan (l97l) proposes the use of multiple-partial cor­
relation coefficients. This is the procedure that will be used to ana­
lyze the block-recursive causal model of organizational power with mul­
tiple indicators. 
Procedures for estimating the consistency or stability (reliability 
of measures) and the degree to which a measure captures the meaning of a 
theoretical concept of interest (validity of measures) also assume high 
o^rks by Warren, White and Fuller (1974) and Faisal and Warren 
(l970:a,b) provide a more complete elaboration of the application of the 
errors-in-variables procedure to correct for measurement and specifica­
tion error in linear regression models. 
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within-block correlations and homogenous across-block correlations 
(Bohrnstedt, 1970). In the early stages of model building enou^  indica­
tors may not be developed that represent all dimensions of complex con­
cepts. In this circumstance indicators of single concepts may or may not 
be highly intercorrelated or correlated in the same way across complex 
concepts. Estimates of reliability of the measures are apt to not be 
available. And criteria for assessing the validity of measures should 
focus more on the adequacy of the auxiliary theory that is developed for 
a specific empirical analysis (Blalock and Blalock, 1968) than on sta­
tistical procedures that assume hi^  interrelationships among indicators 
of a complex concept. In later stages of model building, when a number 
of indicators have been developed for each complex concept, these proce­
dures will more likely be applicable to estimate the validity of indica­
tors for separate dimensions of the complex concepts. 
Because this study utilizes secondary data, a limited number of in­
dicators are available. The indicators of single concepts are not al­
ways expected to be highly intercorrelated. Thus the indicators are apt 
to not meet the assumptions required to empirically assess the validity 
of measurement of the complex concepts subsumed by the process of inter-
organizational power. 
Formal organizations - the units of analysis 
The concepts included in the theory of organizational power charac­
terize the relations of organizations as actors. In theoretical terms, 
organizations are collectivities of individuals where mechanisms of 
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integration are formally defined (Blau and Scott, I962). These formally 
organized collectivities have divisions of labor which specify a plurality 
of different positions and are actively seeking to accomplish certain 
tasks. In operational terms, organizations are fixed as to time and 
space, have a specific name and location, have a published statement of 
mission and goals and an organizational chart of positions with descrip­
tions of role expectations for incumbents. 
The empirical units of analysis used to evaluate the causal model 
are county natural resource organizations located in five counties in 
Northeast Iowa in 1976. The five Northeast Iowa counties; Howard, Win­
neshiek, Allamakee, Payette and Clayton; were selected because of the 
unique character of their natural resources. 
The major criteria used in selecting agencies for the study were: 
(1) that an agency have at least county-wide responsibility and (2) that 
it be involved in managing natural resources or have programs that re­
lated to the use of natural resources. The park managers of the three 
largest urban areas in the region also were interviewed. The twelve 
agencies studied were: Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Ser­
vice (ASCS); Farmer's Home Administration (PmHA); Soil Conservation Ser­
vice (ses); Cooperative Extension Service (CES); County Conservation 
Board (CCB); County Engineer's Office (CS)); Fish and Game SîfGroeasnt 
(F6E); District Forest Unit (DFU); Fish Management Biology Unit (Sîffi); 
State Park Ranger (SPR); State Forest Administrative Unit (SFA); and 
Wildlife Biology Unit (WBU). In each agency the top administrator was 
interviewed. 
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Not every agency had a local unit in each of the counties studied, 
therefore the total number of units studied was 59. In instances where 
an agency had multicounty responsibilities, it was included in the county 
where its office was physically located. Units of the FmHA., D6E, DFU, 
PMB and WBU were so classified. One District Forester worked in two of 
the study counties, but his office was located outside the study area. 
The interview in this situation was conducted within the context of the 
study county where the forester was most active and most familiar. A 
brief description of each of the agencies follows. 
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service Agricultural 
Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) is a United States Depart­
ment of Agriculture (DSDA) agency and is organized on a county basis. It 
provides cost-share funds (50 to 75 percent) to landowners who install 
permanent soil and water conservation practices on their land designed to 
control erosion and to prevent siltation and waste pollution. The major 
practices covered by cost-sharing include construction of lagoons, pits, 
settling basins, terraces, diversions, dams, ponds, permanent grass cover, 
sod waterways, buffer strips and tree plantings and timber improvement. 
A proportion of their funds (about 5 percent) is allocated to the Soil 
Conservation Service for technical assistance. The Forest Incentive Pro­
gram (cost-share ranging from 50 to 75 percent) is designed to encourage 
tree planting and timber stand improvements in selected counties; an Iowa 
Conservation Commission District Forester provides planning and technical 
assistance for this program. In this program, a primary client is the 
smaller private forest owners. Forest improvement practices supported 
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throu^  the program include planting trees and improving timber (e.g., 
thinning, pruning, release of seedlings and site preparation). 
Farmer's Home Administration The Farmer's Home Administration 
(FmHA) is a USDA agency that makes many different types of loans to groups 
and individuals. Loans may be secured by rural communities seeking to 
develop water supply and sewage systems. Resource Conservation and De­
velopment loans are made to public bodies and to nonprofit corporations 
for open space acquisition, recreation development and water supply proj­
ects, FmHA soil and water loans support a variety of activities includ­
ing farm pond construction and repair, building dikes, terrace and ero­
sion control structures, land treatment practices and the establishment 
of permanent pastures and farm forests. Recreation loans are made to as­
sist eligible farmers who wish to convert their land to income-producing 
recreation enterprises including swimming, fishing, boating and camping. 
Soil Conservation Service The Soil Conservation Service (SCS) 
assists conservation districts, communities, watershed groups, federal 
and state agencies and other cooperators with erosion control and water 
management problems by bringing about needed physical adjustments in land 
use. Its purpose is to conserve soil and water resources, improve agri­
culture and reduce damage caused by floods and sedimentation. The service 
provides technical assistance for these programs to individuals, groups 
and governmental bodies at the county level throu^  the 100 soil conserva­
tion districts in Iowa. The conservation districts are administered by 
the Iowa State Department of Soil Conservation. These districts receive 
state funds through the Department of Soil Conservation. 
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The Soil Conservation Service provides technical assistance for 
conservation operations, soil surveys and river basin surveys. It also 
provides technical and financial assistance for the watersheds and flood 
prevention program (small watershed program) and resource conservation 
and development projects (RC & D). Assistance to the small watersheds 
and RC & D projects is provided through local sponsoring groups. 
Cooperative Extension Service Education is the goal of a fourth 
USDA agency - Extension Service (CES). County Extension programs assist 
residents, particularly farmers, in interpreting problems and in applying 
technology based on research. Major educational programs include those 
dealing with pollution, land use planning and conservation and development 
of natural resources (soil, water, mineral). Area or office specialists 
are available to assist county personnel with specific needs or problems 
and to provide special services. Extension personnel work with other 
USDA agencies in supplying information on conservation-oriented farming 
practices, particularly with regard to plowing practices and the appli­
cation of pesticides. 
County Conservation Board County Conservation Boards (CCB) are 
established in 98 Iowa counties, including four of the five counties in 
the study area. County governments, working through conservation boards 
are authorized to acquire, develop, maintain and make available to resi­
dents of the county, public parks, preserves, park ways, playgrounds, 
recreation centers, forests and wildlife and conservation areas and to 
encourage the development of natural resources« The Executive Officer of 
the Board is responsible for carrying out policies established by a three-
member park board and makes day-to-day decisions about the management of 
109 
county lands and parks. The State Conservation Commission advises and 
counsels management and planning activities and reviews large (over 
$2,500) acquisition and development expenditures and plans. 
County Engineer's Office Only one of the counties in the study 
has adopted a zoning ordinance; therefore, the County Engineer's Office 
(CEO) was included in the study because it often is the unit that handles 
problems associated with land use. This office also is responsible for 
the design and maintenance of county roads and bridges. The Engineer's 
Office also is responsible for enforcing county sanitation ordinances, 
particularly landfill and sewage disposal regulations. It frequently 
relates to the provision of public recreation facilities, stream channeli­
zation and waterway diversion because of its assigned responsibilities. 
Fish and Game Enforcement Pish and Game Officers (FGE) are em­
ployed by the Iowa Conseirvation Commission in each county. As peace of­
ficers, they are responsible for enforcing the state's fish and wildlife 
laws, including licensing, capture limits and other regulations. Some of 
their other duties include field surveys, hunter safety programs emd in­
vestigations and local public relations. 
District Forester The objectives of the Forestry Section of the 
Iowa Conservation Commission are to foster environmental protection and 
to ensure economic and social benefits from trees, forest lands and re­
lated resources. Twelve forestry units are distributed across the state. 
District Foresters (DFU) provide technical management advice to landowners 
on questions about forestry practices and particularly in the development 
of forestry management plans. Foresters are responsible for the technical 
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phase and inspection of ASCS cost-share forestry practices, including 
tree-planting and timber stand improvement. Through a state tree farm 
program management recognition is given to landowners involved in contin­
ued production of a forest crop. The district Forester works with other 
sections of the Conservation Commission on forest management of state 
lands. 
State Park Ranger Unit The State Park Hanger (SPR) is charged 
with preserving and maintaining state parks and preserve areas. Park 
rangers are stationed at the State's larger holdings and oversee the 
maintenance and security of these areas. Rangers are responsible for 
maintaining the parks as refuges for fish and wildlife, as well as provid­
ing recreation opportunities for the general public. 
State Forest Administration Unit The Yellow River State Forest 
is a 5»800 acre multiple-use area. The unit manager's responsibilities 
include management of game and forested acreage, operation of a sawmill 
and the maintenance and supervision of recreational facilities. The for­
est serves as a research and demonstration area for state land management 
practices and forest management training seminars for area and state re­
source managers. 
Fish Management Biologist Unit The object of the Fish Management 
Biologist Unit (mb) is to improve fishing and to bring about a greater 
harvest of fish from existing waters through the latest scientific fish 
management techniques. Fish Management Biologists provide a variety of 
services to other sections of the Conservation Commission as well as to 
private landowners. They participate in the planning and management of 
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a trout stocking program, private farm pond planning and fish population 
management. The Mississippi River presents special problems in terms of 
pollution management, commercial fishing supervision and dredge spoils 
management. These units are directly responsible to the Fisheries sec­
tion of the Iowa Conservation Commission, 
Wildlife Biologist Unit The Wildlife Biology Unit (WBU) pro­
vides wildlife management support in the form of land and water manage­
ment, the recreational harvest of animals and by providing technical as­
sistance to state and local units. The Wildlife Biology Unit is particu­
larly concerned with maintenance of wildlife habitat on private land. Its 
objective is to provide opportunities for game harvest without jeopardiz­
ing the species involved. Personnel in the 20 Wildlife Biology units in 
the state study animal populations to establish game seasons. The Wild­
life Section of the Iowa Conservation Commission manages lands designated 
as game management areas. 
Data were collected through personal interviews with the 39 top 
administrators in these agencies. Data were originally collected for the 
study, "Interagency Planning for Natural Resource Management" which was 
funded by the Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station (Proj­
ect 102-40-75-73-2042), Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. Dr. David 
Rogers was the principal investigator and directed the research to answer 
the general question, "Is the present use and development of natural re­
sources in the five-county area an unintended outcome of numerous public 
agencies or the intended outcome of coordinated actions by relevant agen­
cies?". 
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Basis of power - control of relevant resources 
The control of relevant resources as the basis of differential 
power among organizations has been defined theoretically as the capacity 
to hold resources for conversion to influence social action. The capac­
ity to hold resources is reflected in the total amount and kind of re­
sources possessed, total constraint over the flow of resources in the 
system and the total availability of alternative sources of valued re­
sources compared to other organizations in a network. 
Possession of resources Resources possessed are defined as 
those commodities or attributes held or owned by an organization that are 
valued and needed for goal attainment. Operations of the type of re­
sources that are valued by organizations must be determined. Indica­
tors of resources possessed can then be developed to reflect the number 
of different valued types, the amount of each valued type and the degree 
of value as comparative properties of the relations between organizations. 
Thus, valued resources can be described in concrete situations as 
those resources that boundary spanning units and/or top administrators 
report are valued or needed by the organization to meet its goals. In 
operational terms, resources possessed are those valued resources that the 
top administrators report that organizations have in their possession. 
Another approach is to determine valued resources based on the re­
ports of boundary spanning units of all organizations in a particular set 
of organizations. Operationally, the extent of value of a resource is 
quantified by the number of votes it receives by organizations in the set. 
Amount and type of resources with specific extents of value are then de­
termined from the reports of boundary spanners. 
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Possession of resources can also be operationalized by obtaining the 
perceptions of top administrators and/or boundary spanners concerning the 
degree organizations suffer from scarcity of specific valued resources 
which constrains the organization's effectiveness. This approach assumes 
that resources perceived to be scarce are also valued resources. 
It is apparent that possession of resources is a complex concept 
which encompasses a number of dimensions of meaning in terms of resources 
that are valued and scarce. This means that a number of indicators are 
needed to validly measure the concept. Furthermore, indicators that are 
valid will reflect all aspects of meaning and will not necessarily be 
highly interrelated. 
In this study resources possessed was operationalized by asking top 
administrators of the natural resource agencies to state the actual amount 
of the agency's operating budget and to rate the perceived scarcity of bud­
get. Actual budget and perceived scarcity of budget were thus selected as 
two separate indicators of resources possessed. These indicators only 
reflect the amount of one type of resource possessed. It is assumed that 
money available for agency operations is a resource valued by all the na­
tural resource agencies (Benson, 1975)• 
However actual budget and perceptions represent two different di­
mensions of resource possession and are not expected to be highly cor­
related. It is likely that administrators will sometimes perceive scarc­
ity for the orgsmization's budget even when dollar accounts are large and 
perceive no scarcity when dollar amounts are small, depending upon the 
nature of goals and services. 
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Top administrators were asked: 
(1) What were your organization's total operating expenditures for the 
previous calendar year (actual amount in dollars)? and 
(2) How strongly do you agree with the following statement as a limita­
tion on the overall effectiveness of your organizational unit? 
(a) Our budget is too small (l-very strongly agree, 2-3trongly agree, 
5-agree, 4-no opinion, ^ -disagree, 6-strongly disagree, 7-very 
strongly disagree) 
Scores were computed for each measure as comparative characteris­
tics of the relations of each organization with other organizations in 
its county set. Comparative values were calculated by finding the dif­
ference between the score of each organization and the score of each 
other organization in the county, and summing them together to form a 
single score for the focal organization's relations. For example, if 
county X had organizations A, B, C and D within its boundaries; the com­
parative budget of A in its relations with B, C and D equals (A^  - B^ ) + 
- G_) + (A_ - D_).^  The actual size of budgets determine the theoret-ij D D 
ical range of values for comparative actual budget.^  
5 Log transformations were performed on actual operating budget 
scores prior to obtaining total difference scores. 
T^he total comparative scores for each variable in the study were 
corrected for the unequal number of organizations in the five counties by 
iividing by n-1, where n = the number of organizations in the county set. 
Scores for each measure were transformed to positive values by setting the 
highest negative value = 0 and adding the difference between that value 
and 0 to every other value. 
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« 
The actual range of comparative actual budget scores is 0 to 2.899* 
The theoretical range of values for perceived budget scarcity is 0 to 7» 
The actual range of comparative perceived scarcity of budget is 0 to 
7.44. The descriptive statistics for both comparative measures are pro­
vided in Chapter V. 
Access to and constraint of resource flows Access to and con­
straint of resource flows was operationally defined as the location of an 
organization within a network regarding its connectedness, which is stra­
tegic for mediating resources to and from the other organizations. Opera­
tions of access and constraint should be aimed at the degree of connected­
ness by exchange interactions among boundary spanners and/or top admin­
istrators. Interactions among directors and information exchange are 
types of exchange activities (Rogers, 1974a). 
One assumption is that an organization in the center of interaction 
and information activity within a network can often gain access to or con­
strain the flow of other valued resources to other organizations without 
actually pOBSêBsiag the resources (Burt, 1977:292). Degree of centrality 
in terms of connectedness with other organizations is the variable of 
interest here. The underlying variable is the extent an organization is 
in a central position of connectedness compared to other organizations -
the degree other organizations must use it as a transitive link for re­
source flows. Operations of connectedness are sociometrics of exchange 
interactions among organizations (Rogers, 1974b). Network analysis, 
graph and digraph theory are techniques used to determine path distances 
and measure the centrality of an actor in a system (Laumann and Pappi, 
1976:20-21). 
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Another approach is to conceive of access to and constraint of re­
source flows as positive or negative connectedness. Operations here must 
discern connections where exchanges are contingent upon other exchanges 
in the other from connections that are contingent upon nonexchanges in 
the other (Cook and Bnerson, 1978). Operations of positive and negative 
connectedness must get at whether or not exchange in one connection does 
or does not preclude exchange in another. 
Access to and constraint of resource flows was operationalized in 
this study as the total director interaction and information exchange an 
organization initiated and received from other organizations in its set. 
Two separate measures were constructed - one based on director interac­
tions and one based on information exchanged. The assumption was that 
organizations whose relations with other organizations were characterized 
by receipt and initiation of comparatively more director interaction and 
information exchanges would have relations with greater access to and 
constraint over resource flows. Director interactions and information ex­
changes are viewed as reflections of a single dimension of the relative 
structural constraint (centrality) organizations have over resource flows 
in a network. Therefore, we expect the two indicators of centrality to 
be highly interrelated. 
Top administrators were asksd; 
(l) In the past year how many times have you been in contact with the di­
rector of any of the following organizations to discuss activities of 
your respective organizations (all organizations in the county were 
listed)? and 
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(2) In the past year how many times did your organization provide infor­
mation to each of the following groups about your activities through 
personal letters, reports or other documents (all organizations in 
the county were listed)? 
Comparative scores were computed by subtracting the total times di­
rector contacts (and information) were initiated and received for each 
organization from the same total for each other organization and summing 
the differences for each organization. The scores for each organization 
were divided by the number of organizations in its set minus one (l). 
The actual range of comparative director interaction values is 0 to 98$. 
The range of actual values for comparative information exchanges is 0 to 
575» The descriptive statistical information for both measures are pre­
sented in Chapter V. 
Availability of alternatives Availability of alternatives re­
fers theoretically to the number of sources available to an organization 
for obtaining needed resources and to the number of different options 
available to an organization for disposal of its outputs. Number of dif­
ferent funding sources, number of potential exchange partners for spe­
cific resources available to an organization within the outside the net­
work, number of different sources of legitimation and positive reputation 
are examples of empirical observâtions to be eoasidered for operations of 
availability of alternative sources of resources. Various aspects of or­
ganizations' domains should be considered for the operations of alterna­
tives for disposal of outputs. The number of different broad type of 
services or products offered, the number of different client or consumer 
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groups served and the number of different technical activities performed 
are examples. 
In the study the availability of alternatives was operationalized as 
top administrators reports of the sources (federal, state, county, fees, 
other) from which they obtain operating funds and the different client 
groups the agency serves. Two separate measures were constructed, one 
which taps alternatives for inputs on one which indicates alternatives 
for outputs. The number of sources of operating funds was selected as 
an indicator of the degree of availability of alternative sources of re­
sources. The number of client groups served by the agency was selected 
as an indicator of the degree of availability of alternatives for dis­
posal of outputs. Alternatives for inputs and alternatives for outputs 
relative to other organizations are both aspects of the options available 
to organizations as a basis for power relations. However, they each rep­
resent a separate dimension of the availability of alternatives. There­
fore, valid measurement of each aspect should be reflected by indicators 
of each that are not highly intercorrelated. Furthermore, each indicator 
may not have the same relationship with other concepts indicators. 
Administrators were asked; 
(1) What proportion of your funding came from each of the following 
sources (federal, state, county, feea/agaeaamenta/tranafara. other)? 
and 
(2 )  Please indicate which of the following categories describe the groups 
your organization serves (describe = 1, not describe = 0), 
(a) farmers, (b) private industry, (c) recreational users, (d) non-
farm landowners, (0) park users, (f) homeowners, (g) local agencies, 
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and (h) other. 
Comparative scores were computed by subtracting the number of dif­
ferent funding sources (and number of different client groups served) for 
each organization from the number for each other organization and summing 
the differences. The actual range of values for the comparative number 
of funding sources is 0 to ).44. Actual comparative values for number 
of client groups served range from 0 to 7.09. The descriptive statis­
tical information for both comparative measures are presented in Chapter 
V. 
Exercise of power - conversion of resources for goal attainment 
The exercise of power is defined theoretically as the ability to 
convert or mobilize resources for social action. The ability to mobilize 
resources to effect social action is reflected in the capacity of the or­
ganization to coordinate its subunits, the number of obligations incurred 
in relations with other organizations and the motivational investment in 
these relations, compared to other organizations in its action set. 
Capacity to coordinate subunits The capacity to coordinate ac­
tivities of its subunits refers theoretically to the degree the collectiv­
ity has the potential to be socially organized as an energy binding sys­
tem, Capacity to coordinate subunits is the amount of potential organiss= 
tions have to be internally coordinated for a desired collective action. 
The degree an organization has the potential to "bind in energy" as power 
exercise is thus reflected in the number of functions subunits or special­
ized roles that can be coordinated and the means available to coordinate 
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the separate subunits for collective effort. 
Theoretical discussions of the degree organizations are divided 
into subunits ordinarily are included under conceptions of the degree of 
horizontal complexity or horizontal structural differentiation of organi­
zations (Price, 1972)0 Discussions of "division of labor," "specializa­
tion," "role differentiation," "functional differentiation," "segmenta­
tion," "fragmentation," and "departmentalization" contain ideas relevant 
to the extent organizations are divided into subunits. 
The notion that coordination is a function of the ability of manage­
ment is a critical theme in organizational theory (Hall, 1977). It is 
assumed that the ability of management to effect control influences the 
degree that subunits are coordinated for a collective purpose. 
There are several operational approaches available for selecting 
indicators of the degree organizations are divided into subunits. One 
approach is in terms of the number of specialized occupational roles and 
degree of specialized preparation of role occupants within the organiza­
tion. Another is to define number of subunits in terms of the number of 
separate functional departments or specialized functional units. Another 
is to define operations of capacity to coordinate subunits as the number 
of separate positions in an organization. An additional approach is to 
view the number of separate goals ae the referent for segmentation (Haas, 
Hall and Johnson, 19^ 7)• 
Operations of the means to effect coordination ordinarily center on 
the characteristics of managers interpersonal or decision-making behaviors 
of managers to effect control (Hall, 1977) or on organizational character­
istics that enhance communication feed back. 
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In this study the capacity to coordinate subunitg is operationally 
defined as the number of positions in the organization reported by agency 
administrators and as the amount of education of the top administrator. 
Hage (1974) argues that mechanisms of communication and criteria vary with 
complexity. The idea that managers function to elicit compliance from in­
dividuals and subunits is advanced by Etzioni (1975). He argues that mana­
gers are more effective in gaining compliance if they are able to match 
structures and types of leadership with the types of goals for which they 
are suitable. In all cases it seems reasonable that an organizations 
ability to effect coordination should in part be reflected in the adminis­
trators knowledge of the appropriate means to elicit compliance from sub-
units which in turn should be reflected in the education of the adminis­
trator. Administrators responded to the following questions for the two 
measures of capacity of the capacity of the organization to coordinate sub­
mits. 
(1) What paid positions (job titles) exist in your local agency? and 
(2) Please indicate the highest level of education that you have achieved 
(highschool-l, some college/technical-2, college degree-3, graduate 
work-4, graduate degree-5). 
These measures of capacity to coordinate are expected to be moderately 
correlated; repressntiag different dimensions of an organlzatloîî's poten­
tial to bind in energy. 
Comparative scores for each organization were computed by subtract­
ing the number of job titles (and education score) reported by each organ­
ization from the number reported by each other organization in the set and 
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summing the differences to form a total difference score for each indica­
tor for each organization. The actual range of values for the compara­
tive number of job titles ranged from 0 to 8.89 and the actual range of 
administrator education was 0 to 4«6« The descriptive statistical infor­
mation for the two measures are reported in Chapter 7. 
Obligations incurred Obligations incurred by an organization are 
defined theoretically as the extent a negative balance is experienced in 
the reciprocity of exchange relations or the extent obligatory debts are 
accumulated. 
The operational referrent for obligations incurred is the reciprocity 
ratio of valued resources exchanged by organizational actors. The inclu­
sion of all exchanges of valued resources and the extent of value of each 
resource, as defined by organizations, in the calculation of the ratio of 
reciprocity would be the most adequate representation of the extent of 
obligations incurred by an actor. 
Another approach is to define extent of obligations incurred in 
terms of the rank, prestige or status conferred on an actor by others. 
Actors that maintain a positive balance in resource exchanges are awarded; 
social esteem, status or privilege by others in order to achieve reciproc­
ity (Blau, 1964). The greater the obligations incurred, the less the 
rank or prestige that is needed to be conferred on the actor by others to 
achieve reciprocity. In the theoretical explication of the power process 
for this dissertation, however, prestige is viewed as an ultimate mani­
festation of power relations and as such would not be appropriate to in­
dicate extent of obligations. 
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For this study, the operational definition of obligations incurred 
is the aggregated balance of resources (funds, facilities or personnel) 
exchanged by an organization in its relations with other organizations in 
its set. Top administrators were asked to report on the number of times 
funds, facilities or personnel were loaned or provided to each other or­
ganization in its set over the past twelve months. A single comparative 
measure was obtained for each organization. The number of times resources 
were provided for B by A was subtracted from the number of times B pro­
vided resources for A. (Resources provided, greater than resources re­
ceived, equals negative obligations), A total comparative score for each 
organization was calculated by summing the differences in the number of 
times resources were provided in each dyad relationship. Actual scores 
ranged from 0 to 144»85. Chapter V contains the descriptive statisti­
cal information for the measure. 
Motivational investment Motivational investment is theoretically 
defined as the extent of commitment to a particular relationship. Moti­
vational investment is the extent a relationship is viewed as necessary 
or essential for obtaining needed benefits. The degree of importance as= 
signed to a specific relation compared to alternative relations is one 
acceptable operation of the extent motives are invested in a particular 
relationship by an organization. Another approach is to operationally 
define motivational investment as the reported degree benefits accrue to 
an organization from a particular relationship that cannot be obtained 
from relationships with other organizations in the action set. Another 
approach is to define operations of motives invested as the extent organi­
zations report they are committed to specific relationships throu^  shared 
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goal values, formal and informal agreements. 
In this study the importance to their work that organizations re­
port they assign to contacts with other organizations is the operational 
definition of motivational investment. Top administrators responded to 
the question; 
(l) How important are the contacts with each of the organizations to the 
work of your organization? 
Responses were assigned on a four-point Likert scale (l-not impor*. 
tant, 4-very important). Comparative scores were developed by subtract­
ing the importance value assigned by the focal organization to the counter 
organization in each dyad from the value assigned by the counter organiza­
tion to the focal organization. A single comparative score for each fo­
cal organization's relations with all other organizations in its set was 
formed by summing the difference across all dyads for each focal organi­
zation. The theoretical range of values was 0 to 5 for each dyad and 
actual value ranged from 0 to 5» Actual total comparative values ranged 
from 0 to Descriptive statist lea for the ssasurs are presented in 
Chapter V. 
Organizational interaction strategies 
Interactions among organizations are theoretically defined as link=> 
ages of cooperative exchange and/or conflict that emerge among organiza­
tions as they attempt to manipulate and control environmental contingen­
cies, The specific patterns of interorganizational linkages that emerge 
are the result of organizations' abilities to control and convert re­
sources vis-a-vis other organizations in their immediate environment. 
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Interorganizational interaction strategies that can be selected to en­
hance or balance power relations include cooperation, conflict, circum­
vention and withdrawal (Blau, 1964; Jacobs, 1974)» Only the operation-
alization of cooperative and conflict strategies are discussed and analyzed 
in this study. 
Cooperative strategies Cooperative interaction is defined the­
oretically as a mutually reinforcing voluntary interaction used by organ­
izations as a strategy to gain or balance power relations that can be asym­
metrical in terms of the amounts and types of resources exchanged and 
which varies according to the potential loss of autonomy or power for both 
actors. An organization that uses a cooperative strategy to gain or 
balance power must demonstrate its capacity to reduce uncertainty for 
another actor and "must make a commitment to exchange that capacity." Co­
operative interaction strategies to gain or balance power include contract­
ing, coopting and coalescing (Thompson, 1967). 
In operational terms, cooperative interactions include interactions 
among organizations carried out by boundary spanning units (i.e., adminis­
trators), including agreements to exchange resources, share decision-making 
personnel and programming. Cooperative interaction strategies are identi­
fied as those cooperative interactions that are initiated by an organiza­
tion in its relations with other organizations. Operationally, contract­
ing strategies include contacts reported by top administrators or other 
boundary persons which define the extent of commitment for future exchanges 
of information, personnel or other resources. Reported contacts can range 
from informal unwritten understandings to formal written contracts and 
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legal mandates for future exchanges. The reported number of representa­
tives of other organizations on the organization's decision-making boards 
or advisory committees constitutes operationalization of cooptation as a 
cooperative strategy. Coalescing, operationally, is the number of spe­
cific programs and ventures that organizations share and pursue with other 
organizations as one decision-making unit. Operationalization of these 
strategies could be accomplished by observation of an organization's of­
ficial documents, minutes of meetings, memoranda, etc. or by the reports 
of organization officials. 
In this study one cooperative interaction strategy is analyzed -
coalescing. Selection of a coalescing strategy is defined operationally 
as the number of joint programs with other organizations reported by ad­
ministrators. Top administrators were asked to report the actual number 
of joint programs their organization shares with each other organization 
in the county set for a one year period. Comparative scores were formed 
by subtracting the number reported by each counter organization from the 
number reported by the focal organization# The differences across all 
dyads in the set were summed for each focal organization to construct a 
single comparative score. The actual range was 0 to 24.6. Descriptive 
statistics for the measure are reported in Chapter V. 
Conflict strategy Conflict has been defined theoretically as 
opposing responsibilities, priorities or actions between two organiza­
tions. The use of conflict by an organization to gain or balance power 
ordinarily involves interactions initiated by the organization to oppose 
or block input resources, goals or programs of other organizations. Con­
flict strategies include indirect opposition such as opposing philosophies, 
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objectives and priorities, as well as direct actions of opposition and 
competition. 
Operations of interorganizational conflict are conflicting respon­
sibilities, priorities programming and disagreements and disputes among 
organizations that are observed or reported by organizations. Further 
operations would be to assess the specific opposing benefits, attitudes 
and actions taken by organizations regarding particular interorganiza­
tional issues of organizations compared to others in their set. 
In this study the extent of selection of a conflict strategy is op­
erationally defined as the extent administrators report that responsibili­
ties and priorities of the organization are in conflict with those of 
other organizations and the extent the organization has disagreements 
and disputes with other organizations. Top administrators were asked; 
(1) To what extent have conflicting responsibilities or priorities affect­
ed the relationship between your organization and each of the follow­
ing? and 
(2 )  To %'hat extent do disagreements or disputes oharacterize the relations 
between your agency and each of the following? 
Responses for each item were assigned on a six=point Likert scale 
(O-none, 1-very little extent, 5-very great extent). Comparative scores 
were constructed by subtracting the conflict value assigaed by the focal 
organization to the counter organization in each dyad from the value as­
signed by the counter organization to the focal organization. Two compar­
ative scores for each focal organization's relations with all other organ­
izations in its set was formed by summing these differences across all 
dyads for each focal organization for each measure of conflict. The 
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theoretical range for each dyad relation was 0 to 10. Actual total com­
parative scores ranged from 0 to ).0 for conflicting priorities and re­
sponsibilities and from 0 to 8,22 for disagreements and disputes. De­
scriptive statistics for these measures are reported in Chapter V. 
Operational Linkages 
Now that operationalization of theoretical concepts in the general 
hypotheses and causal model has been discussed, operational linkages and 
empirical hypotheses can be specified. The empirical hypotheses (E.H,) 
that are specified have to do with relationships between variables and cor­
respond to theoretical propositions or general hypotheses one through five 
presented in Chapter III, Two empirical hypotheses are presented for con­
cepts posited as dependent variables that have two indicators. For the 
readers convenience notations used for the concepts and indicators are 
presented in Table 4.1. 
The diagram of complex concepts forming the dimensions of the proc­
ess of interorganizational power and indicators used in the study along 
with the causal model are also presented a second time in Figures 
•i.l and 4.2. The notations contained in Table 4.1 are added to each of 
the figures. 
Empirical hypotheses 
E.H.I.a. The total number of different positions (COMPLX) reported by 
an administrator compared to the total number reported by each other 
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Table 4*1 Notations for the concepts and indicators included in 
the model of organizational power.^  
Concepts (Blocks) Reference Code Indicators Reference Code 
Resources 
possessed RESCRS 
Actual budget 
Perceived budget 
scarcity 
BDDG 
PBDG 
Access to and 
constraint over 
resource flows CONSTR 
Centrality-director 
interactions 
Centrality-informat ion 
exchange 
CENTA 
CENTB 
Availability of 
si tematives for 
resource inputs and 
outputs AVAIL 
Number of fund 
sources 
Number of client 
groups 
FONDS 
CLNTG 
Capacity to 
coordinate subunits CAPCRD 
Number of positions 
Education of 
administrator 
COMPIX 
EDAM 
Motivational 
investment MOTIVATS 
Importance of 
contacts MOTIV 
Obligations 
accumulated OBLIGATS 
Excess of resources 
provided over received 0BL6S 
Selection of a 
cooperative strategy COOPER 
Number of joint 
programs COOPA 
Selection of a 
conflict strategy COHFLICT 
Extent conflict 
responsibilities 
Extent disagreements, 
disputes 
comA 
COKPLB 
All concepts and indicators are conceived and constructed as total 
comparative variable characteristics of organizations in an organizational 
network. 
Abstract 
I. 
II. 
HI » a* 1 # 
1. Organlz^lopal Power 
Exercise of Power a^ Basis of rower 
b« X • 
Level I. Theoretical Construct 
Level II. Conceptual Dimensions 
Level III. Primary Référant - Latent Concept 
Level 17. Indicators of Latent Concepts 
Manifestation of Power 
Poaaessioa 
of 
Resources 
(RESCRS) 
if 
Bnpirical 
Access to and 
Constraint of 
Resource Plows 
(COHSTH') 
V 
Centrality 
Availfibility 
of 
Alternatives 
(A7AIL) 
i 
Capacity 
to 
Coordinate 
(C^ CRD) 
b.2. 
Number 
of 
Obligations 
(OBUCATS) 
T 
T 
Reciprocity 
of Hesources 
Exchanged 
IV. a. 1. a.2. a. 5. b.l. 
Actual Number of Humber of Humber of 
Budget Director Sources of Different 
(BUDG) Interactions Funding Positions in 
Perceived Initiated and (FOIIDS) Organization 
Scarcity Received (CEITA) Humber of (COMPUC) 
of Budgel; Number of Client Years of (PBDG) Information Groups Bducation of 
Exchangee Sensed Administrator 
Initiated and (CLUl'C) (EDADM) 
Perceived (CENTA) 
b.2. 
Net Balança 
of Resourcas 
Exchanged 
(OBLGS) 
Motivational 
Investment 
(HDTtVATS) 
c.l. 
Interaction Strategies 
T 
Cooperation 
(COOPgt) 
Conflict 
(CONFLICT) 
Importance 
of Contacts 
O 
1 
b.5. 
Score on 
Importance 
of Contacts 
Scale 
(Monv) 
c.l.a. 
Number of 
Joint 
Programs 
(COOPA) 
c. 1. b. 
Score on Extent 
Conflicting 
Priorities and 
Responsibilities 
(COHFLA) 
Score on Extent 
Disagreements 
and Disputes 
(CONFLB) 
Figure 4•1 Diagram oi dimensions of organizational power, latent concepts and 
indicators. 
cAPcai) COOPA 
0BLB8 
OOSFLICT 
_Z1_ 
tJOHFlA COHPLB 
Figure 4.2 The causal model of the process of organizational power, 
including notations for latent concepts (blocks) and indicators. 
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administrator in a county is a positive linear function of the combined 
effects of the actual operating budget (BDDG) perceived scarcity of 
budget (PBDG), the number of times interactions are sent and received by 
administrators (CENTA), the number of times information is sent and re­
ceived by administrators (CENTB), the number of sources of funding (FUNDS) 
and the number of client groups served (CLNTG) reported by an adminis­
trator compared to those reported by administrators of other organizations 
in the county, the effect of each is significant. 
E.H.I.b. The total education of an administrator (EDADM) reported by 
an administrator compared to the total education reported by each other 
administrator in a county is a positive linear function of the combined 
effects of the normal operating budget (BUDG), perceived scarcity of bud­
get (PBDG), the number of times interactions are sent and received by ad­
ministrators (CENTA), the number of times information is sent and received 
by administrators (CENTB), the number of sources of funding (FONDS) and 
the number of client groups served (CLNTG) reported by an administrator 
compared to those reported by administrators of other organizations in the 
county, the effect of each is significant. 
E.H.2 The total of the number of times resources were received by an 
organization from other organizations minus the number of times resources 
were provided by an organization to others as reported by administrators 
(OBLGS) is a negative linear function of the combined effects of the actual 
operating budget (BUDG), perceived scarcity of budget (PBDG), the number 
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of times interactions were sent and received by administrators 
(CENTA), the number of times information was sent and received by adminis­
trators (CENTB), the number of sources of funding (PDKDS), the number of 
client groups served (CLNTG), the total number of different positions re­
ported by an administrator (COMPLX) and the total education of the admin­
istrator (EDADM), compared to those reported by administrators of other 
organizations in the county, the effect of each is significant. 
E.H.4. The total of the degree of importance of contacts (MOTIV) with 
other organizations reported by administrators compared to importance re­
ported by other administrators is a negative linear function of the com­
bined effects of the actual operating budget (BDDGr) perceived scarcity of 
budget (PBDG), the number of times interactions were sent and received by 
administrators (CENTA), the number of times information was sent and re­
ceived by administrators (CENTB), the number of sources of funding (POÎJDS), 
the number of client groups served (CLNTG), the number of different posi­
tions reported by an administrator (CONPLX) and the total education of an 
administrator (EDADM) compared to those reported by administrators of 
other organizations in the county, the effect of each is significant, 
E.H.5. The total number of joint programs reported by an administra­
tors (COOPA) compared to the total number reported by each other adminis­
trator in a county is a linear function of the combination of positive di­
rect effects of the actual operating budget (BDDG), perceived scarcity of 
budget (PBDG), the number of times interactions are sent and received by 
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administrators (CENTA), the number of times information is sent and re­
ceived by administrators (CENTB), the number of sources of funding (PDBDS) 
and the number of client groups (CLNTG), the number of different positions 
reported by an administrator (COMPLX) and the total education of an admin­
istrator (EDADM) and the negative direct effects of the number of times 
resources are received from minus provided for other organizations (OBLGS) 
and the total of the compared degree of importance of contacts with other 
organizations (MOTIV) reported by administrators compared to those re­
ported by other administrators in its set, the effect of each is signifi­
cant. 
E.E.5.a. The total comparative extent of conflicting responsibilities 
score (CONFIA) is a linear function of the combination of positive direct 
effects of the actual operating budget (BUDG), perceived scarcity of budget 
(PBDG), the number of times interactions are sent and received by adminis­
trators (CENTA), the number of times information is sent and received by 
administrators (CENTB), the number of different positions reported by an 
administrator (COMPLX). the total education of an administrator (EDADM), 
and the total of the compared degree of importance of contacts with other 
organizations (MOTIV), and the negative direct effects of the number of 
sources of funding (FOHDS), the number of client groups served (GLNTG) 
and the number of times resources are received from minus provided for 
other organizations (OBLGS) as reported by administrators compared to 
those reported by other administrators in its set, the effect of each is 
significant. 
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E.H,5«b. The total comparative extent of disagreements and disputes 
score (CHFLB), is a linear function of the combination of positive direct 
effects of the actual operating budget (BUDG), perceived scarcity of bud­
get (PBDG), the number of times interactions are sent and received by ad­
ministrators (CENTA), the number of times information is sent and received 
by administrators (CENTS), the number of different positions reported by 
an administrator (COMPLX), the total education of an administrator (EDADM), 
and the total of the degree of importance of contacts with other organiza­
tions (MOTIV), and the negative direct effects of the number of sources 
of funding (PONDS), the number of client groups served (CLNTG) and the 
number of times resources are received from minus provided for other or­
ganizations (OBLGrS) as reported by administrators compared to those re­
ported by other administrators in its set, the effect of each is signifi­
cant. 
The linkages among concepts in the theoretical propositions and 
causal model have been operationalized by specifying their form and direc­
tion, Any attempt to specify coefficients and limits for the relation­
ships has been deferred due to a lack of theoretical rationale. The li­
near form of linkages is specified throughout the propositions. In view 
of the lack of theoretical rationale and the solutions available for analy­
sis, it is considered most judicious to begin with a basic linear form and 
consider the possibility of curvilinéarity or power forms later (Hage, 
1972). However, it is recognized that relationships among all the vari­
ables in the model would appear to be moderately interrelated and to not 
1)6 
belong to the same class or element. When this is true, the linear form 
seems questionable and the curvilinear or power form more likely (Hage, 
1972). 
The block-recursive model 
The general and empirical propositions have been presented which re­
flect the relationships that are postulated for the combined effects of 
all indicators of the independent variables as causes of each dependent 
variable indicator. However, the primary focus of this model building 
study is on the construction and evaluation of a model that links latent 
(complex) concepts in cause and effect relationships. For this purpose 
the analysis moves up a level of abstraction to examine the relative con­
tribution of the complex concepts (blocks) that are posited as determi­
nants on the separate indicators of complex concepts that are posited as 
results. 
More specifically, the theoretical model asserts that comparative 
possession of resources (RESCRS-block of indicators BUDG and PBDG), com­
parative access to and constraint over resource flows (COîîSTR-block of 
CENTÀ and CENTS) and comparative availability of alternatives of resources 
(AVAIIr-blook of FUHDS and CLNTG) each will significantly add to the ex­
planation of an organization's capacity to coordinate its subunits (CAPCRD), 
compared to other organizations in its set after the other two independent 
concepts have explained all they can. Likewise the model posits that com­
parative possession of resources (RESCRS), access to and constraint over 
availability of alternatives (CONSTR) and capacity to coordinate resource 
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flows (CAPCRD) will each add significantly to the explanation of 
comparative obligations accumulated (OBLIGATS) and motivational invest­
ment (MOTIVATS), after the effects of the other three independent con­
cepts have explained all they can. Finally, the model asserts that com­
parative possession of resources (RESCRS), access to and constraint over 
resource flows (CONSTR), availability of alternatives (AVAIL), motiva­
tional investment (MOTIVATS) and obligations accumulated (OBLIGATS) will 
each add significantly to the explanation of selection of a cooperative 
strategy (COOPER) and selection of a conflict strategy (CONFLICT) after 
the other five independent concepts have explained all they can. 
Empirically we hypothesize that the blocks of indicators; compara­
tive budget (BDDG) and perceived budget scarcity (PBDG), comparative di­
rector interactions sent and received (CENTA) and information sent and re­
ceived (CENTS), and the number of funding sources (FUNDS) and number of 
client groups served (CLNTG) will each add significantly to explanation 
of both number of positions (COMPLX) and education of the administrator 
(EDASM) after the other two blocks have explained all they can. We fur­
ther hypothesize that the blocks of indicators; comparative budget (BDDG) 
and perceived budget scarcity (PBDG), comparative director interactions 
sent and received (CENTA) and information sent and received (CMTB), num­
ber of funding resources (FUNDS) and number of client groups (CLNTG) and 
the number of positions (COMPLX) and education of administrator (EDADM) 
will each add significantly to the explanation of both importance of con­
tacts (MOTIV) and the excess of resources provided over received (OBLGS) 
after the other three blocks have explained all they can. 
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Finally it is hypothesized empirically that the blocks of indica­
tors; comparative budget (BUDG) and perceived scarcity of budget (PBDG), 
comparative director interactions sent and received (CENTA) and informa­
tion sent and received (CENTB), comparative number of funding sources 
(PUKDS) and number of clients groups (CLNTG), comparative number of posi­
tions (COMPLX) and education of the administrator (EDADM), comparative im­
portance of contacts (MOTIV) and comparative excess of resources provided 
over received (OBLGS) will each add significantly to the explanation of 
the number of total comparative joint programs (COOPA), the comparative 
total conflicting responsibilities (CHPM) and the total comparative ex­
tent of disagreements (COMPLB) after the other five blocks have been al­
lowed to explain all they can. 
Statistical Procedures 
The statistical procedures employed to test the propositions and 
causal model are linear regression and multiple-partial correlation analy­
sis. The empirical statistical tests for these procedures are presented 
prior to a discussion of the analysis techniques, 
Empirical statistical tests 
The empirical statistical tests that are consistent with the general 
hypotheses (E.E.I.-5.) and the corresponding theoretical statistical hy­
potheses and empirical hypotheses presented earlier are; 
Ho: R = 0 Ha; R 0 
The linking terms in all four types of hypotheses are consistent in that 
all posit that significant variance in a dependent variable is explained 
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by a group of independent variables with the effect of each variable sig­
nificant. 
The empirical statistical tests for propositions outlined in the 
block-recursive causal model are; 
Ho; y(i-k) • u-x = 0 Ha; R^ (i-k) » u-x / 0 
The relationships posited in the theoretical model, empirical hypoth­
eses and theoretical statistical hypotheses are consistent. The empiri­
cal statistical tests are appropriate since each is concerned with assess­
ing the relative importance of specific complex determinajits (blocks) for 
explaining remaining variance in concepts posited as results after th» 
effects of other determinants have been included in the equation. 
The statistical test determines the amount (percent) of remaining vari­
ance explained in a dependent variable by an independent variable or 
blocks of independent variables (independent variables) after the vari­
ance explained by all other independent variables of interest has been 
accounted for. We turn now to a more detailed explanation of linear re­
gression and the multiple partial correlation square procedures. 
Linear regression 
The multiple regression model is applied in this study. Multiple 
regression examines the collective and unique contributions of two or more 
variables to the explanation of a dependent variable (Kerlinger and Ped-
hazur, 1975). The basic equation of the multiple linear regression model 
is; 
Y = a + b^  ^+ bgKg + Vk 
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Where Y equals predicted scores of the dependent variable, X equals 
scores of the independent variable(s), a equals the intercept constant, 
and b equals the regression coefficient. Y values are predicted from x 
values. 
According to Blalock (1964:43)î (l) estimating equations and (2) 
causal models are the two uses of regression models. In the first use 
statements are generated about unknown population values (parameters) 
based on pieces of information (statistics) contained in a sample. The 
second use assumes that hypothesized causal linkages can be approximated 
by linear regression equations. This usage allows hypothesized causal 
linkages between variables to be tested with the assumption that changes 
in X "produces" Y, rather than that Y follows a change in X or is asso­
ciated with a change in X. According to Blalock (I964) the second usage 
has important implications for causal analyses. Althou^  causality cannot 
be empirically verified, linear regression can generate substantive evi­
dence to provide a basis for making causal inferences. 
The criteria for evaluating linear regression models used in this 
study include: (l) the P-test for significance of the full regression 
equation, (2 )  the size and significance of the squared multiple correla-
2 tion coefficient (R - percent of explained variance in the dependent vari­
able), and (5) the size and significance of the regression coefficients 
for each independent variable (Draper and Smith, 1966); Kerlinger and 
Pedhazur, 1975). The F-test compares a calculated P-value with a tabular 
P-value at a specific level of significance (i.e., .01, .05, .10, .25) to 
determine whether the regression of the dependent variable on the indepen­
dent variables (or the amount of variance in the dependent variable 
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explained by the combined effects of the independent variables) is sig­
nificant statistically. Information concerning the amount of variance in 
-he dependent variable accounted for by the independent variable(s) is sup-
plied by the squared multiple correlation coefficient (R ). The amount of 
change in the dependent variable which is a function of a per unit change 
in each of the independent variables is indicated by the partial regres­
sion coefficients (b), A t-test (partial F-test where t^  = P) with one 
degree of freedom is used to determine the statistical significance of a 
single partial regression coefficient when the influence of all other in­
dependent variables in the model is controlled. 
Multiple-partial correlation 
Multiple-partial correlation analysis is a key procedure for causal 
model building and analysis, specifically because multiple indicators of 
complex concepts can be employed. The indicators of a latent concept are 
grouped together in blocks, but allowed to operate independently within 
the blocks. Furthermore the number of separate tests required to assess 
the model's fit with data are greatly reduced from what is required when 
multiple indicators are analyzed on an indicator by indicator basis. The 
fact that only one indicator of a dependent variable can be analyzed at 
a time allows multiple analyses of gach prediction. This allows an exam­
ination of whether the blocks affect the separate components of the de­
pendent variable in the same or different ways (Sullivan, 1974:251). This 
is an asset when it is assumed that concepts are complex (multidimensional). 
In order to obtain valid results for model building and testing it may be 
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necessary to demonstrate that different dimensions are related in dif­
ferent ways to the blocks of independent variables. The researcher can 
assess the relative amount of variance remaining in a dependent variable, 
and accounted for by a set of independent variables, after other blocks of 
independent variables have explained all the variance they can. This is 
an important substantive advantage for providing crucial information for 
model building and testing particularly when highly complex, multidimen­
sional concepts are involved. 
Multiple-partial correlation is an extension of multiple correla­
tion, but the multiple-partial focuses on partitioned explained variance. 
2 While the square of the multiple correlation coefficient (R ) involves the 
proportion of variance in a dependent variable that is explained simultan­
eously by two or more independent variables, the square of the multiple-
partial correlation coefficient pertains to the proportion of the remain­
ing variance explained by a block of indicators after one or more pre­
dictors have explained as much variance as possible in the dependent vari­
able. Thus, the square of the multiple-partial correlation focuses on 
the proportion of variance explained by a single indicator or block of 
indicators, as opposed to the square of the multiple correlation coef­
ficient which represents the percent of explained variance by all inde­
pendent variables at once (Blalock; 1972)^  
Suppose a researcher is interested in explaining organizational ef­
fectiveness (Y). Using Etzioni's (1975) model, he argues that organiza­
tional effectiveness can be explained by Scope (X^ ), Pervasiveness (Xg), 
Job Satisfaction (X^ ), Communication (X^ ) and Socialization (X^ ). 
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While all five variables are believed to each explain significant vari­
ance in effectiveness, taken together, the researcher is interested in 
the effects of job satisfaction, communication and socialization after 
scope and pervasiveness have explained all the variance in effectiveness 
that they can. Thus the researcher's primary interest would be in how 
much of the remaining variance in Y is explained by the block of vari­
ables; Xy X^ , and X^ . The researcher has created two blocks of the in-
5 dependent variables, X^  - Xg and X^  - X^ , for this purpose. 
2 Statistically, R y • x^ xgx^ x^ x^  represents the square of the mul­
tiple correlation coefficient or the proportion of variance in the de­
pendent variable (Y) explained by all the independent variables (X^ - X^). 
In order to determine the proportion of variance explained by the group 
or block of variables, X^  - X^ , the proportion of variance explained by 
the block of variables that are controlled must be first subtracted from 
the multiple correlation coefficient. This procedure is represented in 
the following equation; 
2 2 
R y . x^ xgx^ x^ x^  - R y . x^ x^  
The percent (^ ) of variance explained by X^  - X^  is the percent (^ ) of 
the total variance remaining in Y that is explained by X^  - X^ . In other 
words it is the percent (^ ) explained by X^  - X^  after the block of 
S^everal Iowa state studies have used Etzioni's (1975) model to ex­
plain organizational effectiveness. The example used here is used only 
to illustrate the multiple-partial correlation square. There is no in­
tent to represent or misrepresent the questions explored in these studies 
or in Etzioni's model. 
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variables, - Xg, has been allowed to explain all it can. Thus the re-
2 2 
mainder of variance explained by X^  - X^  (R y • x^ x^^ x^ x^ x^  - R y • x^ xg) 
must be divided by the proportion of variance explained by the block, 
X^  - Xg, subtracted from unity. The equation for the remaining variance 
in effectiveness (Y) explained by job satisfaction (X^ ) communication and 
(X^ ) socialization (X^ ), as a block, after scope (X^ ) and pervasiveness 
(Xg), as a block, has been allowed to explain all the variance it can, is 
as follows; P P 
„ RIT . X,X^ .^X. - R'T . X,X„ 
A (XAX.) • X-Xj lisp Li_ 
^  ^  ^  1 - R ^ -  X ^ X g  
The multiple-partial correlation coefficient and its square will be 
derived using the SPSS computer regression program. A hierarchial inclu­
sion format will regress the dependent variable on each block of indepen­
dent variables after the control block had already been entered in the re­
gression equation. The multiple-partial correlation square is the coef­
ficient that will be used to assess the paths in the causal model. If the 
P-test for improvement in remaining explained variance is statistically 
significant we have support for the assertion that the complex concept of 
interest has significant causal effects on the dependent variable concept.^  
Although the multiple-partial correlation coefficient square cannot be in­
terpreted as a path analysis coefficient, it can be used in an analogous 
T^he formula for the P-test is: 
2 2 
^ R i * jk w - R i « tu w/k^  - k2 
1 — R^ i • tu ••• w/N — kg — 1 
Where N = the sample size and k = the number of independent variables in 
the equation. 
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manner as an estimate for determining paths that should remain in or be 
removed from a causal model (Sullivan, 1971)• In the model building 
framework for this study it is critical to assess the relative contribu­
tions of latent (complex) concepts, represented by blocks of multiple in­
dicators, to dependent variables. The multiple-partial correlation co­
efficient square estimates the relative importance of a block of indica­
tors representing a complex concept as a cause of a dependent variable, 
after the effects all other variables have been assessed. This is an im­
portant alternative procedure for work in the construction of theories 
involving highly abstract constructs as proposed in the present study. 
Statistical assumptions 
The assumptions for use of linear regression and multiple-partial 
correlation procedures to test the hypotheses and assess the causal model 
are delineated in this section. The rationale for the extent each assump­
tion is met in this study or the conditions for relaxing a specific assump­
tion will be discussed as each is presented. 
A.l, The sample must be randomly selected. The units for this study 
comprise the total population of natural resource agencies in five (5) 
Northeast Iowa counties. The data set is used to assess the fit between 
the theory and data in a theory building context. The study is not con­
sidered a test of the theory and no inferences will be made beyond the 
units from which data were drawn. 
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A.2. The Y (dependent variables) are normally distributed at each 
value of X's (independent variables). This assumption can be relaxed if 
the sample size is large or if units analyzed are macro level units of 
emergence from patterned relations among individuals. While the sample 
size is not large (N = 59) the units studied are the relations among or­
ganizations as actors. Also considering that this is a theory building 
and evaluation exercise, as opposed to a theory testing study, it seems 
reasonable to relax this assumption. 
A. 5. The relationship among the variables should be linear. Direct 
examination of the residuals provides evidence as to the degree this as­
sumption is met. Examination of the residual scatterplots (i.e., where 
residuals were plotted against Y values for cooperation and conflict) for 
each of the final dependent variables in this research revealed that this 
assumption was not seriously violated. 
A.4. Residuals (errors) should be random and normally distributed with 
equal variances at each value of X. Direct examination of residual scat­
terplots also provides evidence as to whether this assumption was met. 
The residual plots for the final dependent variables (cooperation and 
conflict) indicate that this assumption was not severely violated; 
A,5* All variables are measured on at least an interval scale. All 
variables in this research were measured as continuous data or on Likert-
type scales which correspond to interval level measurement. 
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A.6. All relevant variables can be theoretically identified and in­
cluded in the model. Based on existing theory of social power and organi­
zational power and past research in the areas of community power, intra-
organizational power and interorganizational power, it is concluded that 
the relevant variables have been identified and were included in the model. 
A.7. There should be a one-way causal flow in thé system (i.e., asym­
metrical causal relationships). Since only asymmetrical causal relation­
ships are posited in the model, this assumption was met. 
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CHAPTER V. FINDINGS 
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate the extent to which 
the theory of interorganizational power process, that has been built, is 
supported by data collected in a specific concrete setting. The identi­
fication and development of indicators for complex concepts subsumed by 
the process of interorganizational power will be evaluated on the basis 
of these data. And the hypothesized causal relationships among the latent 
concepts, which are viewed as central to the power process will be empir­
ically evaluated. The findings will be presented in three sections. 
First, the empirical results regarding the adequacy of indicators as mea­
sures of the latent concepts are presented and discussed. Second, the re­
gression equations included in the causal model are evaluated. The mul­
tiple-partial correlation analysis of assumed causal relations among the 
complex (latent) concepts in the model is presented in the third section. 
The criteria used to empirically evaluate the hypothesized causal 
relations include the: (l) collective contribution of the independent 
variables to the explanation of the dependent variable as indicated by 
squared multiple correlation coefficients (R^ )» and (2) magnitude and 
significance of the regression coefficient for each independent variable 
indicator. The P-test is applied in testing for the overall regression 
of each dependent variable on the independent variables. The t-test is 
used in testing for the significance of the individual regression 
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coefficients. The .25 level of significance is used as the minimum level 
for the decision of whether or not a hypothesis received empirical support 
based on the F-test. The .25 level of significance is also the minimum 
used to decide if, on the basis of the t-test, a single independent vari­
able has contributed significantly to a dependent variable. The .25 level 
of significance is considered an appropriate criterion for these decisions 
when the objective is the building of a model. Significance levels of 
.10, .05 and .01 are more appropriate for the testing of models that have 
been more fully specified and evaluated (Bancroft, I968). In the early 
phases of model development and evaluation, important concepts and indi­
cators may be eliminated from the model before they have been adequately 
assessed or refined. In the model building framework, particularly when 
complex concepts are involved the emphasis is more legitimately on a the­
oretical rationale for decisions to include or exclude concepts and indi­
cators. Empirical assessment focuses on evidence provided to consider 
the adequacy of auxiliary theory and to search for ways to improve the 
measurement of the complex concepts. For this reason, significance levels 
up to .25 will also be noted when it seems reasonable to retain considera­
tion of the hypothesis, given the theoretical argument is convincing. 
Indicators of the Latent Concepts Subsumed 
by the Process of Power 
Descriptive statistics and correlations among indicators of the la­
tent concepts subsumed by the process of power are used to evaluate the 
quality and validity of the indicators. Warren, et al. (1977) report 
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that the interrelationships of descriptive statistics are useful for 
evaluating the quality of measures of concepts. These statistics are also 
reported for comparison with other studies as theory building efforts con­
tinue. The mean, median, mode, variance, standard deviation, range, kur-
tosis and skewness will be examined for each indicator of a concept. The 
reader is again reminded that all measures are constructed to indicate 
comparative variable properties of organizational relations. 
The mean or average of scores, is examined in relation to other 
descriptive measures. It allows comparison across studies while the to­
tal does not and it is useful for comparison to a known criterion. The 
mean along with the median and mode are important for examining the as­
sumption of normality. If the distribution is normal, the mean, median 
and mode will be the same. The median (middle score) is not influenced 
by extreme values and therefore serves as a criterion for whether the 
mean has been unduly distorted by extreme values. The mode (most fre­
quent score) is also useful for indicating the distortion of the mean by 
extreme values. However, the mode has a further substantive value. Bi-
model distribution may indicate that more than one sphere of meaning of 
a concept is being tapped by an indicator. 
%e variance (average of squared deviations from the mean) de­
scribes the extent scores of an indicator are dispersed or spread about 
the mean. The variance is an important statistic to examine to deter­
mine if an indicator demonstrates differences among units of the study. 
If all have the same score on an indicator, there will be no differences 
to explain. The standard deviation (square root of the variance) is also 
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a measure of the dispersion of scores about the mean, but is expressed in 
the original units of measurement. The range is the difference between 
the maximum and minimum scores and is also a measure of dispersion. 
There is a possible range and an actual range. If the actual range of 
scores on an indicator do not represent the possible range, the validity 
of the indicator might be questioned in terms of how well it samples the 
entire scope of meaning of a concept, 
Kurtosis is a measure of the peakedness of a distribution of scores 
on an indicator and is used in conjunction with the variance to evaluate 
indicators. If it is too peaked it may mean the indicator is vague. If 
it is too flat it may mean that the indicator is ambiguous. Information 
regarding the kurtosis of a measure (i.e., clustering) may suggest that 
response choices do not adequately discriminate among the units studied. 
Skewness reflects extreme scores in a distribution and is useful in con­
sidering whether units included in a study are truly part of the popula­
tion of interest. Shewness is also used in conjunction with the mean to 
evaluate the normality of a distribution. 
The correlations among indicators of the same concepts and among 
indicators of different concepts in the model are also examined. The 
intercorrelations will be discussed in terms of specific theoretical as­
sumptions that have been made regarding measurement of the latent con­
cepts of the power process. 
The descriptive statistics for each indicator are presented in 
Table $.1. The reader can refer to Figure $.1 for a diagram of the latent 
concepts and the indicators selected as their measures. 
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics for indicators of concepts subsumed by the process of 
organizational power (evaluation of quality of indicators). 
Concept Indicator Mean Median Mode Actual Range Variance Bhrtosie Skewness 
RESCRS BUDG 0.689 0.609 0.218 0 - 2.899 0.405 0.637 5.789 2.556 
PBDG 5.689 4.197 5.110 0 - 7.440 5.210 1.792 -0.015 -0.324 
CONSTR CESSfTA 471 451 456 0-985 58208 196 0.781 0.460 
CEHTB 256 251 235 0-575 19697 140 -0.076 0.518 
AVAIL puiras 1.044 1.107 0.220 0 - 3.440 0.871 0.953 -0.095 0.841 
CL1ÎTGS 4.116 4.802 5.530 0 - 7.090 4.654 2.155 -1.015 -0.562 
CAPCRD COMPLX 3.805 4.135 4.450 0 - 8.890 3.576 1.891 0.552 0.162 
EDAM4 1.967 1.826 1.780 0 - 4.6(X) 1.255 1.120 -0.576 0.182 
OBLIGAIB OBLGS 86.141 87,508 87.500 0-144.830 476.079 21.819 8.045 —1.404 
MOTÏVATS MOTIV 2.817 2.905 2.800 0 - 5.600 0.082 0.991 2.909 -0.480 
COOPER COOPA 5.659 5.300 3.100 0-24.600 21.680 4.657 5.974 1.846 
CONFLICT COHFLâ 1.507 1.216 1.000 0 - 3.000 0,30a 0.713 -0.062 0.433 
CONPLB 6.824 6.392 6.890 0 - 8.220 1.444 1.222 26.845 -4.712 
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indicators. 
latent concepts and 
154 
The zero order correlations among indicators of the latent concepts 
are reported in Table 5*2. 
Resources possessed 
Actual budget (BIÎDG) and perceived budget scarcity (EBDG) are the 
indicators of comparative resources possessed (B£SCRS)3 Examination of 
the descriptive statistics for actual budget (BUDG) reveals that the mean 
(0.689) and median (0.609) are fairly equal while the mode (0=218) is a 
much smaller score. The actual range (0-2.899) t variance (O.4O5) and 
standard deviation (0.657) indicate that scores are quite well-dispersed 
about the mean. However, the distribution is skewed somewhat to the rig&t 
(skewness = 2.3$6) suggesting some extreme values. The kurtosis measure 
(5.789) indicates a clustering of scores about the mean, yet direct ex­
amination of the frequency distribution revealed general dispersion of 
scores. 
"The reader should consult Table 4»1 i^ a Chapter IV to see the nota­
tion used for the concepts and indicators. The reader is also again re­
minded that all concepts are conceived as comparative variable character­
istics of the relations among organizations. Likewise all indicators are 
constructed as comparative variables. 
2 
Sines the scores of all indicators are calculated as total coHpara-
tive values, the possible range of values are constrained by the original 
raw scores for each organization. Furthermore, some indicators, such as 
actual budget, have a possible range of 0 to infinity. For these rea­
sons the comparison of actual and possible ranges for the indicators are 
not considered useful. 
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Table 5.2 Correlations among indicators of latent concepts 
subsumed by the process of organizational power. 
Resources 
Possessed 
(RESCRS) 
BUDG PBDDG 
Resource Access Number of Capacity to 
Constraint Alternatives Coordinate 
(COHSTR) (AVAIL) (CAPCRD) 
CENTA CENTS FUNGS CLNTG COMPIX EDADM 
BUDG 
PBDDG 
CENTA 
CENTS 
PONDS 
CLNTG 
COMPLX 
EDADM 
MOTIT 
OBLGS 
19*1 -.17 
—,06 
.20* 
.12 
-.10 
-.11 
.25* 
.75* 
.09 
-.14 
-.02 
.52* 
.20* 
.09 
-.00 
-.28* 
-.51* 
.25* 
.58* [ 57* 
CONFIA 
CONPLB 
S^ignificant @ p = .10 or beyond. 
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Table 5.2 (continued) 
Motivational Number " of Cooperation Conl'lict 
Investment Obligations Stratesy Strategy 
(M0TI7ÂT5) (0BLIGA2S) (COOPER) (CONFLICT) 
TfOTrr OBLGS COOPA OONPLA OONFLB 
o
 r .05 .04 .06 -.05. 
-.17 .05 .19 .12 -.07 
.15 -.07 .01 -.08 .18 
.20* .14 .19* -.18 .28* 
.18 .02 .11 -.12 
-.55* 
.19* .05 .18 .00 -.12 
.10 .02 .42* .09 .04 
—.14 .14 .29* .08 -.15 
.02 
-.05 -.27* .29* 
.00 .01 -.05 
ai.LJL .09 
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'The agencies with the extreme values in operating budgets were deter­
mined to be the County Engineer Agencies in the three counties. Since the 
activities of these agencies are considered salient to the use of natural 
resources, they are also considered members of the population of natural 
resource agencies. The realities of relative possession of budget re­
sources among members of a set of natural resource agencies are reflected 
in the distribution of the scores. Measurement of relative operating bud­
get as a possessed resource might include the ratio of budget appropriated 
to an estimate of dollars needed to meet agency goals. A measure deter­
mined in this manner might better reflect possession of budget as a valued 
resource and potentially eliminate the extreme values. 
Perceived budget scarcity (PBDG) as an indicator of possession of 
resources (RESCRS) has a mean (3.589), mode (3.IIO) and median (4.197) 
that are fairly close to ane another, although not equal. The range 
(0-7.44)» variance (3.210) and standard deviation (1,792) show ecores 
well dispersed about the mean. Kurtosis (-O.OI5) indicates that scores 
are not clustered in a narrow range and the skewness statistic (-0=324) 
suggests that the mean is not distorted by extreme values. The statistics, 
taken together, provide some reassurance that the indicator scores are 
fairly normally distributed and that, comparative perceived scarcity of 
budget, as an indicator of resources possessed has some quality. 
It is assumed that comparative actual budget (BTJDG) and comparative 
perceived scarcity of budget (PBDG) do not measure the entire scope of 
meaning of resources possessed. It is also assumed that the two indicators 
are not tapping the same dimension of resource possession. We expect, 
therefore, that if the two indicators are valid measures of resources 
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possessed, they will be low to moderately correlated and not necessarily 
correlated in the same way with indicators of other concepts in the model. 
We find this to be the case. The correlations presented in Table 5«2 re­
veal that the correlation of BTJDG and PBDG is .19. This is interpreted 
as, the greater the comparative actual budget reported by administrators, 
the smaller the comparative perceived scarcity of budget that is reported. 
Actual budget (BUDG) is related significantly to both indicators of the 
number of alternative sources of resources (AVAIL); POEDS = ,45» CLHTG = 
.20 and to one indicator of the capacity to coordinate (CAPCRB); CQMPLX = 
,75. The lack of significant relationships with measures of centrality 
may reflect the deviant organizations mentioned above thsrt are indicated 
in the sample. Perceived scarcity of budget (PBDG) is not related signifi­
cantly to any of the other concept indicators. In general, the inspec­
tion of the correlations indicate heterogeneity of relationships with in­
dicators of other concepts in the model. This is so in regard to magni­
tude and direction of the relationships. Although the theory anticipates 
correlations of greater magnitude between these indicators and indicators 
of the focal dependent variables, cooperative strategy (COOPER) and conflict 
strategy (GONPLIOT), the findings tend to increase our confidence in the 
validity of the measures.^  The findings also suggest that more indicators 
of the concept should be identified to adequately measure the entire 
We are quite confident of the reliability of the actual budget in­
dicator since it is the report of objective organization data by adminis­
trators, However, no estimate of the reliability of the perceived scarcity 
of budget measure is available. 
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domain of meaning and to assess the reliability and validity of measure­
ment. 
Access to and constraint over resource flows 
The measures for access to and constraint over resource flows 
(CONSTR) are director interactions sent and received (CEHTà) and infor­
mation sent and received (CENTS). The mean, median and mode for CERTA 
are 471, 451 and 45^  respectively. The actual range is 0-985. ïbe 
variance is 58201 and the standard deviation is 196. Kurtosis and skewness 
are 0.781 and 0./l60. 
The mean for CMTB is 256, while the median is 251 and the mode is 
235. The variance of CEHTB is 19697» the standard deviation is I40 and 
the actual scores range from 0 to 575» Kurtosis is -O.O76 while skew­
ness is O.5I8. 
Based on the descriptive statisticsç the two indicators appear to 
bave quality as indicators of access to and constraint over resource flows. 
The measureB of central tendency and the skewness statistic for each indi­
cator are close to the same value indicating that the scores are distrib­
uted normally. The statistics for each measure provide evidence of ade­
quate dispersion of scores about the mean, while the kurtosis measure in­
dicates minimal clustering of scores. 
The correlation of CESTA and CENTS is .69 (Table 5» 2). This find-
inf? is consistent with the assumption that the two indicators of access 
to and constraint over resource flows will be highly and positively cor­
related. It was assumed that the two measures would tap the same dimen­
sion of the latent concept. 
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The indicators are related in a homogenous manner with indicators 
of other concepts in the model in terms of direction except for OBLGS, 
the indicator of number of obligations accumulated in relations. There 
is less consistency of correlations with indicators of other concepts re­
garding magnitude. CENTA is significantly correlated - .28 with EDADM, 
while CENTS is correlated - .51 with EDAM, .20 with MOTIV and .28 with 
CONPIB at a significant level. 
The negative correlations of CENTA and CENTB with EDADM are not in 
the posited direction. We expected centrality to be related positively to 
an organization's ability to coordinate subunits. While this may be the 
case when other dimensions of centrality and capacity to coordinate are 
considered, organizations in central positions of interaction and infor­
mation exchange in a network may have less need to maximize integration 
of internal subunits for power exercise. 
The positive correlation of CENTB and MOTIV is also not as hypotbe= 
sized. The theory asserts that greater centrality will produce fewer mo­
tives invested in relations with others. Again additional indicators are 
needed. Greater numbers of exchanges of information may produce senti­
ments which elevate the importance of contacts, whereas this would not be 
so with other dimensions of motives invested in relations. Measures 
should be developed that separate the affective sentiments regarding con­
tacts from importance that is associated with necessity and lack of sub-
stitutability. While the validity of the measures continues to be ques­
tionable, when the assumptions in the theory are noted, we have some evi­
dence for their validity. When only a few indicators of highly complex 
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concepts are available, lack of homogeneity of correlations across con­
cepts can be taken as support for the validity of the few measures in the 
sense that they are tapping separate dimensions of the latent complex con­
cept involved. 
Availability of alternative sources of resources 
The number of funding sources (FONDS) and the number of client 
groups served (CL^ TG) are the indicators of the availability of alterna-
tive sources of resources (AVAIL). Inspection of the descriptive statis­
tics reveals that the means (FONDS = 1.044; CLHTG = 4.116), medians (FDHDS 
= 1.197» OLNTG = 4.802) and modes (FONDS = 1.220; CLHTC = 5*530) are 
fairly equal for each indicator. This suggests that the distributions of 
scores for each measure do not depart markedly from normality. The mea­
sures of dispersion also indicate a spread of scores about the mean for 
each indicator. And the kurtosis and skeuness measures for each score do 
not suggest undue clustering of scores about the mean or distortion of the 
mean by extreme values. These statistics are evidences of the quality of 
the two indicators. 
The two indicators of the availability of alternative sources of 
resources are viewed as tapping separate dimensions of the latent variable. 
Thus the two indicators are not expected to be highly correlated. As ex­
pected the zero-order correlation of FDHDS and CLîîî'G is .25. This find­
ing supports the notion that the indicators are tapping two different di­
mensions of the complex concept. Likewise, the indicators are not consis­
tently related to indicators of other concepts in the model. In terms of 
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direction the relationships are consistent except for the correlation of 
FUNDS and CONFIA. The direction of the relationships are in the posited 
direction except for those with CONFA, MOTIT and OBMrS. The relationships 
of PDUDS with COMPLX (r - .52), EDADM (r = .25) and COHFLB (r = -.55) are 
statistically significant as is that of CLNTG with EDAM (r «= .)8). Al­
though no statistical estimates of the reliability of the two indicators 
are available the knowledge that both involve reports of objective, fac­
tual information by administrators provides some evidence for their reli­
ability. 
The capacity to coordinate subunits 
Two separate measures for the capacity to coordinate subunits 
(CAPCRD) were developed. These are.complexity, the number of unique 
positions (COMPLX) and education of the administrator (EDADM). The mean 
(3.805), median (4.153) and mode (4*450) for COMPLX are fairly homogenous 
and indicate that the distribution of the scores does not deviate to any 
great degree from normality. Measures of dispersion (range = 0 - 8.89, 
variance = 5*576 and standard deviation = 1.891) reveal adequate disper­
sion of scores. Kurtosis (0.552) and skewness (O.I62) are evidence of 
limited clustering of scores and minimal distortion of the mean by out-
lyers. 
Similarly, the descriptive statistics for EDADM support that it is 
a useful indicator. The mean (I.967), median (1.826) and mode (I.78O) 
are quite consistent. The range (O - 4.6), variance (1.255) and standard 
deviation (1.12) reveal dispersion. Kurtosis (-0.376) and skewness (.182) 
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values indicate minimal clustering and distorting of the mean by extreme 
outlying scores. 
The two measures of capacity to coordinate reflect different as­
pects of the scope of its meaning» Therefore, the moderate magnitude of 
the zero-order correlation (,37) for the two indicators is considered sup­
port for its validity. Also, the inconsistent relationships of the two 
indicators with indicators of other concepts in the model are as expected. 
However, as noted earlier, the negative correlations with indicators of 
availability of alternative sources (AVAIL) is not as posited. As hypoth­
esized both COMPIiX and EDAM are positively and significantly related 
to COOPA, The two indicators of capacity to coordinate are considered 
reliable because they both are reports of objective information by admin­
istrators about their respective organizations. 
Motivational investment 
A single indicator of motivational investment (MOTIVATS) was avail­
able for the empirical analysis^  %e indicator is important of contacts 
(MOTIV). The mean (2.817), median (2,905) and mode (2.800) are nearly 
equal. This finding is evidence that scores are normally distributed 
about the mean and not distorted by extreme values® The ranges (-5,6) 
variance (0.982) and standard deviation (0.991) iMicste adequate scatter­
ing of scores across the range of values. The kurtosis statistic (2.909) 
indicates some clustering of scores in a narrow range about the mean. Di­
rect examination of the frequencies, however, showed that this was not 
extreme. The scores are minimally skewed (-0,480). Taken as a whole, 
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the descriptive statistics support the quality of the indicator. 
As noted earlier, MOTIV is correlated positively and significantly 
with CERTB, a result that is contrary to the hypothesized relationship. 
MOTIV is correlated as hypothesized with COHFLâ. (-,27) and not as hypoth­
esized with CONPLB (.29) although both relationships are statistically 
significant. This finding is further support for the conceptualization 
and measurement of the latent concepts of power as multidimensional. To 
the extent that the measure of motivational investment reflects sentiments 
generated by a relationship, we might expect less indirect conflict or 
conflicting priorities and responsibilities (COHFLA) and more direct con­
flict or disagreements and disputes (COHKB). Overall, the correlations 
of MOTIV with indicators of other concepts in the model are not homogenous. 
Number of obligations accumulated 
OBLGS is the single indicator used to measure number of obligations 
accumulated (OBLIQATS). The quality of this indicator is suspect accord­
ing to information provided by the deBoriptive statistics^  The mean 
(86,14), the median (87.51)» the mode (87.50) and skewness (-1,404) are 
consistent with scores that are not badly distorted by outlyers. And the 
range (0-144o83)s variance (476,06) and standard deviation (21,82) rs= 
fleet reasonable dispersion of scores about the mean. However, the kur-
tosis (8.045) as well as direct observation of the frequencies, indicates 
that there is considerable piling of scores in a narrow range about the 
mean. 
OBLGS is not significantly correlated with any of the indicators of 
other concepts in the model. Althou^  we must also question the 
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theoretical relationships that are hypothesized, ve are inclined to ques­
tion the adequacy of this measure. There is considerable theoretical sup­
port of the role of obligations in the power process as a critical ele­
ment in the exercise of power to elicit compliance. Therefore, it seems 
likely that the indicator of obligations lacks quality. However, be­
cause additional indicators of other complex concepts in the model are 
also needed which might be related to the dimension of obligations re­
flected in OBLGS, it is considered prudent to not totally reject it as a 
potential indicator. 
Cooperative strategies 
A single indicator, number of joint programs (COOPA), of cooperative 
strategies (COOPER) is also available for the empirical analysis» Thus 
only the coalescing dimensions of cooperative strategies is tapped. While 
the mean (5.659) and median (5.500) are nearly equal, the mode (5.100) is 
a smaller value. This suggests that the distribution departs somewhat 
from normlity, although the measure of skewness (1.846) is not too large. 
Measures of dispersion (range = 0 = 24.6, variance = 21.689 and standard 
deviation = 4.^ 57) indicate an acceptable scattering of scores about the 
mean, Kurtosis (5*974) is of concern, although an inspection of the fre­
quencies do not show marked clustering of values in a narrow range about 
the mean. Althou^  the quality of this indicator could be improved, it 
is considered acceptable on the basis of these statistics. Use of data 
from a sample of or^ aizations larger than N = 59 mi^ t also correct some 
of the problems of quality. 
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Zero-order correlations of COOPA with indicators across concepts in 
the model are fairly consistent, but of low magnitude, nonsignificant ex­
cept for the relationships with indicators of capacity to coordinate 
(COMPLK = .42 and EDADM = .29). Indicators of the several dimensions of 
cooperative strategies (i.e., contracting, coopting) need to be developed 
to flesh out the full potential to explain cooperative strategies. As with 
other indicators that involve reports of objective and factual information 
about organizations by administrators, the reports of the number of joint 
programs is considered a reliable measure of the coalescing dimension of 
cooperative strategies. 
Conflict strategies 
Conflict strategies (COBFLIOT) are measured by two indicators. The 
extent of conflicting priorities and responsibilities (COIiFLA.) measures a 
dimension of conflict that is latent or indirect. The extent of disagree­
ments and disputes (COHFLB) measures a dimension of conflict that is ac­
tive and direct. COÎIFL& appears to have considerable quality, based on 
the descriptive statistics. The mean (1.307)» median (1.216) and mode 
(1.000) are fairly equal. The range (O - $.000), the variance (O.5O8) 
and the standard deviation (O.713) reflect dispersion of scores about the 
mean, while kurtosis (-O.O62) and skewness (0.453) show that there is min­
imal stacking of values close to the mean and that the distribution is 
not greatly skewed by extreme values. 
The three measures of central tendency for COEPLB are also nearly 
the same (mean = 6.824, median = 6.892 and mode => 6»890)® The variance 
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is 1.494; the standard deviation is 1.222 and the actual range is 0 -
8.220. However, the distribution is negatively skewed (-4.712) indicat­
ing marked distortion of the mean by an outlyer. Inspection of the fre­
quencies verifies that there is one extremely low value with one frequency. 
Kurtosis (26.843) is also extreme. Inspection of the frequencies again 
supports the statistic. Scores tend to be clustered in a fairly ti^ t 
range around the mean. Althou^  these findings tend to raise questions 
about the quality of the indicator (COHPLB), the measure reflects the real 
composite position of organizations relative to each of the organizations 
in their respective networks.^  
As noted earlier the finding that COMPLA. and C0HFL5 are related in 
different ways to indicators of other concepts in the model is viewed as 
support for the validity of the measures as indicators for separate and 
unique dimensions of conflicting strategies. 
In summary» the majority of indicators seem to have quality as mea­
sures of the latent concepts. Those for which problems have been noted 
will be considered suspect in the subsequent empirical analysis. In Chap­
ter 71 methodological and substantive implications of measurement of the 
latent concepts will be discussed. 
Now that the empirical findings regarding the adequacy of indicators 
of the latent concepts have been presented and discussed, we turn to an 
Examination of the frequencies of raws scores on this variable pri= 
or to construction of the total comparative scores shows that scores are 
distributed in a fashion approximating normality with minimal skewness and 
kurtosis. 
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evaluation of the regression equations for each proposition in the cau­
sal model. 
The Model of Interorganizational Power 
The first general hypothesis (G.E.) in the model of interorganiza­
tional power states: 
GoHole An organization's total capacity to coordinate its suhunits 
(CAPCRD) relative to the capacity of other organizations in its set is a 
positive linear function of the combined effects of amount and type of 
resources possessed (RESCRS), the degree of access to and constraint it 
has over the flows of valued resources to and from other organizations 
(CONSTR) and the number of alternative sources of valued resources it has 
available (AVAIL) compared to other organizations in its set, the effect 
of each is significant. 
Because there are two indicators of capacity to coordinate subunits; 
two hypotheses, one for each dependent variable indicator, are stated em­
pirically; 
E.H.I.a. The total number of different positions (CMPLX) reported by 
an administrator compared to the total number reported by each other ad­
ministrator in a county is a positive linear function of the combined ef­
fects of the actual operating budget (BDDG), perceived scarcity of budget 
(PBDG), the number of times interactions that are sent and received by 
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administrators (CENTA), the number of times information is sent and re­
ceived by administrators (CENTB), the number of sources of funding (POITDS) 
and the number of client groups served (CLHTG) reported by an administra­
tor compared to those reported by administrators of other organizations 
in the county, the effect of each is significant. 
E.H.I.b. The total education of an administrator (EDADM) reported by 
an administrator compared to the total education reported by each other 
administrator in a county is a positive linear function of the combined 
effects of the actual operating budget (BUDG), perceived scarcity of bud­
get (PBDG), the number of times interactions are sent and received by ad­
ministrators (CESÎTA), the number of times information is sent and re­
ceived by administrators (CEHTB), the number of sources of funding (FDSDS) 
and the number of client groups served (CLHTG) reported by an administra­
tor compared to those reported by administrators of other organizations 
in the county, the effect of each is significant. 
Each independent variable coefficient is posited to be positive in 
the theoretics! model. The data from regression analysis for evaluating 
the general hypothesis (G.H.I.) via the two empirical hypotheses (E.S.I.a. 
and E.H.l.b.) are presented in Table 5-5» 
The P-test (at the .01 level of significance) indicates that com­
plexity or the number of positions (COMPLX) is a function of the inde­
pendent variables in empirical hypothesis l.a. However, all coefficients 
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Table 5*3 ïïnstandardized and standardized partial regression co­
efficients, t-values, r2 and P-value for causes of ca­
pacity to coordinate subunits (CAPCRD) as power exer­
cise (evaluation of hypotheses l). 
Resources 
Possessed 
Dependent 
Variables b B t-values 
Resources Possessed (RfSCRS) 
BDDG-Actual Budget 
PBDG-Perceived Budget Scarcity 
COMPIX-Humber 
of Positions 
1.896 
0.622 
0.638 
0.059 
5.09*** 
0.53 
Access and Constraint over 
Resources (CONSTR) 
GMTA-Director Interaction 
CMTB-Inf ormat ion 
-0=121 
0.210 
-0.125 
0.156 
0.81 
1.01 
Availability of Alternatives 
(AVAIL) 
PDHDS-Number of Fund Sources 
CLNTG-Number of Client Groups o
 o
 
00
 o
 
0.252 
0.025 
2.02* 
0.22 
R^  = .62 P-value = 8.86* 
Resources Possessed (RESCRS) 
BUDG 
PBDG 
EDADM-
Education of 
Administrator 
-0.162 
0.586 
-0.092 
-0.094 
0.53 
0.60 
Access and Constraint over 
Resources (COHSTR) 
CENTA 
CEZNCB 
-0.758 
-0.147 
-0.132 
-0.185 
0.62 
0.86 
Availability of Alternatives 
(AVAIL) 
PDBBS 0.244 0.203 1.17 
GLKTG 0.172 0.331 2.09** 
R^  = .26 P-value = 1.917^  
®An P-value of 3.42 is significant at the .01 level. 
An P-value of 1.82 is significant at the .10 level. 
*A t-value of 1.697 is significant at the .10 level. 
**A t-value of 2.04 is significant at the .05 level. 
*^ A t-value of 2.75 is significant at the .01 level. 
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5 
are not positive as postulated in the theoretical hypothesis. The co­
efficient for the centrality of organizations as measured by director 
interactions sent and received (CENTA) has a negative sign. Taken to-
2 gether, the independent variables explain 62 percent (E = 62) of the 
variance in complexity. This is a relatively hi^  proportion of the var­
iance explained in capacity to coordinate as measured by complexity 
(COMPLX) and it is significant at the .01 level. 
Two of the independent variables contributes significantly to the 
prediction of comparative complexity. Actual budget is significant at 
the .01 level while number of funding sources is significant at the .10 
level. Actual budget is the most important predictor of complexity af­
ter controlling for the effects of the other independent variables in 
the equation. 
When the education of the administrator (EDADM) is the indicator 
for capacity to coordinate subunits, 26 percent (R = 26) of its vari­
ance is jointly explained by the independent variables in the hypothesis, 
The F-test (at the .10 level of significance) indicates that education of 
the administrator is a function of the independent variables in the hy­
pothesis. Only three coefficients are positive, as hypothosized; per­
ceived budget scarcity (PBDG), the number of funding sources (FORDS) and 
the number of client groups served (OMTG). The number of client groupa, 
alone, contributes significantly to the explanation of education of the 
5 
The scoring for perceived budget scarcity was reversed so that 
high-scarcity «= low score. 
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administrator (at the .05 level) after the effects of the other indepen­
dent variables are controlled. 
On the basis of these findings it can be concluded that the hypoth­
esis is moderately supported. Strong support for the hypothesis would 
require that all variables have a significant effect on the dependent 
variable indicators. It can also be concluded on the basis of these 
findings that the two dependent variable indicators are a function of 
different independent variable indicators. This tends to support the con­
tention that a multiple indicator approach to measurement of the complex 
concepts included in the power process is needed for construction and 
testing of a theory of interorganizational power. 
The second general hypothesis (6.E.) of the power process is: 
G.H.2. The relative number of total obligations incurred by an or­
ganization in its transactions with other organizations in its set 
(OBLIGATS) is a negative linear function of the combined effects of the 
relative total amount and type of valued resources it possesses (EBSCRS), 
the degree of access and constraint it has over the flows of valued re­
sources to and from other organizations (COHSTR), the number of alterna­
tive sources of valued resources it has available (AVAIL), and the extent 
of its capacity to coordinate aubunita (GAPGRD) compared to other orgçmi-
zations in its set, the effect of each is significant. 
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Stated empirically, the hypothesis is; 
E.H.2. The total number of times resources were received by an organ­
ization from other organizations minus the number of times resources were 
provided by an organization to others as reported by administrators 
(OBLGrS) is a negative linear function of the combined effects of the ac­
tual operating budget (BUDG), perceived scarcity of budget (PBDG); the 
number of times interactions were sent and received by administrators 
(CEHTA), the number of times information was sent and received by admin­
istrators (CERTB); the number of sources of funding (POHDS), the number 
of client groups served (CLNTG); the total number of different positions 
reported by an administrator (COMPLX) and the total education of the ad­
ministrator (EDADM); compared to those reported by administrators of 
other organizations in the county, the effect of each is significant, 
Ite data for evaluation of this hypothesis are presented in Table 
5.4 
The overall F-test indicates that obligations incurred, measured by 
the net of exchanged resources received, is not a joint function of t'le 
independent variables as hypothesized. The collective contribution of 
the independent variables to the explanation of the variance in obliga-
2 
tiens %as onl^  four percent (E = *04)* the P=test for the multiple cor= 
2 
relation coefficient square (R ) failed to meet the «25 level used for 
declaring statistical significance. 
Likewise no single independent variable contributed significantly 
to the prediction of obligations incurred by organizations in their 
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Table 5*4 Unstandardized and standardized partial regression co­
efficients, t-values, and P-value for causes of ob­
ligations incurred (OBLIQÀTS) as power exercise (evalu­
ation of hypothesis 2). 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
variable B t-values 
Resources Possessed (RESCRS ) OBLGrS-Met of 
Exchanged 
Resources 
Received 
BUDG 
PBDG 
Access and Constraint over 
Resources (COHSTR) 
CENTA 
CENTS 
Availability of Alternatives 
(AVAIL) 
PDNDS 
CLNTG 
5.050 0.089 0.29 
-0.435 -0.056 0.19 
0.707 0.065 0.25 
-0.188 -0.121 0.45 
-0.704 -0.050 0.14 
-0.199 -0.020 0.10 
capacity to coordinate 
(CAPCRD) 
COMPLX 
EDAM 
-0.996 -0.086 0.26 
5.055 -0.156 0.65 
R^  » .04 P-value = 0.156 
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int erorganizational relat ions. 
It is concluded on the basis of these findings that the hypothesis 
is not supported. As noted in the previous section of this chapter, the 
indicator for obligations (OBLSS) is of questionable quality. We are in­
clined to believe, in view of the important theoretical role of obliga­
tions incurred in the process of power relations, that the measurement of 
the concept in this study is not adequate and that the hypothesis should 
be tested following the development of more adequate indicators. However, 
in view of the fact that a small number of indicators have been developed 
for all of the complex concepts and hence only a small part of the domain 
of these concepts have been tapped, we also believe that the indicator 
should not be discarded until it can be determined whether or not the hy­
pothesized relationships exist with some of these yet to be discovered 
measures. At the same time, additional indicators of obligations incurred 
should also be sought. 
The third geneiral hypothesis in the model of interorganizational 
power states: 
G.E.5. The total comparative motivational investment of an organiza­
tion relative to other organizations in its set (MOTIVATS) is a negative 
linear function of the oofflbiaed effects of amount and type of resources 
possessed (EESCRS), the degree of access and constraint it has over the 
flows of valued resources to and from other organizations (CONSTR), the 
number of alternative sources of valued resources it has available (AVAIL) 
and the degree an organization is able to coordinate its subunits 
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compared to other organizations in its set (CAPCBB)» the effect of each 
is significant. 
Stated empirically, the hypothesis is: 
E.E.). The total of the degree of importance of contacts (MOTIV) with 
other organizations reported by administrators compared to importance re­
ported by other administrators is a negative linear function of the com» 
bined effects of the actual operating budget (BITDG) perceived scarcity of 
budget (PBDG), the number of times interactions were sent and received by 
administrators (CEBTA), the number of times information was sent and re­
ceived by administrators (CEKTB); the number of sources of funding (FOHDS), 
the number of client groups served (CLHTG)J the number of different posi­
tions reported by an administrator (CCMPLX) and the total education of an 
administrator (EDADM) compared to those reported by administrators of 
other organizations in the county, the effect of each is significant. 
The relevant data for evaluating this hypothesis are presented in 
Table 5.5 
2 
Twenty-four percent of the variance (R = .24) in motivational in­
vestment measured by the imuortance of contacts fMOTIVE is axnlained bv 
the hypothesized independent variables. The collective contribution of 
the hypothesized independent variables to the explanation of variance in 
motivational investment is not significant at the .25 level. Al­
though there is no evidence for claiming support for the 
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Table 5*5 ïïnstandardized and standardized partial regression co­
efficients, t-values, and P-value for causes of mo­
tivational investment in relations (MOTIVÂTS) as power 
exercise (evaluation of hypothesis )). 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables B t-values 
Resources Possessed (RESCSS) MOTIV-
Importance 
of Contacts 
BDDG 
PBDG 
Access and Constraint over 
Resources (COHSTR) 
CEHTA 
CENTS 
Availability of Alternatives 
(AVAIL) 
PDKDS 
CLNTG 
Capacity to Coordinate 
(CAFGHD) 
COHPDC 
EDADM 
-0.516 -0.331 1.22* 
0.110 0.200 1.19* 
-0.219 -0.043 0.19 
0.827 0.117 0.49 
0.244 0.230 1.18* 
0.145 0.315 1.76** 
0.164 0.314 1.06 
-0.336 -0.380 1.79** 
.24 P-value = 1.163' 
a 
*A t-value of I.I7 is significant at the .25 level. 
**A t-value of 1.699 is significant at the .10 level. 
®AM P-value of 1.35 is significant at the .25 level. 
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hypothesis, it is noted for consideration in the model building frame­
work. Nearly one-fourth of the variance ia being accounted for. In view 
of the small size of the sample (N = 39), the hypothesized relationships 
deserve further consideration. 
Three of the coefficients for the independent variables; actual 
budget (BDDG), centrality of director interaction (CEMA) and education 
of the administrator (EDADM) are negative, as hypothesized. The relation­
ship of perceived scarcity (PBDG) and motivational investment is not as 
hypothesized. However, two of the independent variables; client groups 
(CLNTG) and education of the administrator (EDAIM) are significant pre­
dictors of motivational investment at the .10 level and three independent 
variables; actual budget (BDDG), perceived scarcity of budget (FBDG) and 
funding sources (FDHDS) are significant predictors at the .25 level. 
Although it cannot be concluded on the basis of these findings that 
the hypothesis is strongly supported, the hypothesis is accorded some 
support in the exploratory context of model development. 
Kie fourth general hypothesis in the model of the process of inters 
organizational power iss 
G.E.4. The relative frequency of selection of cooperative exchange 
strategies by an organization (COOPER) is a linear function of the com­
bination of the positive direct effects of the total amount and type of 
resources possessed (RESCRS), total degree of access and constraint over 
resource flows (COî^ Tfi), the number of alternatives available (i¥ÂÎL), the 
extent of capacity to coordinate subunits (CâPCBD) and the negative direct 
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effects of number of obligations accumulated (OBUGATS) and strength of 
motivational investment (MOTIYATS) relative to other organizations in its 
set, the effect of each is significant. 
Snpirically, the hypothesis is stated as: 
E.S.4. The total number of joint programs reported by an administra­
tor (COOPA) compared to the total number reported by each other adminis­
trator in a county is a linear function of the combination of positive 
direct effects of the actual operating budget (BUDG), perceived scarcity 
of budget (PBBGr); the number of times interactions are sent and received 
by administrators (CENTA); the number of sources of funding (POHBS) and 
the number of client groups (CLSTG); the number of different positions 
reported by an administrator (COMPIX) and the total education of an ad­
ministrator (EDABM) and the negative direct effects of the number of 
times resources are received from minus provided for other organizations 
(OBL^ S) and the total of the compared degree of importance of contacts 
with other organizations (MOTIV) reported by administrators compared to 
those reported by other administrators in its set, the effect of each is 
significant» 
The data which are relevant for evaluating the hypothesis are con­
tained in Table $.6. 
The P-test (at the .05 level of significance) indicates that s©= 
lection of a coalescing cooperative strate^  (COOPA) is a function of the 
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Table $.6 Unstandardized and standardized partial regression co­
efficients, t-values, and P-value for causes of se­
lection of a cooperative strategy (COOPER)(evaluation 
of hypothesis 4)* 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables B t-values 
Resources Possessed (RESCRS) COOPA-Number of 
Joint Programs 
BDDG 
PBDG 
Access and Constraint over 
Resources (CONSTR) 
CENTA 
CEKTB 
Availability of Alternatives 
(AVAIL) 
FUNDS 
CLHTG 
Capacity to Coordinate 
fCAFCBB) 
COMPIX 
EDADM 
Obligations Incurred (OBLIGATS) 
OBLGS 
Motivational Investment (M0TIVA2S) 
MOTIV 
-5^ 5 -0.684 2.89*** 
-0.619 -0.258 1.64* 
-0.556 -0.149 0.77 
0.105 0.511 1.55* 
-0.460 -0.092 0,55 
0.559 0.166 1.04 
2.279 0.926 5.61*** 
0.260 0.006 0.05 
-0.521 0.024 0.17 
0.656 =0.156 0.87 
R » .49 F-value = 2.666 
*A t-value of 1.515 is significant at the .20 level. 
***A t-value of 2.048 is significant at the .05 level. 
s-An P-value of 2.19 is significant at the .05 level. 
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independent variables in the hypothesis. Five of the coefficients; cen­
tral ity of information exchange (CENTS), client groups served (CLHTG), 
complexity (COMPLX), education of the administrator (EDADM) and obliga­
tions incurred (OBLGrS) are in the hypothesised direction,^  Collectively, 
the independent variable indicators explain a substantial proportion 
(R = .49) of the variance in selection of a cooperative strategy. 
Four of the independent variables are significant predictors of 
selection of a cooperative strategy, The actual budget (BDDG) and com­
plexity (COMPIX) coefficients are significant at the .05 level. The cen-
trality of information exchange (CESITB) and perceived budget scarcity 
(PBDG) coefficients are significant at the .20 level. Complexity is the 
most important predictor of selection of a cooperative strategy after con­
trolling for the effects of the other independent variables. The finding 
indicates, as hypothesized, that the more subunits an organization has 
relative to other organizations in its set, the more often it will select 
a cooperative strategy to gain an advantage or balance its power relations. 
Actual budget is also an important predictor of selection of a cooperative 
strategy, althou^  its effects are not in the hypothesized direction. 
According to these data, the smaller the budget, compared to other or­
ganizations, the more often the organization will choose a cooperative 
strategy/ compared to other organisations in its relations with other or­
ganizations. The direction of the relationship of perceived budget scazv 
city and selection of a cooperative strategy is consistent with that 
found for actual budget and cooperation. 
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It can be concluded on the basis of these findings that the hypoth­
esis is only moderately supported. Further theoretical and/or methodo­
logical specification would appear to be in order to account for the re­
lationship between budget and selection of a cooperative strategy. The 
finding that six variables in the hypothesis do not have significant ef­
fects on selection of a cooperative strategy argues strongly for the 
presence of considerable specification error. 
The fifth and final general hypothesis in the model of the process 
of interorganizational power is: 
G.H.5. The relative extent of conflict initiated by an organization 
with other members of its set (CONFLICT) is a linear function of the com­
bination of positive direct effects of the total amount and type of re­
sources possessed (RESCBS), total degree of access and constraint over 
resource flows (CONSTR), the extent of capacity to coordinate subunits 
(CAPCRD), the strength of motives invested in relations (MOTIVATS) and 
the negative direct effects of the number of alternatives available (AVAIL) 
and the number of obligations accumulated (OBLIGATS) relative to other 
organizations in its set, the effect of each is significant. 
Since there are two measures of the selection of a conflict strat­
egy; two hypotheses, one for each dependent variable indicator are 
stated empirically; 
E.H,5.a. The total comparative extent of conflicting responsibilities 
score (COHFLA.) is a linear function of the combination of positive direct 
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effects of the actual operating budget (BUDG), perceived scarcity of bud­
get (FBBG); the number of times interactions are sent and received by ad­
ministrators (CMTA)t the number of times information is sent and re­
ceived by administrators (CENTB), the number of different positions re­
ported by an administrator (COMPLX), the total education of an adminis» 
trator (EOADM), and the total of the compared degree of importance of con­
tacts with other organizations (MOTIV), and the negative direct effects 
of the number of sources of funding (FOKDS), the number of client groups 
served (CLNTG) and the number of times resources are received from minus 
provided for other organizations (OBLGS) as reported by administrators 
compared to those reported by other administrators in its set, the effect 
of each is significant, 
E.S.^ .b. The total comparative extent of disagreements and disputes 
score (COHPLB), is a linear function of the combination of positive di­
rect effects of the actual operating budget (BDDG), perceived scarcity of 
budget (PBDG); the number of times interactions are sent and reeeived by 
administrators (C£NTÂ)> the number of times information is sent and re­
ceived by administrators (CEFTB), the number of different positions re­
ported by an administrator (COMPLK), the total education of an administra­
tor (ED&BM)» and the total of the degree of importance of contacts gith 
other or^ aizations (MOTIV), and the negative direct effects of the num­
ber of sources of funding (FORDS), the number of client groups served 
(CLNTG) and the number of times resources are received from minus provided 
for other organizations (OBLGB) as reported by administrators compared to 
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those reported by other administrators in its set, the effect of each is 
significant. 
The relevant data for evaluating these hypotheses are presented in 
Tables 5«7 and $.8. 
Only a small percent (R^  » .I5) of the variance in conflicting pri­
orities and responsibilities (COIIFL&) is explained by the hypothesized 
independent variables. The P-test for the collective contribution of all 
the independent variables to the explanation conflicting priorities and 
responsibilities is not significant at any of the conventional levels 
(i.e., .10, .05 and .01). 
Conflicting responsibilities and priorities represent a latent or 
indirect form of conflict. Molnar and Rogers (1977) refer to this form 
of conflict as structural conflict. It may be that this type of conflict 
among organizations is not a manifestation of the process of their power 
relations. Rather, structural conflict may grow out of differences in 
ideologies, ends and means. 
Although five of the coefficients; centrality of director inter­
action (CMTA), funding sources (POKDS), complexity (COMPLS), obliga­
tions (OBLGS) and motivational investment (MOTIV); are in the hypothe­
sized directionj no single independent variable indicators contribute 
significantly to the explanation of conflicting priorities and responsi­
bilities, On the basis of these findings it is concluded that the hypoth­
esis is not supported. 
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Table 3*7 Unstandardized and standardized partial regression 
coefficients, t-values, and F-values for causes of 
power manifested in selection of conflict strategies 
(COHFLICT)(evaluation of hypothesis $). 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables B t-values 
Resources Possessed (RESCBS) COIWLA-Oonflicting 
Priorities and 
Responsibilities 
BDDC-
PBDG 
Access and Constraint over 
Resources (COIiSTR) 
CERTÂ 
CEHTB 
Availability of Alternatives 
(AVAIL) 
POHDS 
OBLGS 
Capacity to Coordinate 
(GAPGPJÎ) 
COMPIX 
EDADM 
Obligations Incurred (OBLIGATS) 
OBLfiS 
Motivational Investment (MOÏIVAT'S) 
MOTIV 
-0.122 -0.109 0.36 
-0.290 -0.073 0.39 
0.502 0.138 0.55 
-0.135 -0.266 1.01 
-0.178 -0.253 1.09 
0.183 0.055 0.27 
0.128 0.339 1.03 
-0.472 -0.074 0.50 
0.283 -0.009 0.05 
=0.164 -=0.228 1.14 
R^  » 
.15 F-value = 0.4954 
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Table $.8 ïïnstandardized and standa^ ized partial regression 
coefficients, t-values, E and F-values for causes of 
power manifested in selection of conflict strategies 
(CONFLICT)(evaluation of hypothesis 5). 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variables b 
B t=valU83 
Resources Possessed (RESCRS) OOBFIiB-
Disagreements 
and Disputes 
BUDG 
PBDG 
Access and Constraint over 
Resources (CONST) 
CENTA 
CMTB 
Availability of Alternatives 
(AVAIL) 
FUNDS 
OBLQS 
Capacity to Coordinate 
(CAPCRD) 
COMPLX 
EDAm 
Obligations Incurred (OBLIGATS) 
OBLGS 
Motivational Investment (MOTIVATS) 
HOTIV 
0.124 0.006 0.03 
-0.625 -0.092 0.57 
0.694 0.111 0.51 
0.530 0.061 0.27 
-0.751 -0.573 3.02** 
-0.711 -0.125 0.70 
0.207 0.320 1.11 
0.442 0.045 0.21 
-0.120 -0.021 0.14 
0.456 0.370 2.12* 
E = .36 F-value » 1.5414 
*A t-value of 2.048 is significant at the .05 level. 
-"^ A t-value of 2.73 is significant at the .01 level. 
An F-value of 1.36 is significant at the .25 level. 
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The P-test (at the .25 level of significance) indicates that the ex­
tent of disagreements and disputes among organizations (CONPLB) is a func­
tion of the independent variables in the hypothesis. Collectively the in-
2 dependent variables explain a substantial proportion of the variance (R = 
.%) in disagreements and disputes. 
All but two of the coefficients, perceived budget scarcity (PBDG) and 
motivational investment (MOTIV), are in the hypothesized direction. How­
ever, only two independent variable indicators contribute significantly to 
explanation of the variance in extent of disagreements and disputes, entered 
last in the equation. The coefficient for funding sources (FDUDS), the most 
important predictor, is significant at the .01 level while the coefficient 
for motivational investment (MOTIV) is significant at the .05 level. This 
is a significant finding in view of the theoretical argument that availabil­
ity of alternatives and motivational investment would be the critical vari­
ables in determining choice of a conflict strategy. 
In view of the sample size (N=39) and the model building posture of 
this study* it seems prudent to conclude that the hypothesis is accorded 
some tentative support, even though the proportion of variance explained is 
statistically significant at the .25 level. The hypothesized independent 
variables appear to have some potential for contributing to the development 
of a theory to explain strategies of power relations among organizations, 
especially active or overt conflict. 
This completes the analysis of the propositions in the causal model 
using the regression approach. Here our interest has focused on the amount 
(percent) of variance in each dependent variable indicator (multiple cor-
relation coefficient square - R ) explained by the independent variable 
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indicators, taken together, and on the unique contribution of each inde­
pendent variable indicator on each dependent variable indicator (partial 
regression coefficient). In the third and final section of the chapter the 
analysis centers on causal relationships among the latent concepts, as 
blocks of indicators, posited in the theoretical causal model. In this 
case we want to know how much of une remaining variance in the dependent 
variables is explained by each of the latent independent variaoles (blocks) 
after all other blocks of independent variables have explainea as much of 
the variance as they can. In this way we can get a better feel for the 
hypothesized causal relationship among the latent concepts in xhe theoret­
ical model on the basis of the data. Thus we will examine the multiple-
partial correlation square for each block of independent variaoles with 
respect to each relevant dependent variable indicator.^  
The model hypothesizes that each block of independent variables 
will explain a significant amount of the variance remaining in eaeh de­
pendent variable indicator, after all other blocks of independent vari­
ables have been allowed to explain all the variance they can. Figure 
5.2 presents the causal model of power with the notations for each of 
the latent concepts (blocks) and indicators. The notations are presented 
in Table 4»1 in Chapter IV, 
A two step, hierarchical regression format is used to complete the 
analysis for each block of independent variables and a dependent variable 
Although multiple-partial correlation analysis allows the analysis 
of effects of a group of independent indicators, taken as a single block, 
it does not allow analysis of these effects on a group of dependent vari­
able indicators, as a block. Thus the effects of blocks on separate indi­
cators of the dependent variable must be analyzed. 
CAI?CHD BUSG FEDQ OOOPA 
cofipui swum 
OBLIOilTS COHSTH 
OBLffiS CraiA CEHŒB 
MOnVlTS 
AVAIL 
FUHDS CUrrGS COEFM Gosms 
CD 
VO 
Figure 5., 2 The causal model of the process of organizational power, including 
notations for latent concepts (blocks) and indicators. 
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Indicator, The following regressions were solved for the analysis of the 
eausal model of organizational power: 
(1) Regress COMPLX on BUDG, PBDG after the inclusion of CENTA, CjESTEB, 
PDKDS, CLNTG. (Repeat twice - once for each independent block after 
the other two). 
(2) Regress EDADM on BUDG, PBDG after the inclusion of 6ESFTA, CESTB, 
FDHDS, CLNTG. (Repeat twice - once for each independent block after 
the other two). 
(3) Regress OBLGS on BUDG, PBDG after the inclusion of CE3TA, CMTB, 
FUliiDS, CliNTG, COMPLXf EDADM. (Repeat three times - once for each 
independent block after the other three). 
(4) Regress MOTIV on BUDG, PBDG after the inclusion of CMTA, CEHTB, 
FUNDS, CLNTG, COMPLX, EDADM. (Repeat three times - once for each 
independent block after the other three). 
(5) Regress CôOPA on BUDG, PBDG after the inclusion of CMTA, CESSTB, 
FUNDS, CLNTG, EDADM. (Repeat five times - once for each independent 
block after the other five). 
(6) Regress COUPLA on BUDG, PBDG after inclusion of CESITA, CENTB, FUNDS, 
CLNTG, COMPLX, EDADM, OBLGS, MOTIV. (Repeat five times - once for 
each independent block after the other five). 
(7) Hegresa GOÎîPIiB on BUDG, PBDG after inclusion of GESTA^  FOBDS^  
CMTG; COMPLX, EDADM, OBI^ S, MOTIV. (Repeat five times - once for 
each independent block after the other five). 
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The relevant data for the multiple-partial correlation analysis are 
7 presented in Table 5*9 through $*1). The data from a series of reduced-
form equations are presented for each indicator of each dependent variable. 
The square of the multiple-partial correlation coefficient is also 
2 
recorded for each reduced form equation. The multiple-partial B will 
tell us what percent of the remaining variance in the respective indica­
tor of the dependent variable is explained by the block of indicators for 
the latent independent variables that are entered in step two of the 
equation, after indicators of all other latent independent variables have 
explained as much variance as possible. 
The data from the analysis of the latent dependent variable, capac­
ity to coordinate (CAPCRD), are presented in Table 5.9. 
As noted in the previous section which dealt with the regression 
analysis of effects of independent variable indicators, taken together, 
on the dependent variables, the P-test (at the .01 level of significance) 
indicates that capacity to coordinate (measured by COMPIX) is a function 
of ths hypothesized independent variables. uCnever, here we emphasize 
that 62 percent of the variance (R^  ^• 62) in complexity is ©splaiasd by 
the blocks of indicators| resources possessed (HSSCES) constraint over 
resources (COHSTR) and availability of alternative resources (AVAIL), 
collectively. 
7 Data from the analysis of regression of each indicator of a single la­
tent dependent variable are presented in a single table. 
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Table 5.9 
Dependent 
Variables 
for 
CAPCRD 
Results of the multiple-partial correlation analysis 
of latent causes of capacity to coordinate as ability 
to exercise power. 
Independent 
Variables® 
Square of 
Coefficient^  
COMPLX 
EDADM 
RESCRS 
BDDG 
PBUDG 
COHSTR 
CENTA 
0E5TB 
AVAIL 
FDISSS 
CMT(^  
RESCRS 
BUDG 
PBDG 
COHSTR 
CMTA 
CESxB 
AVAIL 
FDKDS 
CLNTG 
.44 
.05 
.12 
.01 
.10 
.17 
25.14*** .52 .62 
0.99 .61 
4.36** .57 
P-value (full 
model) a 8.862 ® 
0.32 .25 .26 
5.56** .18 
6.55*** .11 
P-valueXfull model) 
m 1.917 
B^lock of independent indicators entered in step 2. 
Square of multiple-partial correlation coefficient for block of 
indicatora entered step 2. 
Square of multiple correlation coefficient entered step 1. 
Square of multiple correlation coefficient for the full model. 
®A P-value (6,52 d.f.) of 3.42 is significant at the .01 level. 
A^ P-value (6,52 d.f.) of 1.82 is significant at the .10 level. 
**A P-value (2,56 d.f.) of 5.26 is significant at the .05 level. 
***A p-value (2,56 d.f.) of 5.25 is significant at the .01 level. 
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To evaluate the paths in the theoretical causal model ve focus on 
the proportion of variance explained in the dependent variable by each 
block of indicators of the latent independent variables, after all other 
blocks of indicators have been entered in the equation. Both the re­
sources possessed (RESCHS) block and the constraint over resource flows 
(CONSTR) block each explain significant variance remaining in complexity, 
after the other two blocks have explained all they can. The multiple-
partial correlation coefficient square for resources possessed is .44 
and is significant at the .01 level. The multiple-partial correlation 
coefficient square for availability of alternative resources is .12, 
significant at the .05 level. 
The P-test (at the .10 level of significance) indicates that capac­
ity to coordinate (measured by EDADM) is a function of resources pos­
sessed (RESCRS), constraint over resource flows (OONSTR) and availability 
2 
of alternative resources (AVAIL), collectively (B = .26), 
The constraint over resource flows (CONSTR) block and the avail­
ability of alternative resources (AVAIL) block each explain a signifi­
cant proportion of the variance remaining in education of the adminis-» 
trator, after the other two blocks of indicators have been allowed to 
explain all of the variance they can. The multiple-partial correlation 
coefficient square for constraint over resource flows is .10 and is 
significant at the .10 level. The multiple-partial correlation coeffi= 
cient square for availability of alternatives is .1? and is significant 
at the ,05 level. 
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Table 5.10 Results of the multiple-partial correlation analysis 
of latent causes of obligations incurred as ability 
to exercise power. 
Dependent 
Variables 
Independent 
Variables®' 
Square of 
Multiple-Partial 
Correlation 
Coefficient^  
P-value 
OBLIGATS RESCRS 
BDDG 
PBDG 
.01 0.50 .05 .04 
CONSTR .01 0.50 .05 
CENTA 
CENTB 
AVAIL .01 0.50 .05 
PONDS 
cmTG 
CAPCRD .02 0.61 .02 
COMPLX 
EDAm 
P-value (full model) = 0.1556 
.^Block of independent indicators entered in step 2. 
Square of multiple-partial correlation coefficient for block of in­
dicators entered step 2. 
S^quare of multiple correlation coefficient entered step 1. 
Square of multiple correlation coefficient for the full model. 
It is concluded on the basis of these findings that the causal link 
between resources possessed and capacity to coordinate subunits is moderate­
ly supported and that the causal relation between constraint over resource 
flows and capacity to coordinate is tentatively supported. Availability of 
alternative resources receives strong support as a latent variable cause of 
an organization's ability to coordinate its subunits as power exercise. 
The data from the analysis of the latent dependent variable -
obligations incurred (OBLIGATS) are presented in Table $.10. 
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On the basis of these findings the latent variables (resources pos­
sessed, constraint over resource flows, availability of alternatives and 
capacity to coordinate subunits) receive no support as causes of the ob­
ligations incurred by organizations. The P-test for the proportion vari-
ance explained (R = .04) in the dependent variable by the blocks of in­
dependent variables collectively does not reach any of the conventional 
levels of significance for empirically evaluating a model in a model 
building framework (i.e., .25» «10, .05, or .01). Likewise, none of the 
single blocks of independent variables indicators explain a significant 
proportion of the variance remaining in obligations, after the other three 
blocks have been allowed to explain all they can. Thus the paths linking 
R^ SCRS, CONSTR, AVAIL, and CAPCRD with OBLIGATS in the causal model are 
questionable according to these data. However in view of the problems 
observed earlier with the quality of the Indicator of obligatione (OBLGS) 
and the strong theoretical support for the role of obligations in the 
ability of organizations to exercise power, it seems reasonable to not 
totally reject the potential assumed in the theoretical causal linkages. 
The data from the analysis of the latent dependent variable, mo­
tivational investment (MOflVAfS) are presented in table 5*11« 
The hypothesized blocks of independent variables do not jointly 
explain a significant proportion of the variance in motivational in­
vestment, at conventional levels of statistical significance (i.e., 
F-value = .25, .10, .05 and .01). However, nearly one-fourth of the 
variance (R^  = .24) is explained by the blocks (BSSCES, COKSTE, AVAIL, 
and CAPCBD), collectively. This is a substantial amount of the total 
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Table 5,11 Results of the multiple-partial correlation analysis 
of latent causes of motivational investment as ability 
to exercise power. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variables®' 
Square of 
Multiple-Partial 
Correlation, 
Coefficient 
P-Value R R 
MOTIVATS 
MOTIV 
RESCRS 
BUBG 
PBDG 
CONSTR 
CESTi 
C®fB 
AVAIL 
FONDS 
GLHTG 
CAPCED 
COMPLK 
EDAM 
.11 3.71** .15 .24 
.01 0.30 .25 
.15 5.29*** .11 
.11 5.71** .15 
F=value (full model) l.loiâ 
&Block of independent indicators entered in step 2. 
S^quare of multiple-partial correlation coefficient for block of 
iiîdixïators entered step 2. 
S^quare of multiple correlation coefficient entered step 1, 
*3-Square of multiple correlation coefficient for the full model. 
**An F-value (2,34 d.f.l of 5=26 is significant at the .05 level. 
***An F-value (2,34 d.f.) of 5.25 is significant at the .01 level. 
variance in the dependent variable indicator collectively accounted for 
by the independent latent variables. Because the sample size is small 
and there is theoretical rationale for the causal linkages, we believe the 
hypothesized relationships should be given further consideration. 
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The multiple-partial correlation coefficient square for three of 
the independent variable blocks are significant at the .05 level or 
beyond. AVAIL explains 15 percent pf the variance remaining in the 
motivational investment indicator (MOTIY), after BKCRS, CORSTR and 
CAPCKD have explained all they can. The multiple-partial correlation 
coefficient square (.15) is significant at the .01 level. RESCRS and 
CAPCBD Also each explain a significant proportion of the remaining vari­
ance in MOTIV after the variance explained by the other three blocks 
has been removed. The multiple-partial correlation coefficient squares 
for RESCRS and CAPCRD are both .11 and significant at the .05 level. 
On the basis of these findings it is concluded that the hypothe­
sized causal paths linking the latent independent variables with moti­
vational investment are moderately supported. 
The data from the analysis of the latent dependent variable, 
cooperative strategies (COOPER), are presented in Table 5*12. The P-test 
(at the .05 level of significance) indicates that the hypothesized 
blocks of independent variables collectively explain a significant pro-
portion (R = .49) of the variance in selection of a cooperative strategy. 
Four of the hypothesized causal paths linking latent independent variables 
with cooperation are supported at least to some degree. The multiple-
partial correlation square for the block, RESCRS, is .27 and the coef­
ficient for the block, CAPCRD is .59* These coefficients are both sta­
tistically significant at the .01 level indicating that a significant 
proportion, 27 percent and 39 percent respectively, of the remaining 
variance in cooperation is explained by each block, after the other five 
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Table 5.12 Résulta of the multiple-partial correlation analysis 
of latent causes of cooperative strategies as mani­
festations of power relations. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variables* 
Square of 
Multiple-Partial 
Correlation, 
Coefficient 
P-value 
COOPER RESCRS .27 10.56*** .50 .49 
COOPB BDDG 
PBDG 
CONSTR b
 
V
O
 
2.77** .44 
CENTA 
CESSTB 
AVAIL .06 1.78* .46 
POBDS 
CLHTG 
CAPCRD .59 17.90*** .16 
COMPLX 
EDADM 
OBLIGATS .00 0.00 .49 
OBLGS 
MOTIVATS .02 0.57 .47 
MOTIV 
P-value (full model) =» 2.666^  
B^lock of independent indicators entered in step 2. 
Square of multiple-partial correlation coefficient for block of 
i^ndicators entered step 2. 
S^quare of multiple correlation coefficient entered step 1. 
Square of multiple correlation coefficient for the full model. 
®An P-value (10,28 d.f.) of 2.19 is significant at the .05 level. 
*ft.n F-r<ilue (2,?0 d.f.^  of 1.45 ig signifioant Rt thp .25 level. 
**An P-value (2,50 d.f.) of 2.49 ie significant at the .10 level. 
***An P-value (2,36 d.f.) of 5.25 is significant at the .01 level. 
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have explained all the variance they can. The multiple-partial correla­
tion coefficients for blocks, CONSTR and AVAIL are .09 and .06, respective­
ly. Both coefficients are statistically significant at .10 •and .25 levels, 
indicating that the proportion of remaining variance in cooperation ex­
plained by each of these two blocks is less convincing as support for the 
respective hypothesized causal paths. The hypothesized relations linking 
OBLIGATS and MOTIVATS causally with cooperation (COOPA) received no sup­
port from the data. 
On the basis of these findings it is concluded that the hypothe­
sized linkages of the latent variables; resources possessed and capacity 
to coordinate, as causes of selection of a cooperative strategy are 
strongly supported. Overall, it is concluded that the hypothesized la­
tent causes of cooperation in the theoretical model are moderately sup­
ported. Because of the important role of obligations and motivational in­
vestment in the power process, it is suggested that these latent vari­
ables be given further consideration with efforts to identify more ade­
quate indicators of each of the latent concepts. 
The data from the analysis of the latent dependent variable, con­
flict strategies (COBPLICT), are presented in Tables 5»15 and 5.I4. 
ahe hypothesized blocks of independent variables, collectively, do 
aot explain eigilîlcânt variance in the dependent variable conflict, fflsa= 
sured as COHPLA. However, I5 percent of variance in GONFLA is explained 
by the independent variable blocks, taken together. îRiis is a fairly 
sizeable proportion of variance accounted for and in view of the small 
sample size (N = 59) should not be totally disregarded. 
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Table 5.1) 
Dependent 
Variables 
Results of the multiple-partial correlation analysis 
of latent causes of conflict strategies as manifes­
tations of power relations; measured as GONFLA. 
Independent 
Tariables^  
Square of 
Mult iple-Part ial 
Correlation 
Coefficient^  
P-value R 
CONFLICT 
COUPLA 
RESCRS 
BDDG 
PBBG 
CONSTR 
CENTA 
CENTB 
AVAIL 
FUNDS 
CLNTG 
CAPCBD 
COMPLX 
EDADM 
03LIGATS 
OBLGS 
MOTIVATS 
.01 
.05 
.05 
.05 
.00 
.05 
0.28 
0.86 
0.86 
0.00 
.14 .15 
.12 
1.47* .11 
.12 
.15 
1.47** .11 
F-valus (full model) = 0.4954 
B^look of independent indicators entered in step 2. 
Square of multiple-partial correlation coefficient for block of 
g indicators entered step 2. 
S^quare of multiple correlation coefficient entered in step 1. 
Square of multiple correlation coefficient for the full model. 
*An F-value ll,50 d.f.Ï of I.58 is significant at the ,25 level. 
**An P-value (2,50 d.f.) of 1.45 is significant at the .25 level. 
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Table 5.14 Results of the multiple-partial correlation analysis 
of latent causes of conflict strategies as manifesta­
tions of power relations; measured as CONFLB. 
Square of 
Dependent Independent Multiple-Partial „ , _2 
Variable Variables» Correlation^ ® 
Coefficient 
GOÎÎPLICT 
CHPLB 
RESGRS 
BÏÏDG 
PBDG 
CONSTR 
CENTA 
CENTS 
AVAIL 
FUNDS 
CLNTG 
CAPCRD 
CMHLX 
EDÂDM 
OBLIGATS 
OBLGS 
MOTIVATS 
MOTIV 
,02 
05 
26 
07 
.02 
15 
0.57 
1.47* 
.36 
.55 
.15 
2.11* 
0.57 
'51 
.55 
4.94*** .25 
F-value (full model) = I.5414® 
^lock of independent indicators entered in step 2. 
Square of multiple-partial correlation coefficient for block of 
indicators entered step 2. 
^Square of multiple correlation coefficient entered step 1. 
Square of multiple correlation coefficient for the full model. 
®An F-value flO,28 d.f.) of I.56 is. significant at the .25 level. 
"tiXi F-value v2,30 d,f.ï of 1.45 is si^aificaat at the .25 level. 
**An F-value (1,56 d.f.) of 4'11 is significant at the .05 level. 
***An F-value (2,56 d.f.) of 5.25 is significant at the .01 level. 
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Only two blocks of independent variables (AVAIL and MOTIVATS) each 
explain a significant proportion of the remaining variance in CONPLA, after 
the other five blocks have explained all they can. The multiple-partial 
cpefficients squared are .05 for both blocks and are significant at the 
,25 level. 
On the basis of these findings it is concluded that the hypothe­
sized causal relations of the latent independent variables and conflict, 
measured as COHPLA, are not supported, but should be further explored in 
a model building context with additional and/or revised indicators. 
IThe P-test (at the .25 level of significance indicates that the hy­
pothesized independent variables explain a significant proportion of the 
variance (R = .36) in C0NFL3, collectively. 
Four of the six hypothesized blocks of independent variables each 
explain a significant proportion of the variance remaining in COHPLB, after 
the variance explained by the other five blocks has been considered. The 
multiple-partial correlation coefficient square (.26) for AVAIL is statis­
tically significant ât the .01 level. the coefficient for MdTIVATS 
(.15) is statistically significant at the .05 level. These findings indi­
cate that the causal paths hypothesized between availability of altenoa-
tives and conflict and between motivational investment and conflict are 
supported. 
The multiple-partial correlation coefficients squared for CONSTR and 
CAPCHD (.05 and .07, respectively) suggest that constraint over resource 
flows and capacity to coordinate subunits may contribute a significant 
proportion of the remaining variance in conflict, after the other latent 
independent variables have explained all they can» On the basis of these 
205 
findings it is concluded that the hypothesized latent variable causes of 
conflict measured as COMPLB are moderately supported. 
In summary, the empirical findings lend some support to the hypothe­
sized theoretical causal model. The findings, even when limitations of 
the methods and data are considered, provide a number of useful insights 
for building a theory of the process of interorganizational power. In 
Chapter VI, the conclusions and implications that emerge from the process 
of constructing a theory of power are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 71. IMPLICATIOHS AND StJMMAET 
There are two main objectives of this final chapter. The first is 
to discuss the implications that are drawn from an evaluation of the 
theory of organizational power relations. These implications will be 
discussed under the following headings: (l) implications for theory, 
(2) implications for method, (5) implications for policy, and (4) impli­
cations for future research. 
The second main objective is to briefly summarize the dissertation 
in terms of the objectives stated in Chapter I, 
Implications for Organizational Theory 
The problem addressed in this dissertation is the development of a 
formal theory of the process of organizational power in the context of 
relations within a network of organizations. In Chapter II organizational 
power was conceptualized as a process inherent in the relations of organic 
zational actors. The theoretical framework viewed formal organizations 
as semifopen systems. This view recognized that organizations are ra­
tional and goal-seekingj but that organisations are also infiaenced by 
environmental elements, particularly other organizations. The concep­
tualization stresses that organizations are not moved about helplessly by 
environmental contingencies. Bather organizations seek to increase or 
balance power relative to other organizations in order to reduce the 
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uncertainties of environmental contingencies. Thus, the interaction strat­
egies (cooperation, conflict, circumvention, and withdrawal) that organ­
izations select to deal with other organizations in their environment are 
considered key variables to be explained in the model of the process of 
organizational power relations. The empirical analysis of the model pro­
duced findings which have some important implications for organizational 
theory.^ 
The findings regarding the model of power indicate that there is 
utility in viewing the selection of cooperative and conflicting interac­
tion strategies as outcomes in a process of organizational power relations. 
Variables explicated in the process of power relations that were posited 
as causes of the selection of cooperative and conflicting strategies were 
found to be important predictors of the selection of each strategy. Forty-
nine percent of the variance in selection of a cooperative strategy was 
explained ty the variables, collectively. The variables found to have a 
significant direct effect on the selection of a cooperative strategy were 
comparative complexity, actual budget, perceived budget Hcarcity arid cen-
trality of information exchanged. Substantively, this means that the re­
lative selection of a cooperative strategy, defined as joint programs, was 
found to be dependent upon an organization having more positions, less 
The conceptual model includes the four interaction strategies as 
key variables to be explained which intervene in the process of power res 
lations that are ultimately manifested in organizational effectiveness 
and prestige. However, the focus of the theory building and evaluation 
activities of the dissertation was an explanation of two of the interac­
tion strategies - cooperation and conflict. 
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budget, more perceived scarcity of budget and greater exchange of infor­
mation compared to other organizations in its set. Although actual bud­
get and perception of little scarcity were hypothesized to be positively 
related to selection of a cooperative strategy» they sr© both found to 
be important predictors of cooperative interaction. 
Fifteen percent of the variance in selection of a conflict strat­
egy» measured as conflicting priorities and responsibilities, was ex-
2 plained by the independent variables in the model of power, collectively. 
None of these variables had a significant direct and independent effect 
on conflicting priorities and responsibilities. Thirty-six percent of 
the variance in selection of a conflict strategy defined as disagreements 
and disputes, was explained by the variables, collectively, QSie variables 
found to have a significant direct effect on the selection of this form of 
a conflict strategy were the comparative number of funding sources and 
motivational investment. Substantively, this means that the relative se­
lection of a conflict strategy, defined as disagreements and disputes, was 
found to be dependent upon an organisation having fs'-'sr alt©mativs sour­
ces of valued resources available to it and greater motivational investment 
in its relations with other organizations compared to these other organic 
zations in its set. 
Findings regarding the analysis of relationships among the latent 
independent variables hypothesized as causes of selection of cooperative 
The proportion of variance in conflicting priorities and responsi­
bilities explained by the independent variables was not statistically sig­
nificant. 
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and conflicting strategies also uphold the view that strategies are out­
comes in the process of interorganizational power relations. The latent 
variables; resources possessed, capacity to coordinate, access to and con­
straint over resource flows and availability of alternative sources of re­
sources each provided a significant proportion of the explanation of vari­
ance remaining in selection of a cooperative strategy, after the effects 
of all other independent variables had been accounted for. The substan­
tive meaning of this finding is that when the unique effects of the inde­
pendent latent causes are compared, possession of resources, capacity to 
coordinate subunits, access to and constraint over resource flows, and 
availability of alternative sources of valued resources, relative to 
other organizations in its set, are each important latent causes of the 
organization's relative choice of a strategy of cooperation. Possession 
of resources and the capacity to coordinate subunits emerge as the most 
important latent causes. 
The comparative latent variables; access to and constraint over re­
source flows, availability of alternative sources of resources and motives 
invested ia relations with other organizations each explained a signifi­
cant proportion of variance remaining in selection of a conflict strategy, 
defined as disagreements and disputes, after all the other independent 
variables had together explained all they could. In substantive terms 
this means that when the various effects of the latent causes are com­
pared, an organization's relative access to and constraint over resources 
in the network, the availability of alternative sources of resource rela­
tive tr - r organizations and its relative motivational investment in 
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relations with other organizations are each important causes of the fre­
quency it will select a strategy of conflict compared to the frequency 
other organizations in its set will select a conflict strategy. On the 
basis of these findings availability of alternative sources and motiva­
tional investment are the most important latent causes of the selection 
of a conflict strategy. 
The findings associated with the analysis of relationships among 
variables explicated from the dimensions of the power process; power 
bases and power exercise; also indicate that there is potential in the 
view of organizational power relations as a causal process. 
Sixty-two percent of the variance in the capacity to coordinate 
subunits aspect of power exercise, defined as organizational complexity, 
was explained by the variables explicated from power basis, collectively. 
Actual budget and the number of funding sources bad significant direct 
effects on complexity. Substantively, this means that an organization's 
actual budget and number of alternative sources of valued resources» 
relative to others in its network, directly influences its relative capac­
ity to coordinate subunits for power exercise. 
Variables explicated as the basis of power explained twenty-six 
percent of the variance in the capacity to coordinate subunits aspect of 
power exercise, defined as education of the administrator. The number of 
client groups had a significant direct effect on the education of the ad­
ministrator. In substantive terms, this finding indicates that the 
larger the number of client groups that an organization serves relative 
to other organizations in its network, the greater its relative capacity 
to coordinate subunits as power exercise. 
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Only four percent of the variance in the relative number of obliga­
tions accumulated, as an aspect of power exercise» was explained by hypoth-
sized independent variables explicates of power basis and exercise, 
collectively. Substantively, it would appear that power exercise reflect­
ed in obligations accumulated are not caused by these aspects of power baw 
sis and exercise. 
However, 24 percent of the variance in motivational investment, as 
an aspect of power exercise, was explained by hypothesized variables ex­
plicated from the basis and exercise of power concepts. Actual budget, 
perceived budget scarcity, the number of funding sources, the number of 
client groups served and the education of the administrator each had sig­
nificant direct effects on this aspect of power exercise. Substantively, 
this suggests that power exercise reflected in the organization's relative 
motivational investment in its interorganizational relations is a direct 
outcome of its budget, perceived scarcity of budget, the number of sources 
of funding, the number of groups of clients it serves and the number of 
years of education its administrator has compared to other organizations 
in its set. 
%e findings regarding analysis of causal relationships among the 
latent concepts explicated from the dimensions of power basis and exercise 
indicate that the model of the process of power relations has some useful­
ness. Availability of alternatives and resources possessed each contrib­
uted a significant proportion to the explanation of the variance remain­
ing in capacity to coordinate subunits, defined as complexity, after all 
the other independent latent concepts had explained all they could. Access 
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to and constraint over resources and availability of alternatives ex­
plained a significant proportion of the variance remaining in capacity 
to coordinate subunits defined as education of the administration after 
all the other independent latent concepts had explained all they could. 
In substantive terms this means that an organization's capacity to coor­
dinate subunits or to use the energy of "organization" to exercise power 
is the result of separate causal links from the three aspects of the ba­
sis of its power - the resources it possesses« its access to and con­
straint over resources and the availability of alternative sources of re* 
sources relative to other organizations in the environment. 
A significant proportion of the variance remaining in motivational 
investment as power exercise defined as the importance of contacts, was 
contributed by each of the latent concepts; resources possessed, availa­
bility of alternatives and capacity to coordinate subunits; after the ef­
fects of all the other latent variables had been removed. Substantively, 
this suggests that the relative motives an organization invests in rela­
tions with other organizations as capacity for power exercise is deter­
mined by the amount of resources it possesses, the availability of alter­
natives to obtain or dispose of resources and the capacity to coordinate 
its subunits compared to other organizations in its environment, with each 
latent variable producing a separate effect. 
The findings associated with the model of organizational power pro­
vide some encouragement for the conceptual approach that has been taken. 
The approach is consistent with arguments advanced by sociologists who 
reason that power is a highly abstract multidimensional construct that 
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must be explicated so that relationships among concepts comprising the di­
mensions of the power process can be analyzed (Burt, 1977; Olsen, 1978). 
Furthermore, the findings suggest that the view of organizations as goal 
seeking actors that seek to manipulate their power relations in order to 
control environmental uncertainties has potential. Overall, the findings 
lend some support to the notion that relative intra and interorganizational 
characteristics comprising the basis and exercise of power determine the 
strategy that is selected to control environmental contingencies. 
Unquestionably, the moderate to small amount of variance explained 
in the dependent variables indicates that other important variables should 
be added to the model. With the exception of obligations accumulated, 
however, the amount of variance explained in the dependent variables is 
encouraging. And the analysis of causal relationships posited among the 
latent concepts suggest that additional efforts to develop a theory of or­
ganizational power should include attempts to revise and add to the model 
developed here. These findings should provide impetus for the development 
of future theoretical models that concentrate on identifying and specify** 
ing additional dimensions of the power process and for further explicating 
the complex concepts comprising these dimensions in order to add to the 
explanation of manifestations of interorganizational power relations. 
Implications for Methods 
The findings reported in this study have implications for sampling 
of the empirical units of analysis, measurement of theoretical concepts; 
and the use of multiple-partial correlation to analyze causal relation­
ships among blocks of multiple indicators of complex concepts. 
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Secondary data were used for the empirical analysis in this study. 
The empirical units of analysis were county natural resource agencies lo­
cated in five counties in Northeast Iowa. Thus the sample must be re­
garded as a nonrepresentative, purposive one or as a total population of 
natural resource agencies in the five Northeast Iowa counties. In either 
case inferences cannot be made beyond the organizations studied. 
The size of the sample (N = 39) also placed a constraint on the em­
pirical analysis. Ei^ t variables were included in the theoretical causal 
model. Even if a probability sample had been available, the sample size 
would have been inadequate in view of the number of variables in the model. 
While we believe the sample has provided useful data for empirical evalu­
ation of the model in an exploratory and theory building framework, it is 
advised that future efforts to build and evaluate theories use a represent­
ative and substantially larger sample of organizations to empirically eval­
uate the fit of the theory to data. This will tend to enhance the stabil­
ity of statistical coefficients and maximize the generalizability of the­
ories that are developed and tested. 
Multiple indicators were used to measure the complex concepts inclu­
ded in the process of organizational power relations. The use of multi­
ple indicators to measure the entire domain of meaning included in high­
ly complex ccncopts zs sdvaiitagsous because tho approach wcilces use of 
several indicators and the separate identity of each indicator is main­
tained throughout the analysis. Use of multiple indicators facilitates 
the assessment of reliability and validity of measures. Measures of the 
same concept are expected to be highly intercorrelated and correlated 
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moderately and in a homogenous fashion with measures of different con­
cepts, However, this assumes that either all dimensions of the same con­
cept are highly intercorrelated or that all of the separate concept di­
mensions of a highly complex concept have been identified with multiple 
indicators specified for each dimension. la this theory building study 
the multiple indicators specified as measures are not necessarily ex­
pected to be highly intercorrelated. This is so because in the early 
phase of building a theory, the probability that the few indicators de­
veloped for each complex concept reflect a single dimension of the concept 
meaning is very slim. For this reason it is advised that future efforts to 
build and test a theory of organizational power include the use of multiple 
indicators to measure complex concepts and these efforts focus initially on 
the further theoretical specification of dimensions of the complex concepts 
with development of an additional number of indicators to adequately mea­
sure each of the dimensions. Once this was accomplished there would be 
potential for the measures to meet assumptions required for the use of 
techniques to make statistical adjustments for measurement and specifica­
tion error in the empirical analysis of the causal theory. 
All measures used in the study were constructed from data charac= 
terizing single organizations. The measures were constructed to reflect 
properties of the relations of single organizations. We believe that this 
approach is worthy of replication with a larger representative sample of 
organizations. However, it is also advised that the causal relationships 
be tested with organizational dyads as the units of analysis. This would 
allow evaluation of the effect of power relations with a particular other 
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organization on the interaction strategies that are selected» 
Multiple-partial correlation analysis was used to evaluate the 
causal linkages among latent (complex) concepts in the theoretical model. 
Blalock (1972) suggests that the multiple-partial correlation coefficient 
has a number of potential benefits which are mostly unrealized because 
social scientists are largely unfamiliar with its use. 
One advantage is that the relative amount of variance remaining in 
a dependent variable that is accounted for by a set of independent vari­
ables, after other independent variables have explained all they can, can 
be determined. This has substantive potential for building and evaluating 
theoretical models that contain complex concepts for which multiple indi­
cators have been developed. Using the multiple-partial approach, indica­
tors of the complex concepts can be grouped together in blocks. Unlike 
the index approach, the indicators operate independently, in blocks, with­
out forming a summary or composite measure. And compared to an indicator 
by indicator approach to assess the fit of a model with data, the number 
of tests required can bs grsatly reduced. Although indicators of depen­
dent variables must be analyzed separately, this allows more than one test 
of each prediction which may reveal differences in the way blocks of in­
dependent variables affect the separate components of the dependent vari­
able (Sullivan, 1974). Ibis can be an insi^ tful advantage for model 
building activities. 
In general, the multiple-partial approach is recommended for use in 
future efforts to develop and evaluate theoretical models containing com­
plex concepts with multiple indicators identified for each concept. The 
approach is useful for evaluating the hypothesized linkages among the 
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latent concepts while retaining the advantages of the multiple indicator 
approach for measurement of the complex multidimensional concepts. 
Implications for Development of Policy 
The implications of the findings of this study for development of 
policy for organizations generally are highly speculative and must await 
replicative research with larger and representative samples of organiza­
tions. Even if only natural resource agencies or very similar organiza­
tions are the object of inference, implications must be tentatively ad­
vanced because of the small sample size, the nonrandom sampling procedure, 
and the modest size of coefficients. However, if used along with other 
information that is available to organizational decision-makers, implica­
tions tentatively drawn, can be used as a basis for discussion and evalu­
ation of policy. Furthermore, if the findings are sustained by future 
research, they contain some important implications for policy that can 
promote the rational use of interorganizational strategies. 
First, organizations that have smaller budgets, greater perception 
of budget scarcity, greater centrality in the network of information ex­
changed and greater complexity relative to other organizations are more 
likely to initiate cooperative strategies with the other organizations in 
their environment. This finding is consistent with a study of health and 
welfare organizations conducted by Aiken and Hage (1968) where they found 
support for the hypothesis that organizations that are more complex are 
also more innovative said thus seek cooperative programs with other or­
ganizations in their environment in order to gain needed resources. 
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Greater relative structural centrality may be the basis of a power ad­
vantage that is needed to encourage an organization to use cooperative 
contacts for access to additional resources or power through obligations* 
Greater relative resources possessed (budget and perceived scarcity) 
promote greater organizational complexity. Thus, this aspect of the 
power base may be essential to development of the capacity to exercise 
power while the structural basis is important for the actual exercise of 
power. This implies that consideration should be given to enhancing the 
structural location of organizations in networks regarding the flows of 
valued resources and to promotion of the use of resources possessed to 
acquire more positions to increase the capacity for coordination if coop­
eration with other organizations is the desired objective. Perhaps re­
sources should be limited beyond those needed to develop the capacity for 
power exercise in order to encourage cooperative organizational interac­
tions. 
Second, organizations that have greater relative availability of 
alternative resources (via funding sources) and less relative motivational 
investment in relations with other organizations are less likely to enter 
into direct conflict with these organizations in their environment. This 
implies that some attention should be devoted to the development of more 
alternative sources of valued resources for organizations asd to decreas­
ing the commitments among organizations regarding their relations, if 
conflict is to be prevented. 
Since the implications of the various aspects of the power process 
and interaction strategies for organizational effectiveness cannot be 
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projected prior to research to evaluate the relationships between each 
aspect of the power process and effectiveness, it seems advisable that 
policy formulators promote research to evaluate all the relationships 
posited in the theoretical model, including the characteristics of power 
relations that determine organizational effectiveness. 
Implications for Future Research 
The theory of the process of organizational power that has been 
presented in this study is a modest attempt to build and evaluate a theo­
retical model that can be refined and expanded with further theoretical 
and empirical analysis. Unquestionably much remains to be done in the 
area of interorganizational power relations. Not only is there much that 
needs to be accomplished regarding more theoretical elaboration of the 
process of power relations, antecedents and consequences of the process 
also need to be conceptualized and relationships with the process tested. 
This study has addressed the problem in terms of explicating the . 
power process and developing causal linkages among the concepts inherent 
in the dimensions of power. The findings suggest the following implica­
tions for future research. 
First, future research should strive to replicate the study with 
data on other types of organizations, both public and private. Second, 
future research should endeavor to evaluate all the relationships posited 
in the theoretical model, including the charaùteristics of power rela­
tions that determine organizational effectiveness and prestige. Research 
should build on a central sociological assumption that power is manifest 
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in effectiveness and status. This approach would construct a theoretical 
model that reflects the assumptions underlying much of the prevailing 
organizational literature and decisional behavior and test that model 
in the empirical or real world arena. Third, future research should con­
sider a longitudinal design to allow a more rigorous evaluation of the 
causal relationships and thus data for more direct inferences about 
cause and effect relations. Fourth, future research should explore the 
use of comparative characteristics that reflect relations within a set 
of organizations rather than a focus on single organizations or re­
search on dyads. Finally, future research should consider use of an ex­
perimental design in order to analyze reciprocal effects between vari­
ables in the model. 
Summary and Evaluation of the Theory 
The problem addressed by this dissertation was to develop a formal 
theory of the process of organizational power. Recognition of the im­
portance of the power ooaeept in theoretical discussion of social organi­
zation in spite of frustrated efforts to develop conceptual and em= 
pirical analyses which promote cumulative research finding was the cen­
tral rationale for selection of this problem. 
The general objective of the study was to enhance the understand­
ing of organizational power by constructing a formal theory of power as 
a process characterizing the relations among formal organizations. To 
accomplish this objective, three dimensions - the basis, exercise and 
manifestations - of the process of organizational power relations were 
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explicated. Complex concepts subsumed by each dimension were identi­
fied and defined in both theoretical and operational terms. Causal re­
lationships among the latent concepts were also specified, theoretically 
and operationally. Specific indicators of the complex concepts were de­
veloped and the theory was evaluated with data drawn from a sample of 
natural resource agencies. 
The specific objectives of the dissertation were: 
(1) to elaborate a conceptual definition of organizational power as a 
multidimensional process of relations among organizational actors, 
(2) to explicate the dimensions of the process of organizational power and 
develop theoretical and operational definitions of the concepts cen­
tral to each dimension, 
(3) to develop propositions linking concepts of the dimensions of the 
power process with clarification of theoretical and operational link­
ages, 
(4) to order the theoretical propositions into an interrelated set by se­
lecting some otatements as premises or assumptions and arranging the 
remainder into a model of causal relationships, 
(5) to identify specific indicators for the concepts contained in the cau­
sal model, 
(6) to empirically evaluate the causal model, and 
(7) to assess the exercise of theory construction and evaluate the formal 
theory in terms of the contributions to the understanding of the proc­
ess of organizational power. 
Each of these objectives were identified to enable the study to con­
tribute to organizational theory by; (l) constructing a formal theory 
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of organizational power relations conceptualized as a per\'a8ive, highly 
abstract and multidimensional process and (2) empirically evaluating the 
theory with data to serve as the basis for further studies to refine and 
build models of organizational power relations. 
The formulations of the objectives was guided by an awareness of: 
(1) the importance of organizational power relations and of the strate­
gies used by organizations to increase and/or balance their relative 
power to organizational practitioners as well as to society generally, 
(2) the status of past theory and research regarding interorganizational 
power, and (5) the underutilization of the process of theory construc­
tion as a means to promote understanding of power relations. These con­
siderations were discussed in Chapter I. 
The conceptualization of organizational power as a process charac­
terizing the relations among organizations was discussed in Chapter II. 
Organizational power was viewed as a highly abstract and multidimensional 
process that included the relative control and conversion of resources into 
actions to achieve desired ends. The dimensions of the power process were 
identified as; (l) the basis of power - control of resources, (2) exer­
cise of power - conversion of resources for action, and (3) the manifes­
tations of power - outcomes of the basis and exercise of power. In 
Chapter II these general dimensions of the power process were further 
explicated to identify the complex concepts that comprise each dimension. 
Theoretical definitions were presented for each of the complex concepts. 
Organizations were conceptualized as semi-open systems which inter­
act with environmental elements (including other organizations) in order 
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to control the certainty of their environments (Thoppson, I967). The 
manipulation of power relations was seen as a way of managing environ­
mental contingencies. Specifically, organizations are seen as select­
ing certain strategies of interaction with other organizations, depend­
ing upon specific causal linkages among concepts subsumed by the basis 
and exercise of power, in order to reduce environmental uncertainty. 
In Chapter III theoretical statements were developed to explain 
the process of organizational power. Assumptions for the formal theory 
were stated and general hypotheses were deduced. Finally, the complex 
concepts suggested as defining characteristics of the process of power 
were organized in a causal model. The focal dependent variables in the 
model were interaction strategies selected by organizations - cooperation, 
conflict, circumvention and withdrawal. 
Operational definitions of the complex concepts explicated from 
the dimensions of the power process and of the units of analysis were 
presented in Chapter IV. The operational definitions were presented in 
a general way to be applied across various types of organizations and 
also were presented for the development of specific measures used in 
this study. It was argued that multiple indicators is the approach that 
is most advantageous for measurement of the abstract, multidimensional 
concepts subsumed by the power process^  Specific indicators yere select^  
ed as measures of the complex concepts from data drawn from natural re­
source agencies in five Northeast Iowa counties. 
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The empirical hypotheses corresponding to the five general hypoth­
eses contained in the causal model of the process of organizational 
power were presented in Chapter IV. An empirical hypothesis was developed 
for each indicator of the complex concepts posited as dependent variables. 
The statistical procedures used to empirically analyze the hypotheses and 
the linkages hypothesized among the latent concepts in the model were dis­
cussed. These procedures were linear regression and multiple-partial 
correlation. 
The findings from the empirical analysis of the hypotheses and 
causal model were reported in Chapter V. Descriptive statistics and 
zero-order correlations were used to examine the quality of each indica­
tor. The results indicated that the indicators of resources possessed 
(BUDG), obligations incurred (DBLQ8), cooperation (COOPA) and conflict 
(COKPLB) lacked some quality and that efforts should be directed at im­
proving these indicators for future empirical analyses. Three of the five 
hypotheses contained in the causal model of power received some empirical 
support using the linear regression approach. Using the multiple-partial 
correlation analysis, a majority of the latent concepts hypothesized as 
determinants of latent concepts posited as results received some support. 
When comparative capacity to coordinate subunits as power exercise 
was considered as a dependent variable, the following results were ob­
tained.^  Sixty-two percent of the variance in comparative capacity to 
T^he reader is again reminded that all concepts in the model are com­
parative characteristics of the relations of organizations. 
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coordinate subunits, measured as complexity, was explained by the six in­
dicators of concepts subsumed by the basis of power. Comparative actual 
budget and number of funding sources were the only variables found to 
have a significant direct effect on comparative complexity. Twenty-six 
percent of the variance in comparative capacity to coordinate subunits, 
measured as education of the administrator, was explained by the six in­
dicators of concepts subsumed by the basis of power. Only the compara­
tive number of client groups served was found to have a sipiificant di­
rect effect on the comparative education of the administrator. 
In the evaluation of causal paths in the theoretical model, the 
resources possessed block and availability of alternatives 
block each explained a significant proportion of variance remaining in 
complexity, after the other two blocks subsumed by the basis of power 
had explained all they could. The constraint over resource flows block 
and the availability of alternatives block each explained a significant 
proportion of variance remaining in education of the administrator, after 
the other two blocks had explained all they could. 
When comparative obligations incurred as power exercise was consid­
ered as a dependent variable the following results were obtained. Only 
four percent of the variance in comparative obligations incurred was ex­
plained by the hypothesized independent variable s, collectively. So 
single independent variable had a significant direct effect on obliga­
tions incurred by organizations. 
Similarly, in the evaluation of causal linkages among the latent 
concepts in the model, no latent concept, hypothesized as a cause of 
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obligations, explained significant variance remaining in obligations, 
after all the other hypothesized blocks had explained all they could. 
When comparative motivational investment as power exercise was the 
dependent variable in the analysis of the model, the following results 
were obtained. Twenty-four percent of the variance in comparative mo­
tivational investment Has explained by the hypothesized independent vari­
ables, collectively. Comparative actual budget, comparative perceived 
budget scarcity, comparative number of funding sources, comparative num­
ber of client groups served and comparative education of the administaa-
tor each had a significant independent effect on comparative motivational 
investment. 
Evaluations of the causal linkages between latent independent vari­
ables and motivational investment revealed that the resources possessed 
block, availability of alternative resources block and capacity to coor­
dinate subunits block each explained a significant proportion of vari­
ance remaining in motivational investment, after all other hypothesized 
causal blocks had explained all they could. 
When comparative selection of a cooperative strategy was the focal 
dependent variable in the model, the following results were obtained. 
Forty-nine percent of variance in comparative selection of a cooperative 
strategy was explained by the hypothesized independent variables, collec­
tively. Comparative actual budget, comparative perceived budget scarcity, 
comparative information exchanged and comparative complexity each had a 
significant direct effect on comparative selection of a cooperative strategy. 
The analysis of causal linkages hypothesized for the latent concepts 
revealed that the resources possessed, constraint over resource flows, 
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availability of alternatives and capacity to coordinate subunits blocks 
each explained significant remaining variance in selection of a coopera­
tive strategy, after all other blocks had explained all they could. 
When comparative selection of a conflict strategy was the focal de­
pendent variable in the model, the following results were obtained. 
Fifteen percent of the variance in comparative selection of a conflict 
strategy, measured as conflicting priorities and responsibilities, was 
explained by the hypothesized independent variables, collectively. None 
of the variables had a significant direct effect on conflict, measured as 
conflicting responsibilities and priorities. Thirty-six percent of the 
variance in comparative selection of a conflict strategy, measured as 
disagreements and disputes, was explained by the hypothesized independent 
variables, collectively. Comparative number of funding sources and com­
parative motivational investment each had a significant independent ef­
fect on conflict, measured as disagreements and disputes. 
The analysis of causal linkages hypothesized for the latent concepts 
revealed that only the availability of alternatives block explained a sig­
nificant proportion of variance remaining in conflict, measured as con­
flicting priorities and responsibilities, after all other hypothesized 
blocks had explained all they could. However, the constraint over resources 
block, availability of alternatives block, capacity to coordinate block 
and motivational investment block each explained a significant proportion 
of the variance remaining in conflict, measured as disagreements and dis­
putes, after all other blocks have explained all they could. 
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The implications of these findings for organizational theory, 
policy development, methods and future research were discussed in the 
first section of this final chapter. 
In conclusion, the objectives set forth for the study have been 
partially met. A formal theory has been prepared which allows its sub­
jection to empirical observation and analysis (testability). Assump­
tions of the theory were explicitly stated. The assumptions stated 
allowed as much explanation as possible with* ., the limitations of the 
generality of the theory and the conceptual unknowns that remain 
(parsimony). The theory was advanced as a middle range formulation 
which intended to address s limited number of issues (scope). Finally, 
the theory offered considerable potential, as demonstrated by the em­
pirical evaluation, for description, explanation and prediction of the 
process of organizational power. 
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